Vol. 30, no. 1: Full Issue by International Law & Policy, Denver Journal
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 30 
Number 1 Winter Article 9 
May 2020 
Vol. 30, no. 1: Full Issue 
Denver Journal International Law & Policy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
30 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y (2001). 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at 
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-
commons@du.edu. 






of International Law and Policy
VOLUME 30 NUMBER 1 WINTER-2001
ARTICLES
NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE MVAQUILADORAS:
LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
OF NAFTA ARTICLE 303 FOR
UNITED STATES-MEXICO TRADE .......... David A. Gantz 1
NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT ....... Gustavo Vega-Canovas 55
IN SEARCH OF AN UNDERSTANDING
WITH THE UNITED STATES .......... Juan Rebolledo Gout 63
MEDIATION FURTHERS THE PRINCIPLES
OF TRANSPARENCY AND COOPERATION
TO SOLVE DISPUTES IN THE NAFTA
FREE TRADE AREA ................ Dr. Luis Miguel Diaz 73
& Nancy A. Oretskin J.D.
FREE TRADE BUT NOT FREE TRANSPORT?
THE MEXICAN STAND-OFF ........ Paul Stephen Dempsey 91

Chancellor Daniel L. Ritchie
Denver Journal
















































































Chancellor Daniel L. Ritchie
As the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy celebrates
its thirtieth anniversary, it is most fitting that we dedicate this issue to
Daniel L. Ritchie, Chancellor, University of Denver. Chancellor Ritchie
has been a strong proponent, an influential and persuasive advocate,
and a clear and forceful voice for internationalization at the University
of Denver. He has been an inspiration to all of us in the University
Community.
After his inauguration as the sixteenth Chancellor of the
University, Dan Ritchie appointed a task force to undertake a thorough
review of international activities at the University. He took the task
force report seriously and began what became truly a transformation of
the University's international programs. In the University's new
strategic plan, Study Abroad and International Human Rights
Advocacy figured prominently. The new Cherrington Global Scholars
initiative, which will provide opportunities for every junior at the
University to be able to study abroad at no additional cost, is a tribute
to his leadership. Similarly, the newly established International
Human Rights Advocacy Center in the Office of Internationalization
owes its existence to his vision. Dan Ritchie's international interests
have frequently taken him abroad where he has taken the time to meet
DU alumni and friends. Last year he was named an Honorary
Professor at Bundelkhand University, Jhansi, India.
Before moving to Colorado, Dan Ritchie had a distinguished career
for eight years with Westinghouse Broadcasting and twenty-two years
in various executive positions with MCA, Inc. He began his
involvement with the University as a Trustee in 1983, and became
Chancellor in 1989. He serves as Chancellor without pay and has given
the University most of his spacious Grand River Ranch, which has
netted more than $50 million for various University projects. "The
ranch has held a very special place in my heart for the last two decades.
I love this land, but I love the University of Denver more," he said in
1998.
Under Chancellor Ritchie's leadership, the University concluded
this year the largest fundraising campaign in its history, topping the
$200 million goal by nearly $74 million. The campus' skyline and
culture are changing with a $350 million construction and renovation
program. A new state-of-the-art Law School building is rising on the
main campus, and should be ready by next June.
Named Citizen of the West in 1998, the Chancellor is very active in
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several business and civic associations, including serving as President
of the Independent Higher Education of Colorado Fund.
The International Legal Studies Program and the Denver Journal
of International Law and Policy are indeed privileged to have Daniel L.
Ritchie as our Chancellor.
NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE
MAQ UILADORAS:
Legal and Policy Implications of NAFTA
Article 303 for United States-Mexico Trade'
DAVID A. GANTZ"
I. INTRODUCTION
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ', which
entered into force on January 1, 1994, has greatly stimulated the
expansion of trade within North America. In particular, the phased
elimination of tariff barriers for trade in goods that "originate" in North
America, along with provisions that facilitate and protect foreign
investment, have encouraged an increase in total regional trade from
about $350 billion in 1993 to $670 billion in 1999, a 91 percent increase
over the six-year period.2  Such increases in intra-regional trade,
although perhaps at a slower rate, are likely to continue during the first
decade of the Twenty-first Century. Foreign investment also continues
to increase, to an estimated $13.2 billion in 2000, up from $11.6 billion
An earlier version of this paper was delivered as the McDougal Lecture at the
University of Denver College of Law in March 2001. The paper is based in significant
part on a study prepared for and financed by the United States Customs Service on the
impact of the 2001 NAFTA changes on customs operations by the National Law Center
under the direction of the author. The project reflects not only the author's work, but the
research assistance of Marcel Dabdub, a law student at the University of Arizona, and the
drafting and editing of Luis Martinez and Mariana Silveira, both of the National Law
Center, as well as the comments and suggestions of an "experts" group of Mexican,
Canadian and American customs lawyers and officials, particularly Carol Osmond, Esq. of
the Ontario Bar, and Isabel Sanchez, Jorge Montanez and Luis Ricardo Rodriguez, all of
the Mexican Bar.
Professor of Law and Director, International Trade Law Program, University of
Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law; Associate Director, National Law Center for
Inter-American Free Trade.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S. - Can. - Mex., 32
I.L.M. 289 (chs. 1-9); 32 I.L.M. 605 (chs. 10-22) [hereinafter NAFTAI.
2. See U.S Census Bureau, U.S. Trade Balance with Canada (2001),
httpJ/www.census.gov/ foreign-trade/balancelcl220.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2002); U.S.
Census Bureau, U.S. Trade Balance with Mexico (2001), http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c2010.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2002); Mexican Secretariat of Economy,
Mexico's Integration to the World Economy: Mexico-Canada Trade, at http://www.nafta-
mexico.org/trade/Mexico s_trade/Mexico_s_Integrationto-the-Wo/
performamexico-s-integration tothe_wo.html (last visited Mar.1, 2002).
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in 1999.3 In 2000, the United States accounted for about $9 billion
worth and Canada, about $500 million;4  NAFTA sources thus
represented about 72 percent of Mexico's total foreign investment.5
However, major changes affecting intra-NAFTA trade have recently
taken place, on January 1, 2001, as mandated by NAFTA's Chapter 36
These changes constitute the most significant modifications of the
NAFTA trading system since 1994, and have major implications for
future trade, particularly exports from Mexico to the United States and
Canada under the Maquiladora (border industries) system7 , and
investment in Mexico designed to produce finished goods for export to
the United States and Canadian markets.
Until 2001, if materials, parts and components imported into one
NAFTA country (e.g., Mexico) from outside North America were made
into finished goods, and the finished products were then exported to the
United States or Canada, Mexico was not required to collect normal
"most favored nation" (MFN) import duties on the non-NAFTA
materials, parts and components.! Yet, on January 1, 2001, as required
by Annex 303.7, Article 303 of NAFTA was implemented, sharply
limiting such duty waiver or remission.9 Mexico is now required to
collect MFN duties (frequently in the 12-18% range or higher) on non-
NAFTA parts and components that are in excess of the import duties
3. See Mexican Secretariat of Economy, Mexico Attracts Record Levels of Investment
(2001), available at
http://www.naftaworks.org/Publications/nletters/NW2001/nw200l.html (last visited Mar.
1, 2002).
4. See Mexican Secretariat of Economy, Mexico Attracts Record Levels of Investment
(2001), available at
http'/www.naftaworks.org/Publications/nletters/NW200inw200l.html (last visited Mar.
1, 2002).
5. See id. Factors contributing to the strong investment performance, in addition to
NAFTA, include a 6.9 percent GDP growth rate and the peaceful transfer of political
power to Vincente Fox in 2000.
6. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at Annex 303.7.
7. There are other export-oriented regimes in Mexican law, such as the Pitex, Altex
and Ecex regimes. All are affected in essentially the same manner as the Maquiladora
program, and are not discussed in detail in this article. The Pitex regime, for example,
permits an existing Mexican manufacturer to set aside a specific production unit, or
create a subsidiary, for exports. See Pitex Decree, Diario Oficial [hereinafter D.O.] May 5,
1990, as amended D.O. May 11, 1995 and D.O. Nov. 11, 1998.
8. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 303. Duty remission was not permitted for imports
of color picture tubes over 14 inches in diagonal measurement. NAFTA, supra note 1, at
art. 303, para. 8; and NAFTA, supra note 1, at Annex 303.8.
9. NAFTA, supra note 1, at Annex 303.7 (Effective Dates for the Application of
Article 303). A government may forego duties on imported materials, parts and
components in several different ways. The optimal situation for the manufacturer is a
complete waiver of the duties, so that they never have to be paid. However, some systems
provide for remission or "drawback" of duties paid, so that it may be several months or
longer before the duty amounts paid at the time of importation are recovered. See
NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 303, para. 5.
VOL. 30:1
2001 LEGAL & POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF NAFTA ART. 303 3
assessed on the finished goods entering the U.S. or Canada. ' However
there are exceptions for those industries covered by Mexico's new
special sector programs (PROSEC) or where products are imported
under the provisions of one of Mexico's many other free trade
agreements. (There are also limited exceptions for goods entered under
bond for transportation or imported and exported under the same
condition, as for testing, cleaning, repacking, etc., for duty-free shops."1)
Also, under Article 304, existing duty waiver programs tied to export
performance are eliminated.'2
In most instances, U.S. or Canadian duties on Mexican (NAFTA)
originating finished goods now or within a very few years will be zero;
as of 1999, tariffs had been eliminated on 80 percent of all tariff items
in intra-regional trade. Consequently, most non-NAFTA parts and
components imported into Mexico became fully dutiable as of January
1, 2001, again except- and this is a very broad except- where special
sector programs provide otherwise. 4 (For U.S. -Canada trade, such
duty remission on non-NAFTA parts and components was limited after
January 1, 1996.)'5
The impact of these changes will be most pronounced on sourcing
patterns for Mexican manufacturers exporting to the United States and
Canada, particularly for the many "maquiladoras"16 that are currently
purchasing some parts and components or raw materials from outside
the NAFTA region. United States and Canadian producers are also
subject to the restrictions, but U.S. industry is much more self-
sufficient than Mexico's, and U.S. most-favored-nation import duties on
most imported parts and components are zero or near-zero.' 7 In Mexico,
in contrast, import duties on parts and components are in the 12-18
10. Materials, parts and components originating in one NAFTA country and exported
to another for production there are not affected. Finished goods exported outside the
NAFTA region will also continue to benefit from duty remission programs. See NAFTA,
supra, note 1 at art. 303; see also NAFTA, supra note 1, at Annex 303.7.
11. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 303, para. 6.
12. Id. at art. 304, paras. 1-2; and id. at Annex 304.1-2.
13. See NAFTA Tariff Elimination Schedule, available at
http://naid.sppsr.ucla.edu/NAFTA96/ TBL3_7.htmnl (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
14. NAFTA, supra note 1, at Annex 302.2. Under the NAFTA tariff schedules, most
duties are eliminated immediately or in phases ending January 1, 1998 (five years), or
January 1, 2003 (ten years). See generally, NAFTA, supra note 1. It is estimated that as
of 1999, 80 percent of items in the tariff schedules traded duty free between Mexico and
the United States. See Country Commercial Guides FY 1999: Mexico, Chapter VI-Trade
Regulations and Standards,
http://www.state.gov/www/about-state/business/com-guides/1999/wha/mexico99_06.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
15. NAFTA supra note 1, at Annex 303.7.
16. A maquilero (or maquiladora) is defined as "one who measures or takes dues for
grinding corn." CASSELL'S SPANISH DICTIONARY 547 (1968). The term as used today no
longer connotes any relationship to grain milling.
17. See generally NAFTA supra note 1.
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percent ad valorem range, and only about 3.2% of the parts and
components used by the maquiladoras are sourced in Mexico."8
The more than 3,700 maquiladoras licensed under Mexican law"
produce finished goods primarily for export or components for use in the
production of exported goods. Of all the industrial sectors, the
maquiladora sector is the most dynamic in the Mexican economy. At
it's peak, the sector employed nearly 1.3 million persons, 28 percent of
Mexican manufacturing employment in 1999, the nation's largest single
source of foreign exchange, recently surpassing petroleum and far
outdistancing tourism.2' Although maquiladoras are concentrated in
electronics, transportation (including autos and auto parts) and textiles,
they involve a variety of manufacturing activities.2' Maquiladoras were
responsible for a total export value of nearly $80 billion in 2000.
Approximately 20 percent represents Mexican value added, while the
remainder consists of imported parts and components. The impact on
the United States is particularly significant, given the fact that about
80% of the maquiladoras are U.S. owned and the United States exports
billions of dollars of parts and components to Mexico for assembly there,
probably over $45 billion worth in 2000, representing directly at least
one million U.S. jobs.23
However, the changes that occurred on January 1, 2001 also impact
upon United States importers (other than those whose products use
only North American materials), and governmental institutions
involved in or regulating intra-NAFTA trade including the United
18. In-Bond IndustrylIndustria Maquiladora 2001 (CNIME/Consejo Nacional de la
Industria Maquiladora de Exportaci6n, AC/Nat'l Maquila Ass'n, Mex., D.F., Mex.), Nov.-
Mar. 2001, at 13.
19. See Maquila Overview, at http:/www.maquilaportal.com/VisitorsSite/nav2l.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2002) (presenting an overview of the history of maquiladoras with
statistics from 1994 to April 2001).
20. See Lucinda Vargas, The Binational Importance of the Maquiladora Industry,
SOUTHWEST ECONOMY, NovJDec. 1999, at 2 [hereinafter Vargas, Binational Importance],
available at http://www.dallasfed.org/htm/pubs/pdfs/swe/swe99_6.pdf (last visited Sept.
24, 2001); Lucinda Vargas, Maquiladoras 2000: Still Growing, EL PASO BUSINESS
FRONTIER, Issue 3 2000, at 2 [hereinafter Vargas, Maquiladoras 2000], available at
http://www.dallasfed.org/htmpubs/pdfs/busfront/300.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2001).
21. These three sectors account for almost 75 percent of total employment and 80
percent of production. See Vargas, Maquiladoras 2000, supra note 20.
22. In-Bond Industry lIndustria Maquiladora 2001, supra note 18, at 17.
23. Exact figures are difficult to estimate, but of the total imports of maquiladoras in
2000 (about $62 billion), it is likely that at least $45 billion are from U.S. sources, given
that total exports of all kinds from China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Singapore, including machinery and equipment, consumer goods and all other products,
are only $18 billion. See In-Bond Industry /Industria Maquiladora 2001, supra note 18,
at 17; Secretariat of Economy, Comercio Total de Mexico (2000). Using U.S. Department
of Commerce estimates that $1 billion worth of exports is responsible for 20,000 jobs, the
parts and components destined for the maquiladoras represent 900,000 jobs.
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States Customs Service (USCS).2 Among the major legal, economic and
policy issues raised by the changes are the following: Are Mexico's new
regimes for manufacturing operations legal under NAFTA and the
World Trade Organization agreements?
If Mexico assesses import duties on non-NAFTA origin raw
materials, parts and components, thereby increasing the manufacturing
costs of the finished product, will a significant number of the producers
move their facilities elsewhere in Latin America, or to Asia, with
adverse employment and investment implications for Mexico (and the
United States)?
Alternatively, if duty-free importation of non-NAFTA parts and
components is permitted to continue under the new special sector
program, will that practice discourage investment in production of parts
and components in Mexico, keeping the Mexican materials content of
maquiladora- produced goods at the current 2-3 percent levels,25 and
foregoing new jobs and technology transfer?
If maquiladora employment declines significantly, or even
increases more slowly, where will Mexican workers ready to enter the
work force find jobs (legally or illegally) except in the United States?
With the many changes taking place in the world economy, will the
value of Mexico's preferential access to the United States and Canadian
markets under NAFTA be reduced to the point where it is no longer a
substantial incentive to new Mexican investment and job creation?
It is easier to ask most of these questions at the present time than
to answer them, in part because the NAFTA mandated changes are so
recent. Assessment is also complicated by the fact that the
implementation of NAFTA continues to take place simultaneously with
other, global trade-liberalization measures. These may reduce the
effect of the tariff advantages Mexico enjoys in the United States and
Canadian markets under NAFTA. For example, the tariff reductions
resulting from the "Uruguay Round" of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations resulted in a reduction of
average tariffs imposed by developed countries by 45 percent, from 5.5
to 3 percent, and by 28 percent for developing countries, from 14.9 to
10.7 percent. While U.S. tariffs remain high in some areas, such as
textiles and apparel, footwear, chemicals, small trucks, color picture
tubes, the reduction or elimination of world-wide tariffs has reduced the
level of tariff preference that can be offered by the United States,
Canada, the European Union, Japan and other developed countries in
24. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§
3301, 3331-3333.
25. In-Bond Industry /Industria Maquiladora 2001, supra note 18.
26. RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATr-WTO SYSTEM,
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAw 84-85 (1998).
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free trade areas.27
Also, preferential access to the United States market for
manufactured goods from developing nations world-wide, and
particularly in the Caribbean Basin, Andean nations and Africa, has
been expanded in recent years. Other trade developments such as the
impending membership of China in the World Trade Organization, 8
and the entry into force on July 1, 2000 of a free trade agreement
between Mexico and the European Union,29 will necessarily affect
investment in and trade with Mexico as well.
Investment and production in Mexico- entirely apart from customs
issues- is significantly affected by the strength of the U.S. economy. A
weakening U.S. economy may cause production cutbacks, worker layoffs
and even plant closing regardless of changes in the NAFTA customs
regime, or in circumstances where the NAFTA changes are the "straw
that breaks the camel's back" in the ongoing corporate analysis of costs
and benefits of doing business in Mexico.
Whether these changes in the longer run will offset the advantages
of producing goods in Mexico for the United States market- convenience
of shipping and travel, a favorable investment regime, political
stability, among others- remains to be seen.
In Part II, this article reviews the operations of the maquiladora
system, historically and under the early NAFTA period, 1994-2000. In
Part III, I analyze the Article 303 changes and their impact on the
maquiladora system, along with the contemporary external factors,
including WTO tariff reductions, China's entry into the WTO, and the
Mexico - European Union Free Trade Agreement, that are most likely to
affect maquiladora-based U.S. trade with and investment in Mexico.
Finally, in Part IV, I present a necessarily preliminary assessment of
the impact of these developments. Throughout, I focus primarily on
Mexican production and investment in Mexico, although I briefly
discuss other aspects of the NAFTA trading relationship.
27. However, NAFTA preferences can be a substantial incentive for many Canadian
and United States producers because Mexican tariff rates still average about 10 percent.
The success of global tariff reduction, as well as NAFTA, also reduces the significance of
other special programs, such as the "9802" duty waiver for the U.S. origin components
used to assemble finished goods abroad for export to the United States.
28. See Emma Jane Kirby, China enters WTO fold (Sept. 17, 2001), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ hi/english/business/newsid_1548000/1548866.stm (last visited Mar.
1, 2002).
29. See EU congratulates Mexico on watershed vote (July 3, 2000) at
http//news.bbc.co.uk/ hi/english/world/americas/newsid_817000/817334.stm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2002).
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II. THE MAQUILADORA SYSTEM AND ITS INTERACTION WITH
NAFTA, 1965-2000
NAFTA for Mexico is a job, investment, technology and export
generating "machine." For the United States, it is a means to improve
global competitiveness by utilizing low-cost labor where necessary in a
convenient location while maintaining a high U.S. content in
manufactured goods. It also is designed to give United States exporters
preferential access to the Mexican market, which remains protected by
relatively high (10-15%) most-favored-nation tariffs on most imports
from outside North America. Thus, despite the terminology, for the
United States, Canada and Mexico, NAFTA is functionally less a free
trade agreement, than a preferential trade agreement, designed to give
preferential access to each other's markets, even if regional trade
replaces imports from outside North America that are lower priced and
better quality." Although "import substitution" as a national policy has
been frowned upon for decades, to some extent NAFTA is a regional
import substitution mechanism, with some of the same potential for
distorting global trade.3 ' However, the traditional concerns relating to
imports substitution policies followed by relatively small economies
probably do not apply to NAFTA. The incorporation of two small
economies, Canada and Mexico, into the huge United States' economy
means that Mexico and Canada now enjoy much greater economies of
scale. A very significant vehicle for achieving Mexico's objectives under
NAFTA has been the maquiladora system.
A The Maquiladora System in Mexico
The idea of using relatively inexpensive Mexican labor to assemble
goods destined for the U.S. and other export markets pre-dates NAFTA
by almost 30 years. 2 The maquiladora program is an evolution of a
cooperative approach between Mexico and the United States. It is
30. It nevertheless appears to qualify as a free trade agreement under Article XXV of
the GATT 1994, in its permitted derogation from global "MFN" treatment. See RAJ
BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, supra note 26, at 163-69 (Lexis Law Pub., 1998).
31. Ironically, the proliferation of regional free trade areas is in part a result of
developing countries' rejection of national import substitution models, where high cost,
inefficient domestic producers are protected by high tariff walls and quotas or other non-
tariff barriers that dominated economic policies of the 1960s and 1970s. The move toward
market liberalization by countries such as Mexico, stimulated the negotiation of regional
trading blocs, such as NAFTA. See JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOcs IN
THE WORLD EcoNoMIc SYSTEM 7-11 (Inst. Int'l Econs. 1997). Of course, free trade
agreements may lead to greater regional economic activity that stimulates global as well
as intra-regional trade, creating as well as diverting trade. Id. at 109-110.
32. See Maria Plumtree, Note & Comment, Maquiladoras and Women Workers: The
Marginalization of Women in Mexico as a Means to Economic Development, 6 SW. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 177, 178 (1999).
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designed to give American companies the nearby low-cost labor they
require to remain competitive in the world market, and to generate
vitally needed jobs for an ever-growing Mexican population. For the
United States, the maquiladora program permits U.S. firms to locate
labor-intensive operations in Mexico, thereby achieving lower labor
costs in a highly competitive global market.33 How did this all come
about?
1. The Significance of Population Pressures
For demographic reasons, perhaps the greatest challenge facing
any Mexican government is job creation. Despite the success of
population control measures initiated in the early 1970's, Mexico has
one of the most rapid population growth rates in the world, and it is not
expected to level off for another generation." Consequently, this means
that every year the government and private industry must create some
1,000,000 new jobs to avoid increasing unemployment and the economic
and social problems that would follow. For a nation that had a
population of 48 million in 197035 and approximately 100 million by
January 2000,36 this is a daunting requirement. (In comparison, for
most of the 1990's, during a period of unprecedented economic growth,
the United States created approximately one and a half million new
jobs per year3 7 with a population almost three times greater than
Mexico and an economy 20 times larger.)
Even in very good economic times and with effective economic
incentives, to create over a million new jobs annually is a serious
challenge. Under the best of circumstances in the past, only about
900,000-1,000,000 jobs have been created annually in Mexico. 38 If this
process does not continue, the new members of the labor force each year
will be added to the rolls of the unemployed, or to the numbers
migrating (both legally and illegally) northward. 9
33. See Vargas, Binational Importance, supra note 20, at 1.
34. "[Tlhe population [of Mexico] has quintupled since 1940, and will continue to
surge at about 1 million people a year for nearly three decades.. .many forecasters predict
that slowing fertility rates will mean that the country's population will virtually stop
growing by 2045." Sam Dillon, Smaller Families to Bring Big Change in Mexico, N. Y.
TIMES, June 8, 1999, available at
http://www.uwmc.uwc.edu/geography/demotrans/mexpop.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2001).
35. See id.
36. See County Navigator-Population Facts, available at http://www.os-
connect.com/pop/ p2.asp?sort= 1970 (last visited Mar. 2, 2002).
37. See COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, America's Competitive Resurgence: What
Drove U.S. Prosperity, in U.S. COMPETITIVENESS 2001: STRENGTHS, VULNERABILITIES AND
LONG-TERM PRIORITIES 11, at http://www.compete.org/pdf/Section-l.pdf (last visited Mar.
3, 2002).
38. See Dillon, supra note 34.
39. Id.
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All Mexican presidents since Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-1970) have
focused on job creation, with more or less success.40 It is almost
inevitable that this continuing need to create employment will
dominate the economic policies of future Mexican governments.
2. From the Bracero Program to the Maquiladoras
Between 1942 and 1964, some of the pressure created by Mexico's
growing population was absorbed by the "Bracero" program, under
which Mexican farm laborers were permitted to work regularly in the
United States, primarily in Texas and California. 4' The program was
initiated to address a shortage of U.S. citizen agricultural workers
during the labor crisis created in the United States by World War I1.2
While the Bracero program was broadly criticized at its peak as being
exploitative of Mexican labor4" and a mechanism to avoid unionization,
higher wages and better working conditions for American agricultural
laborers, it met the principal goal of providing work to thousands of
Mexican citizens and offsetting labor shortages in the U.S. during the
1940's.
By the early 1960's, however, the Bracero program was becoming
politically unacceptable in the United States." It was under attack
because of the perceived exploitation of Mexican workers laboring in
poor working conditions, as well as concerns that immigrants were
taking low wage jobs away from U.S. citizens in the border states
(Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas).45  Cdsar Chavez and
other organizers were being heard in Washington as well as in the
Central Valley of California. In 1963, President Kennedy decided to
terminate the program, which ended during the Johnson
administration in December 1964.46 However, President Johnson, like
40. See Gerhard Rempel, Post-War Mexico, available at
http://mars.wnec.edu/-grempel/coursest world/lectures/postwarmexico.html (last visited
Mar. 3, 2002).
41. Howard R. Rosenberg, Snapshots in a Farm Labor Tradition, 3 LAB. MGMT. DEC.
1 (1993), available at
http://are.berkeley.edu/APMP/pubs/lmd/htmYwinterspring-93/snapshots.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2002).
42. Gordon H. Hanson & Antonio Spilimbergo, Mexican Migration and U.S. Policy
Options, in Immigration in U.S.-Mexican Relations: A Report of the U.S.-Mexican
Relations Forum (Jan. 1998), at httpJ/www. iadialog.org.immigrat.html (last visited Sept.
19, 2001).
43. Kitty Calavita, US. Immigration Policy: Contradictions and Projections for the
Future, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 143, 146 (1994).
44. See id.
45. KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND
THE I.N.S. 141 (Routledge, 1992).
46. RICHARD B. CRAIG, THE BRACERO PROGRAM: INTEREST GROUPS AND FOREIGN
POLICY 197 (U. of Tex. Press, 1971).
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his Mexican counterpart President Diaz Ordaz, was well aware that the
Bracero program had provided an important safety valve for Mexican
population growth.47 They realized that elimination of the program
without providing an alternative source of work for the affected
Mexican citizens would most likely lead to an increase in Mexican
illegal immigration to the United States.48
As a result, the Mexican and United States governments, with
input from the private sector from both countries, created a new
mechanism to meet the needs of both countries: the maquiladora
system. The creation of the maquiladora program required the close
political and technical cooperation and coordination of both nations.49
3. Basic Concepts of the Maquiladora System
For this new program to be successful from Mexico's point of view,
it had to meet a number of potentially conflicting objectives. While
Mexico desperately needed to attract new investment that would
generate manufacturing jobs, the Mexican government also did not
want to disturb the politically powerful industrial oligarchy that
benefitted from the protection that high tariffs and a variety of non-
tariffs barriers provided against foreign competition. Mexico's
industrial base in 1964 was characterized by high-cost, mediocre quality
production that survived only because Mexican consumers had no other
choices. (Competition within the Mexican economic system began
approximately 20 years later, during the de la Madrid administration in
1985). 50 Throughout this time, the Mexican government was not
inclined to abrogate Mexico's highly exclusionary foreign investment
restrictions, even when President de la Madrid began to liberalize trade
in the 1980's. A good example of this is the 1973 Mexican Foreign
Investment Law, which was not modified even informally until 1989."1
This law effectively required federal government approval of every
foreign investment based on a highly subjective list of factors, required
the use of a portion of Mexican materials and components, and in most
instances limited foreign ownership to a minority 49 percent share.
The solution for Mexico was to institute a job-creating
47. See Calavita, supra note 43, at 167.
48. Id.
49. DONALD W. BAERRENSEN, THE BORDER INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM OF MEXICO
3 (1971).
50. See Kurt Kroese, Integration of the Maquiladora Program and NAFTA: A
Proposal to Protect Mexico's Economy in TOWARD SEAMLESS BORDERS: MAKING FREE
TRADE WORK IN THE AMERICAS 168, 186 (Boris Kozolchyk, ed., 1993).
51. See Chiang-feng Lin, Investment in Mexico: A Springboard Toward the NAFTA
Market -An Asian Perspective, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 73, 96 (1996).
52. See Law on the Promotion of Mexican Investment and the Regulation of Foreign
Investment, Art. 5, May 8, 1993, 12 I.L.M. 643, 644 (1973).
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industrialization program that would focus on production only for
export, located in isolated border regions, generate new jobs and attract
new technology to Mexico. This original concept was particularly
attractive because many of the former Bracero workers had remained in
the northern border regions, rather than returning to the interior of
Mexico.n The maquiladora program over time has created many
incentives, including the possibility of 100 percent foreign ownership
and freedom from many government restrictions then applicable to
other foreign investors.4 Most significantly, firms that qualified for the
program would be permitted to import machinery and equipment duty
free on a "temporary" basis for the life of the plant.5  They could also
avoid payment of the steep Mexican import tariffs on raw materials,
parts and components if these inputs were utilized to produce goods for
export. Exemption was granted from the value-added tax and
56effectively, until 1994, from corporate income taxes. This meant that
such firms (the vast majority of which were American-owned) could set
up a factory in the border area and import all or most of their
equipment, avoiding most normal taxes as long as they produced for
export. The only major limitation was on sales in the domestic market.
Initially, such sales were prohibited. However, in 1989 maquiladoras
were permitted to sell in the Mexican market up to 50 percent of the
prior year's export sales.5" Then and now, Mexican import duties are
normally payable on parts and components used in the manufacturing
of finished goods for the Mexican domestic market, and such
transactions are subject to the value-added tax (WA).58
4. U.S. Cooperation: Item 807.00, TSUS, and Other Benefits
U.S. government programs which were seen as encouraging U.S.
firms to move their manufacturing operations (and accompanying jobs)
offshore could not reasonably be expected to be any more popular than
the Bracero program. Fortunately for the maquiladora program in
Mexico, U.S. customs laws already contained a mechanism that served
the maquiladora concept well when combined with the other
advantages of Mexican production for U.S. firms.
53. See Ignacio Ibarra, Maquiladora Impact, Ariz. Daily Star, Sep. 16, 1991, at 1B
(detailing the growth of Nogales, Sonora, from a population of approximately 50,000 to
over 250,000 between 1970 and 1990).
54. See JAY M. JESSUP AND MAGGIE L. JESSUP, DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO 84-86
(1992).
55. Decreto para el Fomento y Operacidn de la Industria Maquilado, Art. 20, D.O.,
Dec. 22, 1989 [hereinafter the "1989 Decree"].
56. See Mauricio Monroy, Harmonizing the Mexican Tax System with the Goals of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV.739, 753 (1998).
57. 1989 Decree, supra note 55.
58. Id. at 4, art. 23.
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Although the concept was politically unpopular with some, many
U.S. producers realized by the early 1960's that they could not compete
in world markets against products that were highly price-competitive
when using relatively high-cost U.S. labor in labor-intensive industrial
production. The search for lower labor costs in such industries as
footwear and textiles was not new. In the immediate post-World War II
period, most of the U.S. textile industry moved from New England to
the South to pursue find lower wages and escape organized labor.5 9 It
was obvious to many U.S. economic policy-makers that if movement
toward lower-cost labor markets for assembly were inevitable, a system
which would help to assure that such offshore production would contain
a high U.S. content was far preferable to the alternatives. Also, a low-
cost labor manufacturing base adjacent to U.S. territory would provide
other economic advantages, such as use of the new Interstate highway
system (to deliver parts and components and return finished products)
and U.S. communications, enhanced control over exported technology,
and convenience for U.S. management.
The TSUS 807.00/HTS 9802 programs dating from 193060, although
never limited exclusively to Mexico, met many of these economic policy
objectives. Where U.S. components exported in condition ready for
export are re-imported as finished products into the United States, U.S.
duties are payable only on the value added abroad."' These benefits are
available only where the U.S. components have not lost their physical
identity and their value has not been enhanced abroad except by
assembly and operations incidental to the assembly process. Similar
treatment applies to textile and apparel goods where all fabric
components are wholly cut and formed in the United States. 2
Before the advent of the "Generalized System of Preferences" in
1974, United States import duties on finished goods imported from
Mexico and other developing countries were, in some instances,
substantial. The prospect of avoiding duties on the U.S. component
portion of a foreign product was thus a powerful economic incentive.
Item 807 also encouraged U.S.-owned factories in Mexico to use U.S.
origin parts and components, and over the years probably discouraged
many firms from moving their production to Asia, where use of
American made components would have been much less attractive
because of transport costs.6 The limitation of item 807 treatment to
59. Paul Krugman, Some Chaotic Thoughts on Regional Dynamics, at
http://web.mit.edu/ krugman/www/temin.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
60. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1994) (the Tariff Schedules of the United
States (TSUS) were replaced by the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United States
(HTSUS or HTS) in 1988).
61. U.S. IN'L TRADE COMMN, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE UNITED
STATES, PUB. No. 3378, at 9802.00.80 (2001).
62. Id. at 9802.00.90.
63. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., IMPORT REQUIREMENTS ON
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goods "assembled" abroad using U.S. components also helped to ensure
that most of the high value-added processes would remain in the United
States, and that only the final assembly operation would move to
Mexico. ' Otherwise, a Mexican operation exporting goods to the United
states would be considered by USCS to be engaging in "manufacturing"
rather than "assembly", and would lose the 807 tariff benefits.65
B. The Essential NAFTA Scheme: Preferential, Duty-Free Trade
The core of NAFTA's incentives for trade in manufactured goods is
comprised of four elements: (1) elimination of tariffs for "originating"
goods that are traded within the region; (2) rules of origin that, in most
instances require a high North American content (through the source of
materials or a significant manufacturing process) in order for goods to
qualify as NAFTA originating for preferential tariff treatment;6 (3)
elimination, after January 1, 2001, of duty remission on non-NAFTA
originating materials, parts and components, encouraging the use of
North American inputs;6' and (4) for textiles and apparel, automobiles,
agricultural products and others, reduction or elimination of
quantitative restrictions. 68
An important non-trade element, extensive protection for foreign
investors under NAFTA's Chapter 11, including the elimination of most
restrictions on foreign ownership of Mexican companies and of the
requirement for government approval of investment in most sectors, 9 is
discussed in part C, below.
None of these trade benefits are guaranteed exclusively for NAFTA
members, except those relating to investment. For example, Canada
provides similar benefits for trade with Chile,7" and the United States,
for trade with Israel.7 Mexico has separate free trade agreements with
Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Nicaragua and
Israel, among others. Mexico concluded an agreement with the
ARTICLES ASSEMBLED ABROAD FROM U.S. COMPONENTS (ITEM 807.00), CUSTOM
INFORMATION SERIES C:79-1, at 22 (1978).
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 1.
66. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at arts. 302, 401.
67. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at arts. 401, 402.
68. Id. at ch. 3.
69. See id. at ch. 11.
70. Canada and Chile Reach Free Trade Agreement; Highlights of the Canada-Chile
Free Trade Agreement, Nov. 14, 1996, Pub. No. 209, CAN. DEP't OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
INT'L TRADE, available at http'//www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ (last visited September 29, 2001).
71. See Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade Statutes, 1977 ed. 213 (Committee
on Ways and Means, 105"' Cong., 1' Sess., Jun. 25, 1977).
72. MEXICo'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE, MEXICAN TRADE OFFICE SECOFI-NAFTA
(Ottawa, Canada), at http://www.nafta-
mexico.org/trade/Mexicostrademexico_s_trade.html (Mexico-Chile: effective Jan. 1,
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European Union that entered into force July 1, 2000, 73 which could
potentially be quite significant. An FTA with Guatemala, El Salvador
and Honduras entered into force March 15, 2001.74 A commission is
even being formed to study an FTA between Mexico and Japan,"5
although Japan's closed agricultural market will make negotiating such
an agreement very difficult, despite the current inability of Japanese
industry to compete in the Mexican market with the preferential tariff
treatment afforded to Canada, the United States and now the nations of
the European Union. 6
NAFTA, like every so-called "free" trade agreement, cotemplates
the elimination of customs duties on intra-regional trade. Under
NAFTA, tariffs on U.S. -Mexico trade are fully eliminated no later than
January 1, 2008 (fifteen years after NAFTA's entry into force), but the
vast majority of tariffs will be eliminated by January 1, 2003.7 While
many tariffs were eliminated immediately upon the enactment of
NAFTA, others are eliminated at five, ten or fifteen year intervals. In
addition, there are many variations on the general approach to tariff
elimination. The actual tariff elimination schedule for each product is
determined from the importing party's NAFTA Tariff Schedule." U.S. -
Canada trade became fully duty-free, except for some agricultural
products, as of January 1, 1998, in accordance with the ten year phase-
out schedule in the U.S. -Canada FTA that was not altered by
NAFTA.79
NAFTA's rules of origin are designed to avoid Mexico's becoming an
"export platform" for final assembly of non-North American parts and
components. Accordingly, for a product to qualify as NAFTA
originating, a significant North American content must normally be
demonstrated, either through a tariff shift, the inclusion of major
components or materials produced in North America, or through
demonstrating a high (50-60 percent) "regional value content." ° For
1992; Mexico-Columbia-Venezuela (G-3): effective Jan. 1, 1995; Mexico-Costa Rica:
effective Jan. 1, 1995; Mexico-Bolivia: effective Jan. 1, 1995; Mexico-Nicaragua: effective
July 1, 1998).
73. Id.
74. Marcos Aleman, Central America Joins Mexico in Plan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June.
16, 2001, at 2001 WL 22916204; But see Honduras Postpones Implementation of Mexico
Trade Deal, CORPORATE MEXICO, May 2, 2001, at 2001 WL 3331756 (Honduras delayed
implementation).
75. Toshio Aritake, Bilateral Agreements: Japan, Mexico to Begin Study Commission
on Free Trade Accord, but Timing Uncertain, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Jun. 19, 2001.
76. Id.
77. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 302, Annex 302.2; See also NAFTA Tariff
Elimination Schedule, supra note 13 (it is estimated that as of 2003, duties on 92 percent
of the tariff schedule items comprising U.S.-Mexico trade will have been eliminated).
78. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at Annex 302.2, § 3.
79. Id. at §§ 4-9.
80. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at arts. 401, 402; see also id. at Annex 401.
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example, a large screen color television does not qualify for NAFTA
treatment unless the picture tube is of North American origin.8' Most
apparel must be made from fabric that satisfies the "yarn forward" rule
to be of North American origin,82 meaning that the yarn, the fabric and
the apparel itself are all produced in North America. Automobiles will
ultimately be required to have 62.5 percent regional value based on "net
cost" calculations that track the country of origin as well as major parts
of principal assemblies such as engines and transmissions.83
However, for many products, such as, for example, bathtubs, it is
sufficient that production involve a major manufacturing process -often
the equivalent of "substantial transformation"- to confer regional
origin." Where a complete tariff shift would otherwise be required -all
materials, parts and components must be classified under a tariff
heading different than the finished product. Under NAFTA there is a
de minimis exception: if no more than seven percent of the value of the
product fails to undergo a tariff shift, the product may nevertheless
qualify for NAFTA treatment.85
Under the system, it is immaterial whether the materials, parts
and components, and manufacturing operations, take place in Mexico,
the United States or Canada. The objective is to favor production not
only of finished goods but of imputs within North America, not in any
particular NAFTA nation, although Mexico's significantly lower wages
have in many respects favored Mexico for finished goods production,
and to a lesser extent for input production as well.
Even though duty remission on non-NAFTA components
conditioned on export performance was permitted until January 1,
2000, there has been a strong incentive in many industries to purchase
NAFTA-originating parts and components. For example, if an auto
manufacturer is seeking to demonstrate that 62.5 percent of the net
cost is North American, the manufacturer is better off using disk brake
assemblies made in the United States rather than brakes made in
Korea. The latter will not count toward the 62.5 percent regional
content. Even if the rule of origin is a tariff shift, use of a North
American component rather than a non-NAFTA component may reduce
the total value of non-originating material below the seven percent de
minimis threshold, and thus permit a claim of NAFTA origin and the
duty benefits associated therewith.
81. Id., at Annex 401 (Since January 1, 1999, the printed circuit boards (item
8528.10.bb) must also be of North American origin).
82. See id. at Annex 401, ch. 62.
83. Id. at art. 403 (5) (a); See also id. at Annex 403.1.
84. HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 61, item
2507, 6910 (the clay or Kaolin enters under item 2507, while the finished bathtub is
classified under item 6910).
85. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 405.
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As of January 1, 2001, use of non-NAFTA parts and components
resulted in a double "whammy." The cost of non-NAFTA components do
not count toward a percentage regional value added, as has been the
situation since the beginning. In addition, Mexican import duties at the
"most favored nation" rate will have to be paid on all imported parts
and components to the extent that these duties are less than the duties
on the finished products when imported into the United States or
Canada. They can no longer be forgiven through the current duty
remission program, although the effect may be similar to the old system
if the affected manufacturing sector is subject to one of the new special
sector "PROS-EC" programs, or if the imported parts and components
are imported from one of the many other nations with which Mexico has
a free trade agreement. The impact on manufacturing costs of Mexican
MFN import duties on imported parts and materials could be
substantial, even ruinous, because most of the duties are 12-18 percent
ad valorem.86
In 1993, the year just prior to NAFTA, Mexico was the most
significant beneficiary of the U.S. GSP program. 7 Under NAFTA, all
goods that entered the U.S. duty-free under the "general system of
preferences" (GSP) became duty-free under NAFTA as of January 1,
1994, with an important proviso.8 Beginning in January 1, 1994,
NAFTA rather than GSP rules applied. 9 In some instances, this shift
was probably beneficial, since a 35 percent Mexican value added -
difficult to achieve if the principal Mexican value added is labor costs -
was no longer required in all cases.' In other cases, NAFTA rules of
origin may be more stringent, as where the regional value added must
be 50 percent or 60 percent depending on the calculation methodology.91
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the volume of GSP imports that lost
duty-free treatment as a result of application of the NAFTA rules of
origin was probably small.
While most U.S. imports are not subject to quotas or other
quantitative restraints, the U.S. will continue to impose quotas on
many textile and apparel imports until they are eliminated January 1,
2005 (and replaced with tariffs) under the WTO Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing, as noted earlier. However, NAFTA provides special
treatment for Mexican and Canadian textiles. Not only are NAFTA
origin textiles admitted under preferential duty rates, but non-
86. See id. at art. 303.
87. RALPH FOLSOM & MICHAEL GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss TRANSACTIONS §
4.15 (1995).
88. Id. at § 4.22.
89. Id.
90. Id. at § 4.14.
91. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 402 (defining the 'net cost" method and the
"transaction value" method of calculation regional value content).
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originating textiles are also admitted under preferential conditions.'
Likewise, quantitative restrictions on such products as sugar are
reduced or eliminated under NAFTA.93
C. Protection and Encouragement of Foreign Investment
Central to the NAFTA objective of trade and job creation was the
task of making Mexico's investment climate more attractive to U.S.,
Canadian and other foreign investors. As noted earlier, Mexico's
market opening and liberalization policies, beginning in 1985, included
major reforms in restrictive investment laws. These reforms helped to
encourage a significant increase in direct foreign investment well before
January 1, 1994. However, for some investors, investment in any
foreign country -including but not limited to Mexico -requires a high
level of protection against arbitrary host government action such as
expropriation. Investors are also aware that reforms made by national
legislation are subject to political winds and changes in government. In
contrast, investment protection rules embodied in a binding
international agreement, such as NAFTA, are much less susceptible to
arbitrary or unexpected abrogation.'
Chapter 11 of NAFTA embodies a series of investment protections
similar to those found in the more than 40 bilateral investment treaties
the United States has concluded with developing nations in Latin
America, Asia and Africa. 9' Under Chapter 11, covered investors
("investors of another party") enjoy a series of basic protections.
Investors include NAFTA citizens, individual or corporate, and the term
"investment" is defined broadly.9 Investors receive national treatment
or most favored nation treatment for their investments, whichever is
better, and must generally receive treatment that is consistent with
international law and is "fair and equitable."" Performance
requirements (obligations to purchase materials locally or export a
certain portion of production, such as the former requirements of the
maquiladora program) are abolished, by January 1, 2001 or before. 9
92. See id. at Annex 300-B.
93. Id. at ch. 7, art. 703 (note that market access in agricultural products is treated
separately for U.S.-Mexico trade and Canada-Mexico trade)..
94. Mdxico: Foreign Investment Act of 1993, Dec. 27, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 207 (Mexico
implemented its obligations under NAFTA).
95. Eleanor Robert Lewis, The United States Bilateral Investment Treaty Program:
Protection for U.S. Investors Overseas, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 127 (Ginger Lew, ed., 1994).
96. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1139 (in the case of a corporation, it enjoys the
protections regardless of ultimate ownership if the company is organized under the laws
of one of the NAFTA members and operates a business in one of the NAFTA countries).
97. Id. at arts. 1105, 1102, 1103.
98. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at Annex I-Mexico (NAFTA requires the elimination of
so-called performance requirements for foreign investments by NAFTA investors in
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Also, limitations on choice of management by nationality are eliminated
and currency convertibility and corporate transfers are guaranteed."
Expropriation or nationalization is permitted only under limited
conditions and with the payment of fair compensation, as required
under international law.1" Disputes between foreign investors and host
governments are subject to binding international arbitration, usually
under the "Additional Facility" rules of the World Bank's International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the
arbitral rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL).' 1
Chapter 11 covers all foreign investments except those subject to
specific reservation under one of the NAFTA annexes. Moreover, it
provides for a phase-out of host government approval for investments in
non-reserved sectors up to relatively high and increasing limits, $75
million for Mexico during the period January 1, 2000 - January 1, 2003,
ultimately increasing to $150 million after nine years.'m For most
manufacturing operations, there are no reservations.
III. THE MAQUILADORA SYSTEM, 2001 AND BEYOND
The restrictions on duty drawback and duty remission programs
that became effective January 1, 2001, are likely to have a more
significant impact on the maquiladora system, and thus on U.S. -
Mexican trade and investment, than have any other changes since
NAFTA became effective in 1994, and perhaps since the creation of the
maquiladora system in 1965. Significantly, Mexico's responses to these
changes, to maintain current maquiladora operations and at the same
time encourage further direct foreign investment and new employment,
are constrained by Mexico's obligations under the World Trade
another NAFTA member nations. Prior to 1994, one of the most significant performance
requirements was the limitation on maquiladora sales in the Mexican domestic market.
Under NAFTA, as of 1994, maquiladoras were permitted to sell in the domestic market a
volume equal to as much as 50 percent of the preceding year's export sales. This
percentage increased by five percent each succeeding years, i.e., 55 percent in 1995, 60
percent in 1996, etc., with the limitation eliminated as of January 1, 2001. Initially, this
change probably had little impact on domestic sales, particularly of consumer products,
because of the deep recession following the December 1994 currency crisis); But see Gloria
Arizaga, Repunta Consumo: Crece 11.2% en Enero (Consumption Rises: 11.2% in
January), EL ECONOMISTA, http://wwweconomista.com.mx (March 23, 2000) (as of
early 2000, there is anecdotal evidence that in some sectors, such as consumer electronics,
domestic sales are increasing).
99. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at arts. 1106, 1107, 1109.
100. Id. at art. 1110.
101. Id. at art. 1120; See David A Gantz, Reconciling Environmental Protection and
Investor Rights Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10646 (2001) (for a
discussion of certain aspects of investor - state litigation under Chapter 11).
102. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at Annex I-Mexico.
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Organization Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, as
well as by the provisions of NAFTA.
Ironically, the elimination of duty waivers mandated by Article 303
is designed in part to deal with a situation that probably does not occur
very often today. If U.S. and Mexican factories are both producing
widgets for sale in the United States market, there is an element of
unfairness if the Mexican factory pays no import duties on non-NAFTA
parts and components, while the U.S. competitor must pay such import
duties on the parts and components that she imports (since the finished
products are not exported but instead are consumed in the United
States). This gives the U.S. producer higher materials costs by the
amount of the U.S. duties on the imported materials. Of course, the
other major objective of Article 303- encouraging substitution of
regional parts and component production for non-NAFTA inputs-
remains valid.
However, if the Mexican producer exporting to the United States is
competing with a Chinese producer also exporting to the United States,
the elimination of duty waivers for Mexico favors the Chinese producer.
The latter will continue to enjoy the duty waiver in his home country for
non-Chinese parts and components (and lower wages), although the
finished product from China may be subject to U.S. import duties while
the Mexican product will not.
A Limitations on Duty Remission for Non-NAFTA Parts and
Components
NAFTA, Article 303(1), limits duty remission of Mexican import
duties on non-NAFTA parts and components to the lesser of the
Mexican import duties on the parts and components, or the U.S. (or
Canadian) duties on the finished products. Significantly, the limits do
not apply to parts and components originating elsewhere in the NAFTA
region; such imports continue to receive duty referral or remission to
the extent regular duties have not already been eliminated among the
NAFTA parties. Antidumping and countervailing duties imposed by
NAFTA nations on non-NAFTA products must be assessed upon the
entry of the goods and cannot be remitted.'O However, Mexico has
interpreted its laws to preclude assessment against the maquiladoras of
antidumping duties originally imposed prior to January 1, 2001, on the
maquiladoras,°' on the apparent grounds that such interests did not
have an opportunity to participate in the administrative process that
103. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 303(2)(a).
104. Customs Law (Ley Aduanera), art. 2(X), (amended 2000), available at
http://www.mexicolaw.com/CustomsLawDemo/Articlel-9.htm (last visited September 10,
2001).
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led to assessment of the dumping duties."5
Separately, Article 304(1) precludes the initiation of new duty
waiver programs if the benefits are conditioned on performance
requirements,'0 such as exporting a given percentage of production.
Under Article 304(2), and Annex 304.2, Mexican duty waivers tied to
performance (export) requirements must be eliminated January 1,
2000. °7 However, to the extent that duty waiver programs are not
conditioned on performance requirements, they arguably remain legal
under NAFTA.
To illustrate the impact of the change on Mexican manufacturers,
consider the production of a Mexican widget that is exported to the
United States. The widget, in this example, uses Asian parts valued at
$30 subject to a 10 percent Mexican duty, or $3.00. The finished
product has a transaction value"° of $100 when imported into the
United States. U.S. duties on the widget are five percent ($5.00). Prior
to January 1, 2001, the Mexican duty of $3.00 would have been deferred
or remitted, regardless of any duty owing on the finished widget when
imported into the United States. After January 1, the situation is as
follows:
a) If there remains a U.S. duty of five percent ($5.00) on the widget,
the Mexican authorities are permitted to remit the entire $3.00
Mexican duty on imported parts could be remitted.
b) If the U.S. duty is two percent ($2.00), only $2.00 of the $3.00 in
total Mexican duties could be remitted.
c) If the U.S. duty is zero- the predominant situation- no
Mexican duty could be remitted.
The effect of this limitation on duty remissions is an increase in the
manufacturing (materials) costs for Mexican widgets by $3.00, if the
U.S. duty on the finished product is zero, unless of course that widget
parts and components are purchased in North America, entitled to
special sector treatment or enjoy duty free entry under one of Mexico's
other free trade agreements. If widgets are a competitive product
worldwide, the effective increase in manufacturing costs - $3.00 or three
percent in this example - could eliminate profit. The increased cost
may cause Mexican widget makers to shift their operations to the
United States, or, more likely, to other nations (presumably in Asia)
where overall manufacturing costs are lower than in Mexico.
105. Id.
106. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 304(1).
107. Id. at art. 304(2); See also id. at Annex 304.2.
108. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. §1401a(b) (1994) (the "transaction value" is the
price actually paid or payable for the goods when sold for export to the U.S., subject to
certain adjustments. Normally, it is used when the transaction is between importer and
exporter that are unrelated parties).
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There are certain industries that are currently more dependent on
non-NAFTA sources than others. The electronics and auto parts
industries are among those that are most seriously affected. For that
reason, and because investment and employment in these sectors are
huge, the Mexican government took steps, discussed in detail infra, to
reduce the impact of additional materials costs on these and other key
industries.
The impending limitations on duty remissions under Article 303,
along with rules of origin encouraging a high level of regional content as
with the 62.5 percent for automobiles, have had an impact on Mexico
long before they became effective. 9 Anticipation of the elimination of
duty remission programs encouraged many producers, particularly in
the electronics and automobile sectors, to develop local (Mexican or
United States) sources for parts previously imported from outside
region."' For example, in the electronics sector, a television producer's
factory is typically surrounded by other, satellite, factories either
independent or owned by related parties, that are producing key
components for the Mexican production of televisions."' This
anticipatory phenomenon has most likely been among the strong
incentives for new direct foreign investment in Mexico since the mid-
1990s, as the drafters of NAFTA presumably intended.
B. Elimination of Duty Remission on Imported Machinery and
Equipment
The 2001 changes under Articles 303 and 304 apply not only to
non-NAFTA parts and components imports, but also to non-NAFTA-
origin machinery and equipment imported by the maquiladoras to
produce goods in Mexico.12 Direct foreign investment in Mexico in
recent years has averaged approximately $9-$10 billion per year,"
although probably only about 20-25% of that goes into maquiladora
manufacturing.14 Much of this investment has most likely been used to
109. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 303(2)(a).
110. Id.
111. For example, Daewoo Electronics de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., which was established
in 1991 in San Luis, Sonora, encouraged the establishment of a subsidiary of Daewoo
Components Co., Ltd. in 1996. That new factory in the same industrial park produced
deflection yokes, tuners and coils for Daewoo Electronics. Moreover, several unrelated
Korean firms are located within a few hundred feet and produce condensers and other
electric parts.
112. NAFTA, supra note 1,at arts. 303, 304.
113. Focus on Mexico, at http://www.eslfocus.com/nationsfolder/fomexico/
infoonmex5.html
(last visited Mar. 8, 2002).
114. In-Bond Industry /Industria Maquiladora 2001, supra note 18, at 26 (estimating
$2 billion in 1999 and again in 2000).
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purchase machinery and equipment for industrial production." Under
the prior maquiladora rules, machinery and equipment could be
"temporarily" imported with the duty deferred under the condition that
it be used in valid maquiladora operations."' In the event that the
machinery was re-exported when it was no longer needed or operations
cease, there was effectively no duty.
As of January 1, 2001, Mexican authorities could no longer provide
such deferral. Rather, Mexican import duties are now payable upon
importation of the machinery and equipment, at the duty rate
applicable in Mexico to imports from the affected countries."' The duty
rate will be the "most favored nation" duty for most non-NAFTA
suppliers, unless the machinery is covered by one of the special sector
("PROSEC") programs at a zero or reduced (usually 5%) rate or is from
a country with which Mexico has a free trade agreement."8 However,
the maquiladoras will continue to import the machinery on a temporary
basis, because in doing so they will avoid paying the value added taxes
of 10%." 9
Because many industrial companies, including some maquiladoras,
depend on machine tools and other equipment imported from Asia,
particularly Japan, Korea, Taiwan and China, the impact on future
maquiladora investment and operations is also likely to be considerable
for sectors not protected by a special decree. For machinery and
equipment imported before December 29, 2000, the term for temporary
imports of machinery and equipment has been fixed at five years or the
term for depreciation under the Mexican Income Tax Law, 2 ' whichever
term is longer. It appears that machinery and equipment that has been
temporarily imported " in the past, and is still within its useful life
(usually 10 years under Mexican law) will not be subject to any duties if
such machinery and equipment has been used in the maquiladora
program.
115. Camilla Castellanos, Foreign Interest, at httpJ/www.mexconnect.com/mex_/trave]
bzml bzmtop50-99.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2002).
116. Decreto para el Fomento y Operaci6n de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportaci6n
[Decree for the Encouragement and Development of the Export-maquiladora Industry],
art. 8(11) and (III), June 1, 1998 (Mex.), available at
http://www.naftaworks.orgdowndoff1998/junOl-1.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2001).
117. Customs Law, supra note 104, at art. 110.




MarcoLeylmp_.ValorAgregado.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2000).
119. Id.
120. Ley de Impuesto Sobre la Renta, art. 99, D.O., Dec. 30, 1980 (Mex.).
121. Customs Law, supra note 104, at arts. 109-10.
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C. Other Limitations Imposed by the WTO and NAFTA
As previously discussed, the pre-2001 maquiladora benefits were
conditioned on exporting a certain portion of production; these
requirements are being phased out under NAFTA as of January 1,
2001, and cannot legally be extended. Such export requirements for
obtaining government benefits - such as duty-free entry of machinery
and equipment for exporters but not for other Mexican producers - will
in the future be a violation of Mexico's obligations under the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The SCM
Agreement prohibits, inter alia, "subsidies contingent, in law or in fact,
whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export
performance. . ."' Under the Agreement, duty remission on machinery
and equipment when conditioned on export of the finished products
would thus be a violation. (There is an exception for duties and for
value added taxes on parts and components that are incorporated in
finished products that are then exported; by agreement they are not
considered actionable export subsidies.)...
These restrictions were not applicable to Mexico immediately upon
the entry into force of the SCM Agreement on January 1, 1995.124
Under the SCM Agreement, Mexico, as a developing nation, generally
has an eight-year period - until January 1, 2003 - to eliminate export
subsidies'n However, during that interim period, Mexico may not
increase the level of export subsidies. 6 Given the increased friction
between developing country and developed country members of the
WTO as demonstrated at the meeting in Seattle in November 1999,'27 it
is possible that Mexico and other developing nations may seek and
122. WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures [hereinafter
"Subsidies Agreement"], art. 3.1(a), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/24-scm.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
123. Id. at Annex I(i).
124. Id. at art. 27.2(b). However, under Act 27.4, existing subsidy links may not be
increased.
125. Id.
126. Interestingly, in sectors where Mexico has earlier reached export competitiveness,
defined as 3.25 percent of total world trade for two consecutive years, the covered export
subsidies for those sectors must be phased out within two additional years, subject to
certain limitations. Based on this standard, it is arguable that Mexico was obligated to
phase out duty free entry of machinery and equipment used for production of color
televisions, automobiles and some textiles earlier than 2003. WTO Subsidies Agreement,
supra note 122, at arts. 27.3-27.6. Mexico has probably accounted for well over 3.25
percent of total world trade in each of these categories - four digit HS headings - for some
time. Apparently, these issues have not been raised with Mexico - not even by the U.S.
Government - perhaps because most of the benefits of the maquiladora program accrue to
U.S. owned firms.
127. WTO Meeting Brings No Progress on Reducing Agricultural Export Subsidies, ON
THE PLATE, Dec. 1999, at http://www.consumeralert.org/pubs/OnthePlate/OTPDEC99.htm
(last visited Mar. 8, 2002).
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receive a further deferral of their obligations under the Agreement
beyond 2003.
As noted earlier, one of the benefits guaranteed to foreign investors
under NAFTA is a prohibition of performance requirements. 28 In
addition to the Article 304 prohibition on tying customs duty waivers to
performance requirements (minimum export percentages), NAFTA
Article 1106 provides as follows:
1. No Party may impose or enforce any of the following requirements,
or enforce any commitment or undertaking in connection with the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct or
operation of an investment of an investor of a Party or of a non-Party
in its territory: (a) to export a given level or percentage of goods or
129services... 
The limitations on domestic sales as a percentage of total sales by
maquiladoras were phased out over seven years, under NAFTA's Annex
I, as of January 1, 2001.130 The provision of Articles 304 and 1106
effectively make it illegal under NAFTA for the Mexican government
from imposing new export requirements on Mexican factories owned by
U.S. or Canadian investors, as a condition, for example, to obtaining
lower duties on imports of non-NAFTA parts and components or
machinery and equipment, or in the case of Article 1106, to obtain other
benefits.1' There is thus an issue of whether the new PROSEC decrees
are in effect (if not technically) export requirements and a violation of
both NAFTA and WTO provisions. If in fact the sectoral programs, as
discussed below, effectively benefit both exporters and producers for the
domestic market, Mexico will be able to argue with considerable validity
that the PROSEC programs are consistent with Mexico's NAFTA and
WTO obligations.
Also, to the extent that the new maquiladora decree retains export
requirements in order for investors to qualify for the benefits of the
decree, this would appear to be a violation of NAFTA, Article 1106.
Thus, the provisions that limit "temporary" imports of materials to
firms that have annual export sales of $500,000 or 10% of total
invoicing, and imports of machinery and equipment for temporary
purposes to firms that demonstrate that 30% of their invoice value is for
export,132 are of questionable validity. Of course, if the firm does not
128. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1106.
129. Id.
130. Id. at Annex I.
131. Id. at arts. 304, 1106.
132. Decreto para el Fomento y Operaci6n de la Industria Maquiladora de
Exportaci6n, D.O., June 1, 1998 (Mex.); Decreto que reforma al diverso para el Fomento y
Operaci6n de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportaci6n, D.O., Nov. 13, 1998 (Mex.);
Decreto que reforma al diverso para el Fomento y Operaci6n de la Industria Maquiladora
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wish to export any portion of its production it probably has no economic
incentive to participate in the maquiladora program.
At the same time, with both NAFTA and the SCM Agreement, the
issue is not simply one of the substantive violation, but a practical
question: who will complain? Since an estimated 80-90 percent of the
maquiladora firms are U.S. owned,' the United States is unlikely to
object-other than on grounds of principle-to the Mexican authorities
about such violations unless the maquiladora industry objects. As long
as most maquiladora production is exported, objections are likely to be
rare or non-existent.
There is, of course, nothing in NAFTA or the WTO agreements that
prevents Mexico from reducing its MFN duties on non-NAFTA
machinery and equipment to zero. However, a general reduction on
such machinery and equipment would benefit not only PROSEC
program beneficiaries but other Mexican producers as well, and would
affect goods produced for the Mexican market as well as those made for
export. A general duty reduction could also have significant fiscal
effects in terms of loss of customs duty income for the Mexican
government, and discourage investment in production of parts and
components in Mexico (and in the United States and Canada). The
principal advantages of MFN duty reduction would be administrative; it
would avoid the additional layer of regulation that the special sector
program imposes, for government officials and maquiladoras alike.
D. Protecting the Maquiladoras Consistently with NAFTA / WTO
Requirements
It has been quite obvious to Mexican government officials and to
maquiladora owners and operators that while the NAFTA provisions
discussed above provide a powerful incentive for maquiladoras to
replace non-NAFTA sources with NAFTA sources of materials, there
are some parts and components that simply cannot currently be
produced in Mexico at competitive prices, in adequate quantities and
with acceptable quality. The industries and the government would have
both faced a difficult situation if Mexico had simply adhered to the
NAFTA requirements, without further action, and as of January 1,
2001, begun charging MFN duties typically between 12-18 percent ad
de Exportaci6n, D.O., Dec. 31, 2000 (Mex.); and Decreto que reforma al diverso para el
Fomento y Operaci6n de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportaci6n, art. 4 A, paras. I, II,
D.O., Dec. 31, 2000 (Mex.) [hereinafter referred to in consolidated form as Maquiladora
Decree].
133. Dignity in Labour, Facts on the Maquiladoras, at
http://www.citinv.itassociazioni/CNMS/ archiviollavoro/maquiladoras.html (last visited
Sept. 8, 2001) (suggesting that 90 percent were U.S. owned, but this may have declined
somewhat given the influx of Asian and European investment in the post-1994 period).
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valorem except for textiles where the rates may be considerably
higher.'T Manufacturing costs would have increased by the amount of
the Mexican import duties. Under such circumstances, many Mexican
manufacturers would have concluded that production of goods in Mexico
for the U.S. market no longer made sense.
This result is unattractive for both the NAFTA governments and
their stakeholders. In most instances, manufacturers have no interest
in shifting otherwise profitable facilities elsewhere, and the Mexican
government has no interest in creating unemployment in the border
region as a result of closed factories. Presumably, the United States
Government shares both objectives because most of the maquiladora
firms are U.S. owned and an increase in Mexican unemployment rates
would presumably encourage emigration to the United States. A shift of
Mexican production to Asia would most likely reduce the U.S. parts and
components content of the finished goods significantly, indirectly
reducing U.S. manufacturing jobs as well.
Mexico has initially addressed the problem through two separate
mechanisms, the new maquiladora and Pitex decrees, and the new
special sector programs. Legislation (decrees) enacted in October and
December 2000 created a new system which no longer ties maquiladora
benefits (or similar Pitex benefits) to export performance. This analysis
provides brief overview of a very complex series of legal changes,
including but not limited to major modifications in the
Maquiladoral3 and Pite 13' decrees, the Mexican Customs Law13,
various subsidiary customs laws and, most importantly, the new
1381
sectoral promotion programs.
134. A textile producer in Nogales, Sonora, told the author during a plant visit in
September 2000 that one of his product lines was dependent on a particular fabric
commonly imported from the Far East. The fabric, after January 1, 2001, will be subject
to Mexican import duties in the 25-30 percent range. He can find no NAFTA supplier of
the fabric at a competitive price, and thus may be forced to discontinue the product line in
Mexico if the fabric is not covered by the special sector program.
135. See generally Maquiladora Decree, supra note 132.
136. Decreto que establece Programas de Importaci6n Temporal para Producir
Articulos de Exportaci6n, D.O., May 3, 1990 (Mex.); Decreto que reforma al diverso que
establece Programas de Importaci6n Temporal para Producir Artfculos de Exportaci6n,
D.O., May 11, 1995 (Mex.); Decreto que reforma al diverso que establece Programas de
Importaci6n Temporal para Producir Articulos de Exportaci6n, D.O., November 13, 1998
(Mex.); Decreto que reforma al diverso que establece Programas de Importaci6n Temporal
para Producir Artfculos de Exportaci6n, D.O. October 30, 2000; and Decreto que reforma
al diverso que establece Programas de Importaci6n Temporal para Producir Articulos de
Exportaci6n, D.O., December 31, 2000 [hereinafter referred to in consolidated form as
Pitex Decree].
137. See generally Customs Law, supra note 104.
138. Decree Establishing Various Sector Promotion Programs, D.O. Dec. 31, 2000 as
amended D.O. Mar. 1, 2001 (Mex.) [hereinafter PROSEC Decree]. Earlier versions, now
repealed, are found at D.O. Nov. 14, 1998, D.O. May 9, 2000 and D.O. Oct. 30, 2000.
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1. Modified Rules for Maquiladora Operations
The changeover to the new system (for parts and components that
do not meet NAFTA origin requirements) effectively began November
20, 2000, in anticipation of the NAFTA restrictions that were effective
January 1, 2001, due to the normal lead time between importation of
parts and components and exportation of the finished products."9
Certain transitory provisions dealing with imports during November
and December 2000, and many other technical changes in the
operational requirements are not germane to this discussion. However,
it should be noted that parts and components imported after November
20, 2000, were subject to treatment under the new law if the finished
goods are exported after January 1, 2001, when the PROSEC decree
becomes effective.4
The most important aspect of the new maquiladora system relate
to the major change. As noted earlier, Mexican duties will be paid on
parts and components imported from non-NAFTA sources, unless one of
the special sector programs applies. They can no longer be waived as
an export condition. Although as noted earlier some maquiladora
benefits are still related to export performance,' there is less emphasis
that in the past on exporting a high percentage of the finished goods
produced by maquiladoras.
In most other respects basic maquiladora operating practices are
not significantly changed, except with regard to relatively minor
administrative requirements and the possibly significant
administrative burdens of operating under a second, overlapping
regime, the special sector (PROSEC) program. Most importantly,
maquiladora assembly operations which are dependent entirely on U.S.
parts and components are essentially unaffected by the 2001 changes
insofar as their materials are concerned. Article 303 does not apply to
those parts and components. Yet, many U.S. maquiladoras have and
will continue to import non-NAFTA origin machinery and equipment,
and are thus affected in that way.
Also, manufacturing sectors that involve goods that are wholly
obtained or produced entirely in the territory of one or more of the
parties,' will not be affected in so far as materials inputs are
139. See id. at Preamble, Transitory Arts. 1, 4.
140. See PROSEC Decree, supra note 138, at Transitory Article 4.
141. See Maquiladora Decree, supra note 132, at art. 4 A. Permission to import raw
materials and containers temporarily, saving the value added tax and allowing the
deferral of payment of any duties on the materials until 60 days after the finished product
has been exported, is available only to firms that have annual foreign sales that exceed
US$500,000 or 10% of total sales. Permission to import machinery, tools and related
items is limited to firms for which foreign sales represent at least 30% of total sales.
142. NAFTA, supra note 1, at arts. 401, 415.
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concerned. These include most mineral products, fisheries products,
agricultural crops and livestock, as well as certain wood products,
pottery, etc., because they do not incorporate inputs from outside the
NAFTA region. Even if there are minor non-NAFTA inputs in processed
foods and furniture, they are likely to be well below the seven percent
de minimis level provided in NAFTA."' Of course, imported machinery
and equipment purchases from non-NAFTA sources will be impacted,
particularly in the mining and agriculture sectors. As a result those and
some other sectors are included in the PROSEC programs with regard
to capital equipment.
Even where Mexican duties on parts and components are payable,
continued use of the maquiladora form of doing business in Mexico will
be essential for most operators. The system continues to offer clear
advantages over alternative ways of doing business in Mexico. Existing
and future investments will continue to benefit from factors that have
been traditionally linked to maquiladora operations. These include
lower labor costs, geographic proximity to the United States and its
excellent transportation infrastructure, the option for managerial
personnel to live in the United States while operating a business in the
border region of Mexico, and Mexico's relative political stability.
However, there are also other specific trade-related advantages to
operating as a maquiladora.
Under the revised maquiladora system, payment of duties where
there is no special sector exemption is deferred for two months following
the exportation of the finished goods,'" which may mean 4-6 months
from the date of importation of the materials into Mexico. For many
companies, this is a significant cost consideration and alone might
justify operating as a maquiladora. The maquiladora regime continues
to grant an additional benefit, in that maquiladoras do not have to pay
the Mexican value added tax (IVA) on components used in assembly or
manufacturing processes (temporary importations), 45 or on machinery
and equipment imports even when the latter are dutiable. Under
NAFTA, Mexican entities may import goods definitively at a reduced
tariff rate, but they normally are required to pay the applicable value
added tax. The IVA is variable, but typically it amounts to 10 percent of
all sales of goods and services within Mexico. 6
Although they are required to comply with applicable customs
regulations and procedures, 17 maquiladoras also enjoy more favorable
customs procedures than that afforded Mexican companies in general.
143. Id. at art. 405.
144. Maquiladora Decree, supra note 132, at art. 8 B; see also NAFTA, supra note 1, at
art. 303(5).
145. Value Added Tax Law, supra note 118, at arts. 29 et seq.
146. Id.
147. Customs Law, supra note 104, at arts. 35 et seq.
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The maquiladora program requires companies to comply with
applicable customs regulations, while facilitating customs procedures. " 8
Maquiladoras are allowed to file consolidated importation documents
(pedimento consolidado),'49 rather than filing a pedimento with each
customs entry. The consolidated document covers several entries during
a specified period of time. The consolidated system makes the process
more expeditious, by avoiding the additional paperwork and filing
required for each single customs crossing.
Additionally, maquiladoras are not under an obligation to comply
with detailed marking requirements. Most products have to bear a label
with Spanish information in compliance with Mexican labeling
standards. Temporary imports carried out by maquiladoras, on the
other hand, include packaging materials, labels and brochures
necessary to complement the basic production program."'
Among other factors, it appears that firms that commonly export
goods to non-NAFTA countries will want to continue operations as a
maquiladora. Only Mexican exports to the United States and Canada
are subject to the January 1, 2001 changes. Exports to other markets
will continue to enjoy the duty deferral and duty-drawback provisions
on imported parts and components indefinitely, and on machinery and
equipment until Mexico's WTO obligations preclude it in 2003. (If
machinery and equipment is used to produce both for NAFTA and non-
NAFTA export markets, the goods will presumably have to meet the
NAFTA imposed limitations on duty remission or drawback.)
There is also a perception that maquiladoras are treated more
favorably than some other sectors of Mexican industry, due to their
tremendous importance to the Mexican economy. The Secretariat of
Economy (SECON) (formerly SECOFI) is the primary government
agency responsible within the Mexican Government for regulating
foreign trade."' The author's impression is that SECON has
traditionally been viewed by companies as a more favorable, flexible
and business-oriented entity, in contrast with other governmental
agencies such as the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP). 
52
148. Id.
149. Id. at art. 37 ("Exporters of merchandise may file at customs through a customs
agent or attorney a single customs request covering several operations of the same
exporter. Such a request shall be called a 'consolidated request.' Maquiladoras and
companies with export programs authorized by the Ministry of Commerce and Industrial
Development may also elect to file for customs dispatch of merchandise through a
consolidated customs request for import.").
150. Maquiladora Decree, supra note 132, at art. 8.
151. The scope of SECON's mission and authority is set forth in the Ley Orgdnica de la
Administraci6n Pdblica Federal [Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration], art.
34, D.O. Dec. 29, 1976, as amended (Mex.).
152. Author's discussions with various maquiladora and their attorneys during
January 2000-March 2001.
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SECON's participation begins with the granting of the relevant
operating permits (i.e. the establishment of the maquiladora) and
continues with monitoring and enforcement.'53  Maquiladoras are
required to submit an annual report to SECON detailing their import
and export operations and domestic sales.' The Maquiladora Decree
also requires maquiladoras to provide any information requested by
SECON or SHCP and to cooperate with them in carrying out program
compliance efforts. 5
2. Special Sector Program (PROSEC)
The second and more innovative mechanism to address the impact
of the Article 303 changes in Mexico is an import duty reduction
program applicable only to specific industry sectors (programas de
promoci6n sectoral). The essence of the PROSEC program is to provide
Mexican importers of the parts and components used to manufacture
specific finished products, with zero or reduced (usually 5%) duties on
certain of the non-NAFTA parts and components.5 6 In order to achieve
compliance with NAFTA and WTO rules, the PROSEC programs are
applicable to all manufacturers of the specified products, regardless of
whether production is for export or domestic consumption, and
regardless of whether the manufacturing operation is carried on under
the rules of the Maquiladora or Pitex programs." '
An initial PROSEC decree issued in November 1998 covered only
the electronics and electrical sectors."" It was replaced with broader
PROSEC decrees issued in May 2000 and again in October 2000." 9 All
of these earlier decrees were superseded by a December 31, 2000,
PROSEC decree, which remains in force, after amendment of the
covered tariff category list on March 1, 2001.6 The December 31 decree,
like the earlier ones, notes the need to "increase the competitiveness of
the domestic production sector in international markets," to obtain raw
materials and machinery that are "critical" for some industries, and to
do so in a manner consistent with Mexico's NAFTA and WTO
153. PROSEC Decree, supra note 138, at arts. 6, 8.
154. Maquiladora Decree, supra note 132, at art. 13.
155. Id.
156. PROSEC - Program of Sectoral Promotion, at
http://www.mexicanlaws.com/PROSEC.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2001) (stating that a
company can import the goods and materials utilized in their production and pay duties of
0%- 5%).
157. Id.
158. PROSEC Decree, D.O. Nov. 14, 1998 (repealed).
159. PROSEC Decree, D.O. May 9, 2000, D.O. Oct.20, 2000; see also PROSEC Decree,
D.O. Dec. 31, 2000 and, supra note 138, at Transitory art. 3.
160. PROSEC Decree, supra note 138. These amendments added only certain items to
the lists of those subject to duty free or reduced duty treatment, and deleted a few.
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obligations.
161
Once a manufacturer has completed the necessary registration
process, it is eligible for PROSEC treatment if a) the finished product
falls within one of the tariff categories listed in the decree, and b) the
particular imported parts and components originating outside of North
America are specifically listed in the decree as well. 162  There is an
exception to the category-by-category treatment of parts and
components. The Mexican Customs Law now provides under Rule 8
that all of the parts and components necessary to produce certain
finished products may be imported under a single "basket" customs
category, rather than under the individual tariff classifications, usually
at a zero rate, once the finished product is granted the necessary
approvals.'6
Thus, Article 3 of the PROSEC decree provides a list of product
sectors that are covered by the decree.64 The direct producer of the
finished product, or one of the "indirect" producers (those who make
intermediate goods used to produce one of the listed finished products)
is authorized to import any of the materials, parts and components
listed in Article 5.'6
The December 31, 2000, PROSEC decree, which remains in force,
covers twenty-two sectors: furniture; toys; sports equipment; footwear;
mining and metallurgy; capital goods; agricultural machinery;
automotive and auto parts; textiles and apparel; chocolate; candy and
similar products; coffee; and a miscellaneous "basket" of products.'6
According to SECON, the PROSEC decree covers approximately 5500
raw materials, parts and components, machinery and equipment tariff
categories, of which about two thirds relate to inputs for the electrical
161. Id., at preambular paragraphs.
162. Maquiladora Decree, supra note 132, at Transitory art. 2.
163. See Tariff Schedule of Mexico, Chapter 98, "Imports of Parts for the Fabrication of
Products Produced by Businesses Which Have Complied with the Requirements
Established for Operations Specified under Rule 8 of the Law of General Duties on
Imports," available at http'//www.
apectariff.org/tdb.cgi/6e616674612063656e746572ff3039333532/imx/Mexico.zip (last
visited Mar. 1, 2002).
164. PROSEC Decree, supra note 138, at art. 3.
165. Id. at art. 166.
166. Under Article 4, subsection 10 of the PROSEC Decree, supra note 138, the
miscellaneous programs include: office or school supplies; buckets and pails; trunks,
suitcases, purses, jewelry boxes and other plastic or textile materials; account books,
notebooks, etc.; binders, folders, etc.; interchangeable hand tools; certain electric motors;
separators of classifiers of ferrous materials or parts; drawing or mechanical calculating
instruments; wrist watches, pocket watches, clocks, etc.; instrument panel clocks for
vehicles, aircraft, spacecraft, etc.; other clocks; time apparatus for measuring, recording or
otherwise indicating intervals of time, time switches, etc.; and cigarette lighters, pocket
and table lighters.
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and electronic industries.167 The March 1 decree added 1,047 items to
the list and removed 37 items (the latter all in the electronics sector).'6
The electronics industry was the first to be subject to a PROSEC
decree, in November 1998.169 Apparently after extensive negotiations
with firms in the electronics/electrical industry, the Mexican
government issued the Electronics/Electrical Industry Decree 170 which
would have eliminated or reduced Mexican import duties not only on
parts and components, but also on machinery and equipment which
cannot reasonably be obtained from North American sources. It is not
surprising that the electronics industry was addressed first, it accounts
for almost 50 percent of total maquiladora production and a third of
maquiladora employment. 171 It is also a highly competitive industry
world wide, with Mexican production facing intense competition from
other sources, particularly in Asia. Most of the Mexican electronics
producers are owned by Asian or European firms, 72 which may reduce
the perceived advantages of operating in North America, particularly if
excess production capacity is currently available in Asian facilities.
Thus, in this industry, the risks to Mexico of production shifts to lower-
labor cost areas of Asia are very real.
Mexico's MFN duty rates are not being reduced or eliminated
across the board, and remain applicable to all other importers, except
those covered by the specific decrees. The PROSEC decree, in itself a
special series of tariff rates (including zero), is specific in its coverage,
and to some extent reflects careful choices by SECON after
negotiations with the affected industries. In theory, at least, a balance
should be sought between avoiding additional costs to manufacturers
for non-NAFTA inputs not easily available in Mexico, and permitting
extensive imports of non-originating goods that could be found in
Mexico or elsewhere in North America. Mexican Officials are
presumably aware that duty-free entry of parts and components used to
produce goods for the domestic market will result in lost customs
revenues, but they nonetheless are liberally granting requests to
include additional items for duty-free entry under the PROSEC
Program.' Also, whether a good is classified under one of the favored
167. Rocio Ruiz Chavez, Seminar on Application of Article 303 of NAFTA, at 8-9 (Mar.
22, 2001)(copy on file with author).
168. See Jorge Caballero Matamoros, Seminar on Application of Article 303 of NAFTA,
at 6 (Mar. 22, 2001) (copy on file with author).
169. See generally Decreto Que Establece Diversos Programas de Promoci6n Sectorial
available at httpJ/www.naftaworks.org/downdof/1998/nov14-1.htm
170. The November 1998 version, D.O. Nov. 14, 1998, has been superseded by the
PROSEC Decree, supra note 138.
171. Lucinda Vargas, Maquiladoras 2000, supra note 20, at 2.
172. Among the largest are Phillips (Netherlands), Thomson, S.A. (France), Daewoo,
Samsung and LG Electronics (Korea) and Sony, Matsushita and Sanyo (Japan).
173. Telephone interview with Lic. Isabel Sanchez, an attorney in Ciudad Juarez, Jun.
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categories, or under a category that is not listed, will make a
tremendous difference with regard to duties paid by the importers and
revenues collected by Mexican customs authorities. Among other
things, maquiladoras, their lawyers and Mexican customs officials will
be paying much more attention to classification and valuation
determinations than in the past, when virtually all parts and
components imports, regardless of classification, were duty-free if made
by maquiladoras or Pitex.
The fine-tuning of the PROSEC program is an on-going process.
Between the first November 1998 decree and the December 2000
decree, the number of covered sectors increased from two (electronics
and electrical industries) to more than 20.174 The list of covered parts
and components is also dynamic. As noted earlier, in March 1, 2001,
two months after the new program went into effect, the Mexican
government published an extensive list of additional items subject to
reduced duty or duty-free treatment under the PROSEC decree.
1 7 5
Additional such decrees are almost inevitable. As official SECON
guidance states: "The programs are flexible because import duty levels
and products included can be modified." 7
Initially, at least, it appears that SECON is being very liberal in its
treatment of requests for the addition of additional tariff items to the
PROSEC lists of parts, components and machinery subject to 5% or zero
tariffs.' In many instances, producers covered by the PROSEC Decree
are being authorized under Rule 8 to import all of the materials, parts
and components under a single "basket" tariff category, an approach
which vastly simplifies the customs and bookkeeping requirements.
7 8
There appear to be fewer situations in which a request is refused, and
there is no evidence that the views of Mexican producers of parts and
19, 2001 (transcript on file with author).
174. See discussion supra at notes 158-166 and accompanying text.
175. See PITEX Decree supra note 136.
176. See A Practical Guide to Mexico's Maquila 2001 Program, at
http://www.naftaworks.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
177. Sanchez Interview, supra note 173.
178. Id. Under this "Rule 8," the Mexican authorities have the ability to permit a
particular importer to import all non-NAFTA parts and components under a single tariff
category at a single duty rate, often zero. For example, under Rule 8 and item 9802.00.02
of the Mexican Tariff Schedules, a producer of electronic goods such as televisions which
has qualified for the PROSEC program may import all of the 400 plus electronic
components used in television production under that single tariff category, rather than
the dozens of different categories under which the individual components would have to
be classified. Whether this provision will be used temporarily to permit certain
maquiladoras to import all non-NAFTA parts and components duty free under the
PROSEC program until the ministries can determine which such parts and components,
if any, can be reasonably sourced in Mexico, or used permanently, remains to be seen. See
also NAT'L LAW CTR. FOR INTER-AM. FREE TRADE, THE IMPACT OF THE 2001 NAFTA
CHANGES: REPORT TO THE U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE 63--64 (2001).
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components who would logically oppose duty-free imports from outside
the region are being considered. This may well reflect the fact that the
Mexican authorities are reluctant to take any steps that would cause a
further reduction of maquiladora employment beyond that resulting
from the softening of the U.S. economy,179 i.e., by encouraging finished
goods maquiladoras to shift their production currently in Mexico to
other, possibly lower cost, venues. In any event, for those finished
goods producers whose materials, parts and components are subject to
PROSEC decree coverage, production costs and general competitiveness
are not significantly changed from what it was prior to January 1, 2001,
despite some additional administrative requirements resulting from
operations under the PROSEC system.
A more difficult question is the extent to which Mexican authorities
in the future will be prepared to remove items from the PROSEC
listings if and when they are persuaded that adequate supplies exist in
North America, a process that will be essential to increasing direct
foreign investment in parts and components producers in Mexico, and
to treating United States and Canadian parts suppliers fairly. The
PROSEC decree itself provides duty free or reduced duty treatment for
most items on a semi-permanent basis, for a year with automatic
renewals, unless and until the Mexican authorities decide to revoke
them. 8" The transitory nature of the PROSEC benefits gives the
Mexican government, at least in theory, the opportunity to discontinue
PROSEC benefits for parts and components that are reasonably
available in Mexico or elsewhere in North America, and there is
anecdotal evidence that after a full review more items available in
Mexico are being removed from the PROSEC lists. In fact, in the
March, 2001 PROSEC decree, 1047 tariff items were added to duty-free
or reduced duty coverage, and 37 tariff items, all in the electronics
sector, were excluded from special sector treatment.' The intensity of
the lobbying before the Mexican government authorities between the
major manufacturers- who will favor continued access to non-NAFTA
sources of parts and components- and present or future investors in
Mexican parts and components production facilities (or United States
facilities), is probably difficult to overestimate. The enormous challenge
to Mexican authorities is equally obvious.
Even though the PROSEC program and the maquiladora programs
are legally distinct, it can reasonably be expected that the
179. Interview with Lic. Isabel Sanchez, supra note 176.
180. See Memorandum of Meeting Between Secretariat of Economy and CNIME et al.,
(Feb. 2001), discussing loss of PROSEC benefits (5% duties in this case) for television
tuners and other major consumer electronics parts and components, and options to avoid
that loss (on file with author).
181. See Secretaria de Economia, Where is the Maquiladora Industry? Nov. 1, 2001
(Power Point presentation), at 18 [hereinafter SECON].
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maquiladoras will be the primary beneficiaries of the PROSEC
program, raising questions as to whether the new regime is in fact
NAFTA and WTO legal. Mexican officials have argued that the sectoral
programs are NAFTA and WTO legal because the duty reduction or
elimination on imported parts and components or machinery and
equipment are not tied to exports. 82 There are no illegal performance
requirements, and the benefits apply to goods that are definitively
imported as well as to those that may be used in the production of
exported products. All producers, not just maquiladoras, may benefit.
As of November 2001, 2,963 firms had registered for PROSEC benefits
and about 12% of those were companies that do not export.18 3 The
longer term persuasiveness of these arguments depends in part on
whether non-maquiladora and non-Pitex Mexican firms apply for and
benefit from the PROSEC program, and on the extent to which sales in
the domestic market of finished products covered by the PROSEC
decree actually benefit from the reduced or zero duties on listed parts
and components.
Finally, one of the campaign promises of President Vincente Fox
was to alleviate the heavy administrative burdens of doing business in
Mexico. The new system, imposing the PROSEC requirements on top of
the modified requirements for maquladoras is in this respect a step in
the opposite direction. The Fox Administration, as noted earlier, might
have simply reduced Mexico's MFN duties for important parts and
components, an approach which would have vastly simplified the
administrative requirements for Mexican business. However, such an
approach would have made it difficult for Mexican authorities to
continue attracting investment by parts and components suppliers,
since many could not compete with cheaper Asian imports if the latter
enter Mexico duty free under MFN duties. In addition, the potential
revenue loss from permitting producers for the domestic market to
avoid duties on imported parts and components would have been
permanent.
The Mexican dilemma can be illustrated by a simple example
(based on an actual situation). An Asian manufacturer of color picture
tubes for televisions has invested over $200 million in Mexican
production facilities, and employs over 1,500 persons. The producer is
considering production in Mexico (for the first time) of 13-inch picture
tubes. The current MFN duty on 13-inch picture tubes in 15%, but
under the PROSEC decree Mexican television manufacturers may
currently import such picture tubes from outside North America duty
free. If the Mexican picture tube producer goes ahead with production
of 13 inch picture tubes, what is the likelihood that Mexican
182. See generally PROSEC Decree, supra note 138.
183. See SECON, supra note 181.
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government authorities will elminate the PROSEC eligibility of imports
of similar tubes at some future date.
The Mexican government is thus in a "Catch-22" situation. If it
revokes duty free entry, the picture tube producer will increase its
investment and employment in Mexico. However, if the use of
somewhat more expensive Mexican picture tubes in place of Asian
source picture tubes increases the effective manufacturing cost of 13
inch televisions in Mexico (about 50% of which is the picture tube), the
television producers may move their television production to China,
Malaysia or elsewhere in Asia, where picture tube and labor costs are
lower. This is particularly likely with regard to small televisions, since
the U.S. MFN duty on such television imports is zero, as it now is with
video cassette recorders and computer monitors as well.'
IV. IMPACT OF REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CHANGES
The 2001 Maquiladora changes are occurring at a time of other
major changes in tariff levels potentially affecting maquiladora
operations. The most significant of these are noted below.
A. Tariff Reductions on U.S. Imports
As a result of the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations, 8' the United
States agreed to eliminate its MFN duties on hundreds of items,
including pharmaceutical products, toys and many consumer electronic
products, and to reduce duties to lower levels on other products.86
These tariff elimination and reduction obligations were phased in over
five years, so that the affected products became duty-fee or subject to
the lower Uruguay Round duties on January 1, 1999.117 Overall, the
trade-weighted average tariff in the United States is under four
percent, 8 " despite continued high tariffs on footwear and apparel, some
chemicals, small trucks and other products. Moreover, anecdotal
evidence has suggested that when U.S. import duties are in the range of
184. See tariff items 8521.10-90 (VCRs); 8471(computer monitors); 8528.12.12 (small
screen televisions); 8528.12.24 (large screen televisions). Harmonized Tariff Schedule of
the United States (2001), Supp.1, Rev. 1, available at http://www.usitc.gov/taffairs.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
185. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/final_e.htm#finalact (last visited Mar.1, 2002)
(the WTO website contains all documents produced as a result of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations)[hereinafter Final Act].
186. Id.
187. Final Act, supra note 185.
188. Barriers to Latin American and Caribbean Exports in the U.S. Market 1998-1999,
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 3 (1999) available at
http://www.eclacwash.org/public.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2002).
VOL. 30:1
2001 LEGAL & POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF NAFTA ART. 303 37
three percent or less some importers will pay the duties rather than try
to qualify for NAFTA treatment, given the risk of additional duties,
interest and penalties if subsequent NAFTA audits deny NAFTA
treatment.
The 1997 Information Technology Agreement (ITA) resulted in the
elimination of U.S. and Canadian tariffs (and those of many other U.S.
trading partners, although not Mexico) on a variety of computer and
other high-technology products, fully effective in most instances on
January 1, 2000.189 Negotiations on an expanded ("ITA-II") began in
1997 but have not been concluded.'
The United States also provides benefits under the Generalized
System of Preferences to developing countries worldwide'91 , to the
countries of Central America and the Caribbean (except Cuba) under
the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 92 and the Andean nations
through the Andean Trade Preferences Act.'93 In the latter two cases,
U.S. market access approaches that of NAFTA. The Trade and
Development Act of 2000 provides duty-free entry of textiles and
apparel for many products from Africa.94 The CBI, in particular, makes
such countries as the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica and Jamaica a
viable alternative to Mexico for supplying the U.S. market. When and
if a "Free Trade Agreement of the Americas" is concluded and
implemented among the United States, Canada, Mexico and up to 30
other Western Hemisphere nations, this will further reduce the tariff
advantages of producing manufactured goods for the United States and
Canadian markets in Mexico, although it may well make Mexican
manufacturers more competitive in other Latin American markets, such
as Brazil. 9' The same is true if the United States is successful in
completing the negotiations of free trade agreements with Chile and
Singapore, now underway, and in negotiating an agreement with the
Central American nations, as proposed by President Bush.'1
189. WTO, Information Technology Agreement - Introduction, at
http://www.wto.org/english/ tratopelinftec e/itaintro e.htm (last visited Sept. 10,
2001)(The Information Technology Agreement became effective April 1, 1999).
190. Id.
191. Generalized System of Preferences Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (2000).
192. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-07 (2000).
193. Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (2000)(due to expire Dec. 4,
2001 unless extended).
194. Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (codified
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
195. See Miami Summit of the Americas Declaration of Principles, available at
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/miamie.asp; see also Miami Summit of the
Americas Plan of Action, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/plan-e.asp.
196. See Rosella Brevetti, Bilateral Negotiations: Chile's Ambassador Says FTA Talks
will Cover TPA-Sensitive Issues, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Mar. 8, 2002, at d4 (reporting
on "substantial" progress in the negotiations); Chris Rugaber, Bilateral Negotiations: US-
Singapore FTA to Include E-Commerce Chapter; Labor, Environmental Issues Remain,
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While a new "Round" of GATT/WTO tariff reductions has only
begun and may take many years to conclude, the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum (APEC) committed some time ago to another round
of industrial tariff reductions without specifying any date.'97 Initially, it
was anticipated that chemicals, energy products, environmental
products, jewelry, medical and scientific equipment, toys, and possibly
fisheries and forest products would be set for "zero to zero" tariff
reductions. Nevertheless, it is expected that eventually - perhaps five
to eight years from now as part of the new round of WTO negotiations -
U.S. MFN duties on a significant new group of products will be subject
to further reductions and eventually, become zero."'
Such changes will ultimately make NAFTA origin for United States
imports increasingly irrelevant, at least for some products. For
example, as noted earlier, it no longer matters to small screen color
television producers in Mexico whether all of the printed circuit boards,
including the tuners, are of North American origin, in order to qualify
for NAFTA treatment." 9 The same is true with computer monitors and
video-cassette recorders. Of course, this is not true for United States
exports to Mexico, since Mexican most-favored-nation duties remain
high, averaging over 10% for imports from non-NAFTA countries."
B. WTO Membership for China and Impact on U.S. Textile Imports
from Mexico
China is a new member of the World Trade Organization, having
been approved by the membership in November 2001.21 With China,
INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Mar. 18, 2002, at d5 (predicting that negotiations would be
completed by mid-year); Rosella Brevetti, International Agreements: Untied States to
Explore FTA with Central America, Bush Says, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Jan. 17, 2002, at d2.
197. See APEC 9' Ministerial Mtng., Annex to the Ministers' Joint Statement, Nov.
22, 1997, available at http'//www.apecsec.org.sg/virtualib/minismtgmtgmin97.html (last
visited Mar. 2, 2002).
198. See DOHA WTO Ministerial, Ministerial Declaration, at para. 16,
WT/Min(01)/Dec/1 (Nov. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist-e/minole/
mindecle.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2002).
199. If the televisions meet the diagonal measurement limitations (34.29 cm., or 13.5
inches, under legislation enacted in June 1999), and undergo a manufacturing or
assembly process in Mexico, they will enter the United States duty free under the MFN
rates. See item 8528.12.84. Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (2001),
Supp.1, Rev. 1, available at httpJ/www.usitc.gov/taffairs.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
200. A study by Enrique Dussel Peters of the National Autonomous University of
Mexico estimates that the rate paid on "definitive" imports- those not imported under
duty waiver programs- was 10.38%. See John Rieger, Going Easy on the Rest, Bus. Mex.,
3437 (Mar. 1, 2001) available at 2001 WL 7670895 (quoting Peters).
201. See WTO, WTO Ministerial Conference approves China's accession, Press/252 (Nov.
10, 2001), available at http'//www.wto.org/english/news.e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm; see also
Washington File, Press and Culture Section, U.S. Embassy, Bucharest, Rom, Transcript:
VOL. 30:1
2001 LEGAL & POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF NAFTA ART. 303 39
there is always the possibility that political or security issues, such as
the diplomatic incident concerning the American "spy" aircraft that
landed in China March 31 after a collision with a Chinese fighter plane,
will interfere with China's embrace of economic and commercial
globalization, and the United States' willingness to encourage such
efforts. °2
Now that China is a WTO member, it will enjoy various WTO
benefits, including the requirement in the WTO Agreement on Textiles
that all textile quotas be phased out by 2004. Given the significantly
lower labor costs in China compared to Mexico, it is reasonable to
assume that some textile producers, at least, will determine that
despite tariffs, high shipping costs, delivery delays, political
uncertainties and the like it is more economical to produce certain
textiles and apparel in China than in Mexico. With some textiles,
Mexican sources are either much more expensive than Asian sources, or
supplies are limited. If the Mexican government prevents continued
duty-free or reduced duty imports of such materials, through the
PROSEC program, it may adversely affect textile production by the
maquiladoras in the future, although current policy appears to favor
inclusion of many textile items under PROSEC.
C. Other Mexican Free Trade Agreements
In addition to normal Mexican MFN duty rates (and exceptions to
these rates), Mexico has a number of other special rates, in some cases
including zero, through free trade agreements with a variety of Latin
American nations and Israel."°  Mexico has also concluded an
agreement with the European Union (EU) that became effective July 1,
2000. While, few maquiladoras are likely importing large quantities of
materials, parts and components from these other Latin American
nations,204 a larger number are probably importing machinery and
USTR Zoellick, Agric. Sec. Veneman on WTO Talks (Nov. 13, 2001), available at
httpJ/www.usembassy.ro/USISWashington-File200/O1-1l-13/eur235.htm (last visited
Mar. 2, 2002).
202. See David E. Sanger, Collision with China: The Overview; Bush is Demanding a
'Prompt'Return of Plane and Crew, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 3, 2001, at Al.
203. Miguel Diaz, Mexico: Free Trade Agreements Anyone?, U. S. - MEX. CHAMBER OF
COM., Jan. 2001, available at httpJ/www.usmcoc.org/naftaMexFTAs.html (last visited
Sept. 14, 2001)(This paper is part of the United State-Mexico Chamber of Commerce's
NAFTA Forum series, which considers general trade issues and sector-specific concerns
between the two nations); Mexico & Israel Sign a Free Trade Agreement, U. S. - MEX.
CHAMBER OF COM., Sept, 2000, available at httpJ/www.usmcoc.org/naftaMexlsra.html,
(last visited Sept. 14, 2001)(This paper is part of the United State-Mexico Chamber of
Commerce's NAFTA Forum series, which considers general trade issues and sector-
specific concerns between the two nations).
204. For example, it is assumed that the Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz auto and
truck factories in Mexico import some components, machinery and equipment from
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equipment and components from EU nations. Duty free treatment
under these agreements will eliminate most of the complexities of the
special decrees for those who enjoy the tariff reduction benefits under
the FTAs. In 2000, Mexico's total trade with Central and South
America was only 3% of its trade with Canada and Mexico, and its total
trade with the European Union nations is only 7% of North American
trade. 215 However, given the relatively high most-favored-nation duties
for most of Latin America, there is at least a potential for significant
increases in bilateral trade there, as well as with the European Union.
1. FTA with the European Union
The FTA with the European Union is likely to be Mexico's most
important FTA other than NAFTA. The European Union is the largest
common market in the world, made up of over 370 million people.2
The EU is in the process of expansion. Its current membership of 15
will be expanded to 20 or more within the next several years, and the
EU will then have a population approaching 500 million.207
There are significant differences between the European integration
process and more modest free trade agreements such as NAFTA. Since
the onset of free trade agreements, many analysts have tried to
compare that process to the European Union. Both systems seek to
establish trade preferences. However, they have different scopes and
purposes. In many respects, the process of European economic and now
political integration is best compared to the experience of the United
States in the few decades after 1789.
2
0
The FTA between the EU and Mexico responds to a predominantly
economic purpose. The purposes of the EU, in contrast, are much
broader. While the European Communities initially had a primarily
economic focus as well, from the outset the purposes of the European
Union were also political. This essential difference is clear in the
following features that characterize the EU, as opposed to the FTA.
The FTA between Mexico and the EU forms part of recent efforts by
the Mexican Government to liberalize trade. In 1986, Mexico became a
Germany.
205. Secretaria de Economia, Subsecretria de Negociaciones Comerciales
Internacionales, Comercio Total de Mexico, for 2000, http'//www.naftaworks.org (visited
Mar. 14, 2001).
206. European Union in Brief, European Union in the U.S., at
http://www.eurunion.org/profile/brief.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
207. Colin Jones, Knocking on the EU's Door: Members of East European Countries,
THE BANKER, May 1998, at 43.
208. See generally Manfred Zuleg, What Holds a Nation Together? Cohesion and
Democracy in the United States of America and the European Union, 45 AM. J. COMP. L.
505, 512 (1997).
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member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),"° and
in 1994 it entered the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). 1 °  Mexico has also strengthened its trading
position through regional agreements, including the NAFTA, as noted
earlier. The significance of NAFTA and its impact on the trading
relationship with Mexico attracted the keen interest of the EU. Trade
between Mexico and the EU has been seriously affected by NAFTA.
Despite the fact that the EU is Mexico's second-largest trading partner,
its trade only represents six percent of Mexico's foreign trade.21" '
Mexico's trade with the U.S. has expanded and constitutes 80 percent of
its total foreign trade.1
The downward trend in Mexico - EU trade has been largely
responsible for an EU decision to reinvigorate the trading relationship
between Mexico and the EU.13 In December 1997, both parties signed
an economic cooperation agreement. 14  After several years of
discussions, the FTA was concluded and became effective in July of
2000.215 The FTA provides for a bilateral, progressive and reciprocal
liberalization of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, under
the framework of Article XXIV of GATT 1994.216 The Agreement further
establishes other objectives, such as the opening of government
procurement markets of the parties; establishment of cooperation
agreements in the field of competition; consultation mechanisms on
intellectual property matters, and establishment of dispute settlement
mechanisms.2 7 In addition, there is a separate regulation on trade in
209. Stuart Auerbach, GATT Voting on Mexico's Membership, WASH. POST, July 16,
1986, at G1.
210. Robin Wright, U.S. Urges OECD to Broaden its Focus, Mandate; Relations: At
Annual Meeting in Paris, Mexico Becomes the Group's First New Member in 20 Years, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, June 9, 1994, at part D, p. 2, col. 3.
211. Michael McClintock, Sunrise Mexico; Sunset NAFTA-Centric FTAA - What Next
and Why?, 7 Sw. J. OF L. & TRADE AM. 1, 72 n. 434 (2000).
212. Id.
213. See Joel Millman and Geoff Winestock, EU and Mexico Reach Free-Trade Pact,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 24923416.
214. Global Agreement, Dec. 8, 1997, Mex. - E.C., available at http://economia-
brusselas.gob.mxlenglish/html/body-global.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2001); Interim
Agreement, Dec. 8, 1997, Mex. - E.C., available at http'//economia-
brusselas.gob.mx/english/html/body-interim.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2001); Final Act,
Dec. 8, 1997, Mex. - E.C., available at http://economia-
brusselas.gob.mx/english/html/bodyfinalact.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2001).
215. EUROPA, Entry into Force of EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Signals Start of
New Era in Europe's Relations with Mexico, at http'/lwww.europa.eu.int/ commJtradel
bilateral/mexico/
ftapr-en.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2001).
216. Decision 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council, Mar. 23, 2000, art. 1(a), Eur.
Union-Mex., available at http'//europa.eu.int/conmmtrade/pdf/en2_decision-goods.pdf
[hereinafter FTA].
217. Id. at art. 1(b-e).
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services.
The process will involve a transitional period, not to exceed ten
years,218 during which existing customs duties on imports and exports
are to be eliminated, and no new customs duties will be introduced. 9
Certain customs duties will be eliminated as soon as the FTA enters
into force, whereas others will be eliminated in successive stages,
following a schedule agreed to by the parties.20
The schedule is not the same for both parties. In general, the
Agreement requires the EU to liberalize its market earlier than
Mexico.2 " Mexican goods get duty-free status four years earlier than
EU goods.m When the Agreement enters into force, approximately 47.6
percent of EU exports of manufactured goods to Mexico will
immediately become duty-free, with the following subsequent
increments: 5.1 percent by 2003; 5.6 percent by 2005; and the
remaining 41.7 percent by 2007.m In contrast, 82 percent of Mexican
exports of manufactured goods to the EU will be duty-free upon the
Agreement's entry into force, with a subsequent phase-in of the
remaining 18 percent by 2003."A In the automobile sector, Mexico has
agreed to shorter timetables to reduce its tariffs, so as to achieve full
liberalization by the year 2003.22
The gradual elimination of duties is also supplemented by specific
provisions covering rules of origin. 6 By virtue of these provisions, EU-
harmonized rules of origin will apply to most industrial goods. (This
encompasses approximately 90 percent of the rules.) In certain areas
(for example, the automotive sector), a compromise was reached so that
Mexican companies would have time to adapt to European standards. 7
The FTA further prohibits the imposition of non-tariff restrictions,
such as quantitative restrictions, discriminatory or unfavorable
provisions, except under exceptional circumstances (safeguard and
shortage clauses).m In order to comply with these provisions,
218. FTA, supra note 216, at art. 2.
219. Id. at art. 3(3-4).
220. See generally id. at tit. II, arts. 5-10.
221. Compare id. at tit. II, art. 5 with id. at tit. II, art. 6.
222. See Subsecretaria de Negociaciones Comerciales Internacionales, Avances de la
Negociacion Comercial Mexico - UE, Rondas de Negociacion, at http://www.economia-




225. FTA, Annex II § C 2.1(iv), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdf/en2_annex_2.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2001).
226. See generally FTA, Annex III, tit. II, art. 2(1-2), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdfgen2_annex_3.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
227. See generally FTA, Annex II, § C.
228. See id. at tit. II, arts. 11-16.
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arrangements have been made to ensure cooperation between Mexican
and EU customs authorities. This cooperation will take place through
the exchange of information, the organization of training programs and
technical assistance mechanisms, the streamlining of customs
documents, the simplification of inspection procedures and formalities
and, in general, the improvement of working methods, transparency
and efficiency.2 9
Like NAFTA, the FTA includes provisions restricting duty
remission programs, 2o again designed to avoid the "export platform"
problem. The FTA provisions, effective January 1, 2003,231 differ
significantly from Article 303 of NAFTA. Most importantly, an exporter
may elect to opt out of preferential treatment for its finished products,
paying the EU MFN duties on the finished product but continuing to
receive a duty exemption from parts and components imported from
non-EU sources into Mexico. Nor is there a complex "lesser of the two"
rule for calculating Mexican duty liability. These provisions would, of
course, affect only exports to the EU; EU owned maquiladoras
exporting to the United States or Canada are subject to Article 303. For
EU companies with manufacturing subsidiaries in Mexico that focused
on exports to the United States and Canada, the FTA may provide
significant relief from Article 303 changes, to the extent that parts and
components are sourced from the EU.
The overall impact of the FTA with the EU on U.S. manufactured
exports to Mexico is quite difficult to assess, but there will undoubtedly
be some sectors in which Canadian and U.S. producers will lose their
competitive edge in the Mexican market vis a vis European producers.
This may occur relatively quickly given the extent to which EU exports
to Mexico become duty free over the six years, as noted above. For
example, prior to July 1, 2000, a Caterpillar tractor for agricultural use
made in the United States entered Mexico duty-free as of January 1,
1994, while Mexico's most-favored-nation tariff remained at 15%.2 A
similar tractor made by Volvo in Sweden was subject to the 15% duty
until July 1, 2000, when it was reduced to 10% under the FTA with the
EU,n3 and will presumably be zero within a few years.
2. Mexican FTAs in Latin America
Mexico's regional international trade negotiations formally began
229. See FTA, at art. 17.
230. See id. at Annex III, tit. IV, art. 14.
231. Id. at art. 14, para. 7.
232. NAFTA, supra note 1, at Annex 302.2(1)(a).
233. See SECON Website, listing for item 8701.90.11,
http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/aracom /cgi/aracomcgi/foxisapi.dll/aracom.ssnci.Aracom
(last visited Jun. 20, 2001).
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in August 1980 with the Treaty of Montevideo, which created the Latin
American Integration Association (ALADI). 4  This 11-member
commercial alliance (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) sought to
create a regional system of economic preferences within Latin
America.2 During the 1990's, Mexico concluded seven free trade
agreements in addition to NAFTA: the "Group of Three" (G-3)
Agreement with Colombia and Venezuela in 1994;236 the Mexico-Bolivia
FTA in 1994;237 the Mexico-Costa Rica FTA in 1994;' the Mexico-
Nicaragua FTA in 1997;0 9 the Mexico-Chile FTA in 1991, and expanded
in 1998;" the Mexico-Israel FTA in 2000;241 and the FTA with the
Triangle of the North (Guatemala-Honduras-El Salvador, effective
March 15, 2001).42 Currently, almost 90 percent of Mexican exports are
destined for the countries covered in these agreements, including
Canada and the U.S. under NAFTA.2 3  Additionally, Mexico and
MERCOSUR have recently announced - perhaps optimistically -- that
234. Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Association,
Aug. 12, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 672 (entered into force Mar. 18, 1981).
235. See id. at ch. I, art. 1.
236. Decreto de promulgacf6n del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos, la Reptiblica de Colombia y la Repfiblica de Venezuela, June 3, 1994, Mex.-
Colom.-Venez., D.O., 9 de enero de 1995 (Mex.), available at httpJ/www.economia-
snci.gob.mx/Tratados/pdfs/tlcg3.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
237. Decreto de promulgaci6n del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos y la Repfiblica de Bolivia, Sept. 10, 1994, Mex.-Bol., D.O., 11 de enero de 1995
(Mex.), available at http://www.economia-snci.gob.mxlTratados/pdfs/Tlcbol.pdf (last
visited Mar. 1, 2002).
238. Decreto de promulgacion del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos y la Repfiblica de Costa Rica, Apr. 5, 1994, Mex.-Costa Rica, D.O., 10 de enero
de 1995 (Mex.), available at http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/Tratados/pdfstlccr.pdf (last
visited Oct. 14, 2001).
239. Decreto de promulgacion del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre el Gobierno de los
Estados Unidos Mexicanos y el Gobierno de la Reptiblica de Nicaragua, Dec. 18, 1997,
Mex.-Nicar., D.O., 1 de julio de 1998 (Mex.), available at http://www.economia-
snci.gob.mxITratados/pdfsITLCNIC.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
240. Decreto promulgatorio del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre la Repfiblca de Chile
y los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Apr. 16, 1998, Chile-Mex., D.O., 28 de julio de 1999
(Mex.), available at httpJ/www.economia-snci.gob.nxTratados/pdfs/tlcchilel.pdf (last
visited Mar. 1, 2002).
241. Decreto promulgatorio del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos el Estado de Israel, Apr. 10, 2000, Mex.-Isr., D.O., 28 de junio de 2000 (Mex.),
available at http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/Tratados/pdfs/isral.pdf (last visited Mar. 1,
2002).
242. Decreto promulgatorio del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos y las Reptiblicas de El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras, June 29, 2000, Mex.-
El Sal.-Guat.-Hond., D.O., 14 de marzo de 2001 (Mex.), available at http://www.economia-
snci.gob.mx/Tratados/pdfs/TLC-Triangulo.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
243. Yadira Mena, Mexico Negociador Multilateral con Vision Bilateral [Mexico:
Multilateral Negotiator with a Bilateral Perspective], EL ECONOMISTA, Aug. 14, 1998,
available at http'/www.economista com. mx (last visited Aug. 28, 2001).
VOL. 30:1
2001 LEGAL & POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF NAFTA ART. 303 45
Mexico would become an associate member of MERCOSUR by 2004.2
Modeled to some extent after NAFTA, the above-mentioned free
trade agreements resemble one another in non-tariff content and
structure. They all include the liberalization of goods and services,
regulate intellectual property rights, include rules of origin, provide
investor protection and create dispute settlement mechanisms,
although language, terms and coverage vary considerably. Mexico's
shift to a more open economy has not always been favorably perceived
in Latin America, particularly by Brazil. 45 Since the ultimate objective
of ALADI is to form a Latin American Common Market, its members
were initially displeased with Mexico's engagement in NAFTA.
However, NAFTA gradually revealed the implicit "bridging"
opportunities. After all, North America constitutes the largest
consumer of goods and services in the Americas.
Moreover, the demand for increased trade and investment flows
has led to a proliferation of bilateral and trilateral free trade
agreements in the Western Hemisphere. These negotiations have
focused on Mexico (and to a lesser extent, on the Southern Cone
Common Market or Mercosur) for several reasons. Mexico is Latin
America's largest exporter and second largest market (after Brazil),M
with preferential access to the United States and Canada. Peripheral
economies seeking to secure commercial ties with the North American
alliance can do so by engaging Mexico in bilateral and multilateral free
trade agreements. Most of the agreements were proposed before the
conclusion of NAFTA, due to concerns that joining or affiliating with
the trade bloc would be more difficult after NAFTA's ratification.
Mexico apparently seeks to make full use of its NAFTA membership in
becoming the north-south commercial bridge and can justifiably claim a
leadership role in the free trade movement, a result that undoubtedly
has political as well as economic benefits for Mexico.
D. The Economic Slowdown in the United States
One of the most important influences on production decisions in
Mexico, largely independent of the Article 303 changes, is the impact of
a slowdown in the United States economy. In the short term, this may
have been more significant than all other factors put together, given
that roughly 80 percent of Mexico's manufactured goods are exported to
244. See John Nagel, Mercosur: Mercosur Invites Mexico to Join Hemispheric Trade
Bloc by 2004, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Sept. 8, 2000.
245. See Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, 1 FOREIGN
POLICY IN FoCus 27, Dec. 1996, available at http://www.foreignpolicy-
infocus.org/pdf/voll/27ifftaa.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
246. Mexico: US $25bn Plan Launched to Help Close the North-South Divide,
COUNTRYWISE PUBL'G LTD COUNTRY MKT REP., Apr. 4, 2001, at 1.
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the United States. 7 Because of the particularly sharp downtown in
high technology products and services in the United States, cutbacks in
production at Mexican suppliers are almost inevitable, and during 2001
there was a reduction in the maquiladora growth rate by three percent.
At least 11 percent of the workforce was laid off and perhaps as much
as 33 percent2A It is also possible that the U.S. economic slowdown, in
combination with additional manufacturing costs as a result of Article
303 and other competitive factors, has encouraged factory closings
which would not have otherwise have taken place, and resulted in
postponement of expansion plans for existing operations and
investment in new facilities.
There have been signs of this trend in the electronics sector, even
though its manufacturers in Mexico appear to have been well covered
by the PROSEC decree, that is, most of their non-NAFTA parts and
components are permitted duty free entry. Such Mexican firms as
Daewoo Electronics (consumer electronics), Sony Corporation (consumer
electronics), Acer Communications (computers), Sanyo Electronics
(consumer electronics), ALPS (keyboards), and SAFT America (cell
phone batteries) announced plans in early 2001 to curtail production,
consolidate factories, reduce employment, suspend operations or initiate
a combination of such changes. 9
IV. THE RESULTS OF IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 303
Given the recent nature of the Article 303 changes, it is too early
for a fully accurate analysis of the impacts. The reader is therefore
warned that these comments are more in the nature of speculation and
identification of likely trends.
A. Changes of Limited Significance for Many Sectors?
For most significant manufacturing sectors, such as electronics,
automotive, and the others covered by the PROSEC system, the
Mexican duty liability of the maquiladoras on non-NAFTA parts and
components may not be significantly higher than in the past under the
full duty remission system, assuming that the PROSEC program will
continue to apply to all or most of the parts and components that were
being imported from outside the region prior to January 1, 2001. As
247. See SUBSECRETARIA DE NEGOCIACIONES COMERCIALES INTERNACIONALES,
Comercio Total de Mexico, at http:www.naftaworks.orgformas/2000jlOOmxct.pdf (last
visited Sept. 4, 2001).
248. SECON, supra note 181, at 8 (reporting an 11% decline in employment); Geri
Smith, Mexico's Wagon is Hitched to a Falling Star, Bus. WK., Oct. 1, 2001, at 88
(reporting 500,000 layoffs, or a third of the total work work force).
249. COMMUNICATION FROM RICARDO RODRIGUEZ, OF KPMG TLJUANA, MEXICO, MAR.
14, 2001, REPORTING ON PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS OF ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY PLANS.
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noted earlier, this inclusive policy has been followed by Mexican
authorities in implementing the new rules, although there are signs
that Mexican authorities are reviewing PROSEC coverage more
carefully in recent months. The automobile industry, with its 62.5%
regional value added2 50 and integrated production in North America is
likely to be one of the least likely to consider production elsewhere.
Even if not all import items are covered by PROSEC, those who produce
for the domestic market as well as for export may be better off. They
will effectively receive duty waivers (or very low duties) on parts and
components used to produce the goods for sale in Mexico, which will
lower manufacturing costs for the Mexican domestic market
significantly. (In the past, those parts and components were fully
subject to Mexican MFN duties.) For these firms, the major costs of the
new regime may be the additional administrative burdens.
However, at the present time it is impossible to predict with any
certainty which items that currently enjoy PROSEC treatment will
remain eligible for duty-free or reduced duty entry for the longer term.
Clearly, such uncertainties, which are virtually inevitable in light of the
Mexican government's challenges as discussed under Part B, infra, will
remain for at least the foreseeable future, for virtually all sectors which
currently enjoy PROSEC coverage.
For sectors that are not covered the outlook is much more
pessimistic. A maquiladora that is dependent on imported parts and
components for its production that suddenly finds its materials costs
increasing by 10-15 percent or more will probably not be likely to
survive operating in Mexico, particularly if there are other options
available.
B. Balancing Finished Product Maquiladora Health Against New
Investment in Parts and Components Production
Ideally, the Mexican government, in consultation with producers of
both finished goods and parts and components, will in implementing the
PROSEC system distinguish carefully between parts and components
that can be produced in North America in adequate quantities, at world
competitive prices and quality, and those which cannot be. This is
probably the greatest challenge of the Article 303 changes, in the
future, recognizing that the current practice of simply granting all
requests for PROSEC treatment as the economy strengthens and
Mexican authorities gain more experience in implementing the
PROSEC program. In the longer term, if Mexican authorities err on the
side of an overly inclusive PROSEC program, they will deprive Mexico
of the investment and jobs that would come from new and existing parts
250. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 403(5)(a) (tariff in effect as of Jan. 1, 2002).
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and components producers. This would frustrate one of Mexico's major
objectives under NAFTA and probably engender criticism by the United
States if the ability of U.S. parts and components producers to sell in
the Mexican market is compromised by overly generous waiver of
normal import duties by Mexico under the PROSEC program.
On the other hand, if Mexican authorities unduly restrict the
availability of duty-free or reduced duty imports under the PROSEC
program, they will increase manufacturing costs in Mexico to the point
where some producers, particularly in the electronics and textile
sectors, shift new and/or existing production to Asia or to other low
labor cost nations in the Western Hemisphere. Thus, fine tuning of the
PROSEC system's coverage is vitally important in maintaining one of
the principal benefits of NAFTA for Mexico, hopefully on an objective
basis as freely as possible from threats from finished product or parts
and components producers/investors, existing and prospective.
C. The Legal Issues
In terms of Mexico's international legal obligations under NAFTA
and the WTO, the complex approach taken by Mexico with modifying its
trade laws and initiating the PROSEC program appears to present at
least a colorable case for compliance, with a few possible exceptions. As
noted earlier, the PROSEC program is consistent with Article 303 in
that the duty benefits are not tied to exports. Also, the program is not
an export subsidy under current WTO rules (applicable to Mexico as of
January 1, 2003), at least to the extent that in practice, as well as
written, PROSEC is made available to producers who are selling
finished goods in the domestic market.
251
The potential weaknesses in Mexico's new regime are four. First,
there is the legal argument that the PROSEC program is not tied to
exports, and thus not violative of Mexico's NAFTA and WTO
obligations. However, the connection is obvious; the December 31,
2001, Maquiladora Decree notes that "with the objective of increasing
their competitiveness, the businesses shall be able to enjoy
simultaneously the benefits of the Sectoral Promotion Program and of
the Export Maquiladora Program."=2  Also, there is the strong
possibility that the benefits will in operation disproportionately favor
members of the export-oriented maquiladora industry, even if those are
nominally available to all producers of specified goods. This could occur
as a result of a weak Mexican domestic market, the lack of
competitiveness of Mexican firms producing largely for the domestic
market, or administrative actions that make it difficult for non-exports
251. As of Nov. 1, 2001, of 2,963 PROSEC registrations, 348, or 12%, were for firms not
connected with export programs. SECON, supra note 181, at 18.
252. Maquiladora Decree, supra note 132, at sixth preambular paragraph.
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to enjoy the full benefits of the PROSEC program. There will be those
who will argue, perhaps not persuasively, that the new maquiladora -
PROSEC program is simply the old system with new clothing, and that
the new system is thus inconsistent with NAFTA and WTO rules. And,
as noted above, certain provisions of the Maquiladora Decree tie the
systems benefits to exports in apparent violation of Article 1106 of
NAFTA.
Secondly, there is at least a theoretical legal question whether
PROSEC's lower duty rates for the twenty-two industrial sectors, but
not for others, could be considered an actionable subsidy under the
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. This
turns on whether the subsidy is considered "specific" to an industry or
group of industries, or, rather, is generally available" to all Mexican
producers that wish to register for the program. The PROSEC program
is available to twenty-two industry sectors, but it is not available to
other sectors, and eligibility is specifically limited to producers of
certain listed products.2 " On the other hand, the system establishes
"objective criteria" governing eligibility and the amount of the subsidy
(duty-free or reduced duty treatment for imported parts and
components), 5 and a strong argument can also be made that the
twenty-two sectors represent such a large portion of the manufacturing
economy that the benefits are "generally available" and thus not
actionable under the SCM Agreement.
Third, as noted earlier, the revised maquiladora program still
incorporates limited ties between eligibility for other maquiladora
benefits and export requirements (exports of $500,000 or 10% of total
invoicing, 30% for benefits for machinery and equipment "). These
elements are probably inconsistent, not with Article 303, but with the
anti-performance requirements obligations (barring virtually any tie of
export performance to the establishment or operation of a foreign-
owned Mexican business) of Article 1106 and with Annex I of NAFTA.
(The latter requires the phasing out of any export requirements for the
maquiladoras by January 1, 2001. 57)
Another, in the author's view weaker, argument for NAFTA
inconsistency can be made against Mexico's decision not to charge
antidumping duties to maquiladora importers based on dumping orders
issued prior to January 1, 2001, despite a specific NAFTA provision to
253. See SCM Agreement, supra note 122, at art. 2.
254. See DIRECCION GENERAL DE SERVICIOS AL COMERCIO EXTERIOR DE SECOFI,
Programas de Promoci6n Sectorial (PROSEC), available at http:www.secofi-
dgsce.gob.mx/avisoimp2.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2002).
255. See Subsidies Agreement, supra note 122, at art. 2, 12.1(a)-(b).
256. Maquiladora Decree, supra note 132, at art. 4-A, paras. I-Il.
257. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at Annex I.
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the contrary.5 8 The Mexican decision was made on grounds that the
maquiladoras did not have the right to participate in the administrative
and judicial proceedings that resulted in the imposition of those duties,
and thus to protect their interest. In support of that position, it is
notable that the NAFTA bar is to antidumping and countervailing
duties that are "applied pursuant to a Party's domestic law.. .25s If
Mexican law does not permit applying the antidumping duties in such
circumstances, neither the U.S. or Canada is in a strong position to
object.
With regard to all of these legal questions, it is again important to
point out that the likelihood of a legal challenge by the United States or
Canadian governments is remote, given that the maquiladora
beneficiaries of the new maquiladora/PROSEC system are
overwhelming U.S. (and to a much lesser extent, Canadian) owned
firms, and the U.S. consumer.
D. Effects of Other Factors
What is the likely effect of decreasing U.S. customs duties on
finished products from non-NAFTA countries, making the NAFTA duty
benefits for some products, such as most consumer electronics and
computer products, largely irrelevant? There is likely in time to be
some shifting of some production, particularly in the electronics sector,
to China or other lower cost markets, where wages and some other costs
are lower, and there is less red tape and are more tax benefits." The
major Asian owned electronics firms operating in Ciudad Juarez, San
Luis, Mexicali and Tijuana already have production facilities in many
other countries, so that cost increases in Mexico may encourage other
manufacturing options. One of the risks of creating a preferential
trading scheme such as NAFTA, where tariff rates may be in conflict
with global comparative advantage, is that over time as global tariffs
are reduced the value of the preferences also declines. This is
inevitable unless one believes that the trends of the past fifty-four years
are likely to be reversed, although it will undoubtedly be many years
before Mexican external tariffs are reduced to the negligible range.
Thus, United States and Canadian exporters to Mexico will continue to
benefit from Mexico's low NAFTA tariffs, at least with nations that do
not yet have free trade agreements with Mexico, even if Mexican
producers exporting to the United States do not.
258. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 303(2)(a) (specifically precluding waiver of
antidumping or countervailing duties).
259. Id.
260. Geri Smith, Is the Magic Starting to Fade for Manufacturing in Mexico?, BUS.
Wy-, Aug. 6, 2001, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/contentl1_32/b3744085.htm (last visited Mar. 5,
2002); see also SECON, supra note 181.
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In terms of Mexican manufacturing and investment, as indicated
earlier, there are many benefits to serving the U.S. market from Mexico
rather than Asia or even the Caribbean beyond tariff differentials and
low labor costs. These include not only legal protection of investment
under NAFTA and relative political stability, but the convenience of
truck transportation and access to the Interstate highway system in the
United States, the ability to meet "just in time" delivery obligations to
customers and, particularly for smaller American firms, the language,
cultural and travel disadvantages of operating in Asia. (The major
obstacles to doing business in Mexico, such as corruption, drug-related
and other crime, limited access to credit, significant defects in the legal
and educational systems and border congestion, are present in most of
the alternatives, in Asia and elsewhere.) It seems unlikely that those
firms with established operations, particularly American-owned firms,
would pull up stakes in large numbers, unless they already have
unused capacity elsewhere in the world or there is a major increase in
manufacturing costs in Mexico, an avoidable problem for most
industries covered by the PROSEC program. It is even less likely that
in an economic downturn that a firm currently producing in Mexico
would engage in the costs and risks of establishing a new plant making
the same product somewhere else, particularly at a time when political
uncertainties in China and Indonesia cannot be ignored.
For smaller American firms, there may be Caribbean or Central
American locales, particularly in the textile and apparel sectors, that
are viable compromises between Asia and Mexico. Duty waiver for
imported parts and components is still available, and access to the U.S.
market under the expanded Caribbean Basin Initiative is available on
NAFTA-like tariff treatment, even if restrictions still apply to some
textiles and other import sensitive goods, and transportation to the
United States may be less convenient.
China's WTO accession and the elimination of textile quotas in a
few more years is probably more significant, particularly if Mexico is
unwilling or unable to give Mexican producers full relief from the high
Mexican duties on textile products. Even with high tariffs, Chinese
labor costs for textiles and apparel are well below those in Mexico, and
the attraction of lower cost Chinese production may be irresistible for
some. At the same time, the Chinese regulatory framework for trade
and foreign investment is neither simple nor friendly, particularly for
smaller companies.26' Travel and transportation to and from the United
States is time-consuming and expensive, and the costs involved in
shipping U.S. origin parts and components to China may be prohibitive.
The overall impact of Mexico's other free trade agreements on
Mexico exports to the United States and investment in Mexican
261. See Shai Oster, Nothing Ventured, ASIA WEEK, July 27, 2001, at 57.
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facilities is difficult to assess, although it appears that the impact will
be largely positive. The FTA facilitates efforts by EU firms, such as
Volkswagen, to maintain a low cost production base for the U.S.
market.262 It is also difficult to tell whether new European investment
is a result of the FTA, of other competitive factors, or both, although
early anecdotal evidence suggests that the focus of that investment is
on production for the U.S. market.2 6 The number of European firms
who will shift production to Mexico for the United States and Canadian
markets, presumably those that import parts and components from
Europe, is difficult to estimate. In time, the ability of Mexico-located
firms to enjoy duty free access to many other Latin American markets
could become significant, particularly if Mexico is able to conclude an
FTA with MERCOSUR, and thereby gain access to the huge Brazilian
market. 26 For some U.S. exporters to Mexico, the loss of preferential
tariff access to the Mexican market vis-o-vis the European Union
nations will have an adverse impact on their competitiveness.
From Mexico's point of view, the increased viability of Mexican
production for EU markets (and the markets of other Mexican FTA
partners as well as for the United States and Canada) is also
important.2  Some economists believe that there is room for
considerable growth in this sector,2'  although whether Mexican
factories can compete with facilities in Eastern Europe for the EU
market remain to be seen. Certainly, the fact that there is now a
United Kingdom consulate in Monterrey, Mexico, and EU investment in
Mexico is increasing, are positive sign." '
The impact of many of these factors may well be exacerbated, or
masked, by the economic downturn in the United States, which as
noted earlier has been at least partially responsible for reductions in
production and employment in the Mexican electronics sector. The fact
that the electronic sector, more than most others, has been relatively
well-protected by duty free treatment afforded under the PROSEC
262. See Chris Kraul, EU Pact Should Boost Mexico's Auto Industry, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
1, 1999, at Al.
263. See Fieri Smith, Is the Magic Starting to Fade? BuSINESS WEEK., Aug. 6, 2001, at
43. For example, Philips Electronics is constructing a color picture tube factory at a cost
of $225 million, and several other Dutch companies (packaging, brewers' vats) are also
investing with an eye toward sales in the United States and Canada.
264. Brazil's economy is twenty-two percent larger than Mexico's, but its foreign sector
is only slightly more than a third the size of Mexico's. See CIA - The World Factbook
2000 - Brazil, available at http://www.odci.gov/ciapublications/factbook/geos/br.html (last
visited Mar. 4, 2002), and CIA - The World Factbook 2000 - Mexico,
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ mx.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2002).
265. Adrian Croft, Mexico's Fox Vows to Step Up Trade With Europe, REUTERS, Jan.
26, 2001, available at http://www.naftaworks.orglpapers/2001/davos.htm (last visited
Sept. 7, 2001).
266. Vargas, Maquiladoras 2000, supra note 21, at 3.
267. See Millman, supra note 263, at A9.
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decrees, and is still cutting back suggests that even where these
changes are attributed to Article 303 there are other factors at play.
United States' owned maquiladoras, as noted earlier, are less likely
to move, at least in the short and medium term (1-3 years) because of
the strong interdependence between Mexican production and U.S.
produced parts and components, often from related companies. With an
estimated $45 billion in parts and components exports to Mexico, this is
a significant sector of the United States economy, representing around
40% of total U.S. exports to Mexico.2  In addition, any significant
downturn in the Mexican economy, as in December 1994, could greatly
reduce United States' finished goods exports to Mexico.
V. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding some delays on the part of Mexican authorities
and a good deal of confusion for industry personnel and government
officials alike, Mexico has managed to replace its export-oriented
maquiladora legal structure with a new system combining maquiladora
benefits with special sector programs designed to keep maquiladora
production competitive in the United States and Canadian markets.
These new structures are in their major features largely compliant with
the requirements of NAFTA and the WTO agreements, despite some
arguable exceptions noted earlier. However, the international legal
questions, despite their fascination for law professors, are clearly not
the most important ones.
In fact, the future may bring problems. In the immediate future,
Mexican authorities are in a "Catch-22" situation: if they give favored
sectors (autos, electronics, textiles) near blanket duty waivers under the
PROSEC program as currently appears to be the practice, they may
discourage investment in Mexican parts and components production,
and injure some U.S. producers of parts and components exported to
Mexico. If they deny PROSEC protection for important parts and
components, the finished product manufacturers may shift their
production to lower operating cost sites, further exacerbating an
unemployment problem among the maquiladoras and possibly
discouraging new investment in production of finished products. The
uncertaintly for the maquiladoras is not helpful.
Mexico's competitive advantages as a manufacturing platform for
the United States market are adversely affected to some extent by
factors both within and without the Mexico and NAFTA, ranging from
268. See In-Bond Industry /Industria Maquiladora 2001, supra note 18; see also U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. Trade Balance with Mexico, available at
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html (visited Mar. 2, 2002) (stating
U.S. exports to Mexico were $111.349 million in 2000).
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the U.S. recession to lower U.S. MFN tariffs to increasing
attractiveness of production elsewhere in Latin America, the Caribbean
and Asia, as well as the complexities of doing business, all as discussed
earlier. The general advantages of Mexican production, proximity to
the United States and its highway system, reasonable wage costs, a
complex but generally pro-business investment environment, cordial
relations between the United States and Mexican governments, relative
political stability and an increasingly democratic system, a language
spoken by 30 million Americans, and NAFTA's investment protections
and guaranteed tariff elimination, remain. Nevertheless, the outlook
for continued robust growth of the United States-Mexico trade and
investment, fueled in the past in significant part by the growth of the
maquiladora sector, is inevitably somewhat cloudier than it has been in
recent years.
NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT
GUSTAVO VEGA-CANoVAS"
INTRODUCTION
Mexico and the United States share both a long border and a long
history of economic integration. Mexico is currently the United States'
second largest trading partner after Canada, accounting approximately
for ten to eleven percent of United States' exports and imports. The
United States, on the other hand, is Mexico's dominant trading partner,
accounting for more than two-thirds of both imports and exports and far
outdistancing Mexico's trade with Europe, Japan, the rest of Latin
America, and Canada. The United States is also the major source of
foreign investment flows in the Mexican economy, accounting for more
than seventy percent of the total. Labor market integration is also very
high. Mexican migrant labor has had a large impact on the United
States economy by increasing the labor supply -an effect probably
greater than that arising from increased United States-Mexican
commodity trade, foreign investment or financial transactions. At least
ten percent of the growth of the United States labor supply since World
War II is due to Mexican migrants.
Not all of the impacts of this deepening integration between both
countries, has been beneficial. In recent decades and especially since
the inception of the Maquiladora program in the mid-sixties, the
environment has become a highly charged regional issue, particularly
in urban clusters along the United States-Mexico border. Whether it is
the dumping of raw sewage, over irrigation, or overuse of fertilizers,
environmental policies and practices in each country affect its neighbor.
According to recent estimates, environmental conditions have worsened
' This paper was originally delivered at the Regional Conference of the American Society
of International Law: "NAFTA-Unresolved Issues: Dispute Resolution, Environment,
Labor and Transportation", organized by the International Legal Studies Program,
University of Denver College of Law, in the City of Denver, Colorado, March 30, 2001.
' Professor, Center for International Studies at El Colegio de M6xico, Mexico City, Mexico;
and Visiting professor and Associate Director of the Center for North American Studies,
Duke University, 1998-1999. He is presently a member and chair of the review panel for
the Final Determination of the Mexican Ministry of Trade and Industrial Promotion
concerning the imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup from the United States File MEX-
USA-98-1904-01 and is also member of the National System of Researchers (SNI) of the
Education Ministry of Mexico.
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along the United States-Mexico border over the past decade. Explosive
growth has created new jobs and raised incomes, but it has been
accompanied by more pollution.
Worsening conditions in the environment along the United States-
Mexico border date back to the 1970's and deteriorated even further
during the "lost decade" of deep economic crisis in Mexico in the 1980's.
It shouldn't be surprising that the proposal to deepen economic
integration through a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
provoked such a sharp opposition from the environmental community in
the United States. According to environmental groups, the increased
industrial growth that NAFTA would produce would further deteriorate
Mexico's environmental infrastructure, lax enforcement of
environmental laws would encourage "environmental dumping" and
increased competition would provoke a "race to the bottom," a
weakening of environmental standards in all three countries. They
demanded that any trade agreements should include strong safeguards
against real or potential abuses.
NAFTA was initially opposed by most major United States
environmental groups, and environmental group opposition was a
significant factor influencing opposition by many democratic members
of the United States Congress. From the onset of NAFTA negotiations,
Democratic members of Congress pressed the Republican
administration of past-President George Bush, senior, to make NAFTA
more environment-friendly, and the Bush administration negotiated
some basic provisions protective of the environment with the
governments of Canada and Mexico. As part of his presidential
campaign, past-President William Clinton proposed the negotiation of
supplemental agreements on the environment and labor.
When President Clinton entered office, a majority of members of
Congress were democrats. However, because a substantial number of
Democrats in Congress opposed NAFTA, the President's strategy for
seeking approval of the agreement was to maintain support for it
among Republicans, while persuading moderate Democrats to vote in
its favor. The Republicans were largely opposed to including
environment or labor related provisions in NAFTA. The moderate
democrats demanded such provisions. To satisfy both constituencies,
the President chose to negotiate two supplemental agreements which
gave the impression of addressing environmental and labor concerns,
but which would not threaten to impose any significant costs on United
States business enterprises. Clinton also chose not to spend large sums
of federal money on improving conditions in United States and Mexican
border communities. In the absence of a United States commitment to a
regional bank, Canada and Mexico preferred a less confrontational
approach to dealing with environmental issues in the region and did not
agree to key United States demands, particularly enforcement
provisions. Thus, the NAFTA side accord on environment did not
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deliver on some of Clinton's ambitious environmental promises. Such a
situation has meant that major environmental groups which initially
supported NAFTA and the parallel side agreements have become
increasingly dissatisfied with government efforts to deal with
environmental issues in the region and have since opposed new trade
initiatives.
Do the last seven years since NAFTA and the parallel side
agreements went into effect, justify the criticisms of environmental
groups?
This paper, attempts to respond to this question by analyzing the
terms of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC) and its implementation history.
THE NAAEC
Both the NAAEC and the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation (NAALC) have a common background, institutional
framework, general norm structure and more or less a similar
implementation history. These commonalities are partly explained by
the fact that both agreements were negotiated out of the political
necessity to gain political support for NAFTA from the United States
Congress and not a genuine political commitment to address regional
environmental and labor issues. This fact in turn explains the limited
impact of the institutional mechanisms contemplated in the NAAEC
and the NAALC. The following discussion focuses on the environment
related agreement: the NAAEC
The NAAEC was created to establish a "framework.. .to facilitate
effective cooperation on the conservation, protection and enhancement
of the environment" 1 and set up an institution, the North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) to facilitate joint
activities and mediate environmental disputes.
Part 1 of the NAAEC comprises an ambitious set of objectives
including the protection and improvement of the environment, the
promotion of sustainable development, and enhanced compliance with
and enforcement of environmental laws. Part 2 imposes on the parties
to periodically issue reports on the state of their environment, to
develop environmental emergency preparedness measures, to promote
environmental education, to develop environmental technology and
scientific research; to assess environmental impacts; and to "ensure
that [their] laws and regulations provide for high levels of
environmental protection."'
1. North American Agreement in Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), Sept. 14,
1993, 32 ILM 1480, 1482; Preamble, available at http://www.naaec.gc.ca/english/resource/
Download/naaec.doc (last visited October 23, 2001).
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Part 3 of the NAAEC establishes the CEC with three components:
the Council; the Secretariat; and, the Joint Public Advisory Committee
(JPAC). The Council consists of the three environment ministers of the
parties, and is the executive decision-making body of the CEC. The
Secretariat serves at the direction of the Council and its officials are
independent of the party governments. The NAAEC establishes an
inter-party dispute settlement mechanism that permits claims based on
an allegation of persistent failure to enforce environmental laws. A
party that is found to have consistently failed to enforce such laws is
expected to devise and implement an "action plan" to remedy this
situation. If an action plan is not accepted or implemented, a monetary
fine may be imposed on the recalcitrant party. The maximum fine is a
modest amount and it is to be expended at the direction of the Council
to remedy the situation of non-compliance in the defaulting party
In addition to the inter-party dispute settlement mechanism,
private parties (including interest groups) may file petitions with the
Secretariat requesting the preparation of a "factual record." If certain
threshhold requirements are determined by the Secretariat to be met,
the Secretariat will request the Council to authorize the preparation of
a factual record. The Council may approve the recommendation to
prepare a factual record by a two-thirds vote. The Secretariat is
responsible for developing and preparing the factual record, and
submitting it to the Council. The Council may approve the publication
of the factual record by a two thirds-vote.
THE NAAEC IMPLEMENTATION HISTORY
When one carefully studies the different provisions of the NAAEC
and takes into account its implementation history so far, several
observations can be made:
First, the NAAEC parties are not subject to specific requirements
in terms of environmental protection. Each party is free to determine its
own level of protection and to modify its rules. In other words, this main
substantive obligation was deliberately drafted to be imprecise. It was
clear to all governments involved in the negotiations that the US was
not seeking an agreement which would impose significant compliance
obligations.
The Secretariat may prepare and publish a "factual record". The
publication of a factual record serves a transparency and publicity
function. While NAAEC governments may alter their behavior based on
adverse publicity, there is no legal obligation that arises from the
publication of an adverse factual record. Intergovernmental dispute
settlement in the context of the NAAEC is limited to claims that a party
has persistently failed to enforce its environmental laws. This standard
has been difficult and will be difficult to apply. Only in rare
circumstances do governments persistently enforce their laws, relying
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instead on voluntary compliance by most persons. It shouldn't be a
surprise therefore, that so far there have been no initiatives regarding
persistent failure to enforce environmental law, and hence this
mechanism remains untested.
Second, the NAAEC did not mean to change and has resulted in
little change in the identity of persons who make environment-related
decisions in the country-parties. Political decisions relating to the
environment in each country-party continue to be made by the relevant
authorities responsible for the environment before the NAAEC entered
into force.
The NAAEC has facilitated some interaction among NAFTA
governments in respect to environmental matters. Representatives of
the governments meet together on a regular basis in various NAAEC
fora. The NAAEC institutions have had success in establishing a range
of research and cooperation programs with respect to the North
American environment. The CEC in particular has developed specific
programs and project implementation in five priority areas:
Pollutants and Health. Projects in this area include the
identification of priority pollutants and development of action plans to
reduce the risks associated with toxic substances; 2 the elaboration and
publication of an annual North American Pollutant Release and
Transfer Register (PRTR); training programs to enhance pollution
prevention; and development of tools to monitor and improve North
American air quality
Environment, trade and the economy. This program identifies links
between environmental variables and economic indicators and reports
on NAFTA-environmental effects;3
Environmental Conservation. The purpose of this program is to
promote the protection and conservation of North American
biodiversity;4
Enforcement. The program monitors and reports on the
2. Actions plans were established to phase out four pollutants: chlordane, DDT,
PCBs and mercury.
3. Phase I of this program identified four major linkages between the NAFTA and
environmental changes in Canada, Mexico and the United States Phase II will develop a
general analytical framework to assess the environmental effects of NAFTA through the
study of specific issues in key sectors such as automotive-transportation, energy-
petrochemicals, and forestry. Environmental impact studies on maize in Mexico, cattle
feedlots in Canada and the United States and electricity in the three NAFTA countries
were used to test and refine the framework for analysis of the NAFTA effects.
4. Projects in this area have identified important resting and nesting areas for
migratory birds and developed ecoregion maps to assess their conservation status and
water resources. This program also developed a North American Biodiversity Information
Network to link the databases of various agencies and make biodiversity information
accessible to the public
2001
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
implementation and enforcement of environmental standards and
promotes regional cooperation to improve environmental laws and
regulations;
Information and Public Outreach. The objective of this program is
to promote environmental awareness and provide the general public
with environmental information;
Even though the CEC was devised not to effect any change in the
way environmental policy is carried out in the three countries, the CEC
has managed nevertheless to produce some change in
intergovernmental conduct in developing Article 13 reports of which
the CEC has produced 3 so far;
Of these three, the most significant has been the investigation of
the death of migratory birds in the Silva Reservoir in Mexico which
concluded that Mexico, was not responsible for the problem.6 A scientific
panel identified specific actions to deal with the issue, but the final CEC
recommendation to the Mexican government was only to conduct a
comprehensive evaluation and propose solutions. As a result of the
Silva report, an action program for the State of Guanajuato was
developed, the state's first environmental council was created, and
workshops on the Turbio River and waste-water treatment were
established.7
It is interesting to note that this report was a result of a petition
filed with the CEC by the National Audubon Society, the Grupo de los
Cien Internacional and the Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental.
The petition to the Secretariat was not submitted as a request for the
preparation of a factual record, but was instead submitted as a request
that the Secretariat prepare a report on an environmental matter. This
approach was supposedly adopted by the NGOs to avoid creating a
5. NAAEC Article 13 permits the Secretariat to prepare reports within the scope of
its approved annual work program, and to prepare reports "on any other environmental
matter related to the cooperative functions of this agreement," unless two-thirds of the
Council object. Such reports will be made publicly available, unless the Council
unanimously decides otherwise.
6. Initial allegations concerning the cause of the deaths had suggested a single
dumping of toxins by an unknown party, or a more systematic dumping of toxic wastes by
a local industrial plant or plants. See Anthony DePalma, Deaths of Birds in Mexico Lake
Test trade Pact, NY TIMES, June 8, 1995 at A4 and Anthony DePalma, Treaty Partners
Study Fate of Birds at Polluted Mexican Lake, NY TIMES, Aug. 1, 1995, at B6.
7. The second report analyzed the long-range transport of air pollutants in North
America. This report provided a technical basis that can be used for coordination of air
pollutions policies in North America. The third report examined the water base in the
resting stops of migratory birds along the upper San Pedro River which originates in
Sonora, Mexico, and runs north into Arizona. The report found that the current level of
development of the aquifer is unsustainable, recommended specific measures for water
conservation, and pointed out the need for a bi-national coordinating structures to
produce and implement action plans.
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confrontational atmosphere.
The results of the case seem to suggest that in a broad sense the
NAAEC appears to have enhanced the capacity of domestic interest
groups to engage national government decision-makers in international
relations, The capacity of environmental groups afforded by the NAAEC
to internationalize the Silva Reservoir problem may have facilitated a
more satisfactory investigation and report on the incident than would
have been forthcoming in the absence of the CEC. Without the CEC, the
matter would likely have been pursued through charges and
countercharges between Mexican government authorities and NGOs,
played out before the press. Significantly, the CEC provided a
mechanism by which a major United States-based environmental
organization was able to coordinate an investigation in Mexican
territory with the cooperation of the Mexican government." Prior to the
establishment of the CEC structure, it is doubtful that the National
Audubon Society would have been able to pressure the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (or USTR) to persuade the Mexican
government to allow a trilateral team of scientists to investigate the
incident.
The NAAEC may have altered political relations between Mexico
and the U.S. by providing a framework in which the EPA could more
legitimately claim to examine Mexico's international governance. Also
at the domestic level, it seems unlikely that the Mexican government
would have responded seriously to a petition from Mexican
environmental interest groups absent the internationalization of the
incident.
CONCLUSION
This conclusion that NAAEC appears to have enhanced the
capacity of domestic interest groups to engage national government
decision-makers in international relations and indirectly influence
government policy seems to hold also in the case of the processing of
citizens submissions and developing factual reports pursuant to Articles
fourteen and fifteen of the NAAEC. The CEC can investigate citizens'
complaints about national enforcement of environmental laws. Between
1995 and August 2000, twenty-eight citizens' submissions on
enforcement matters were registered: nine regarding Canadian
enforcement, eleven regarding Mexican enforcement and eight
regarding United States enforcement.
8. It is worth pointing out that when the CEC created the panel of experts composed
of scientists from the three NAFTA parties to investigate, report and make
recommendations on the matter, the Mexican government welcomed the appointment of
the team.
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The Secretariat ruled that seven of these submissions did not
warrant the cost of developing a factual record, one submission was
withdrawn by the submitters and in four cases the Secretariat informed
the Council that submissions warranted developing a factual record.
The Council instructed the Secretariat to prepare a factual record in the
Cozumel Pier case against Mexico, The British Columbia hydroelectric
dams case against Canada and the Tijuana smelter case against
Mexico. The Council voted down the development of a factual record on
the Quebec animal production pollution case against Canada. Two
factual records have been published to date.
After the Cozumel factual record was compiled, the Council did not
make any recommendation to the Mexican government. Despite the
lack of action of the Council on this matter and the initial disregard of
the record by the Mexican government (which permitted the work to
continue), this submission yielded some positive results; it prevented
the development of a larger tourism infrastructure; it pushed the
Mexican government to declare Cozumel island a protected natural
area and most importantly it involved civil society in ecological
regulation of the island.
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For Mexicans, the United States has been, historically, dream and
nightmare, opportunity and risk. It continues to be so. After the
tormented relationships of the Nineteenth Century, many
contemporary Mexicans believe that the best there can be between
Mexico and the United States is desert, a long and dry distance as
barrier against the danger and threat coming from the north. At the
same time, Octavio Paz called the United States at mid-century: "that
place were men breathed with easiness the rare atmosphere of the
future." Reacting to fear or searching for opportunities, Mexico has
always sought an understanding with its powerful neighbor. It was
quite reasonable to do so. More than that, it has been, and still is, a
national imperative.
What do I mean by an understanding between Mexico and the
United States? To "understand" is something of a bridge and something
of shared code. It is a bridge between past and future. In other words,
while both countries should avoid amnesia, both should also refuse to be
devoured by prejudice, to be petrified in the past, to be diluted or
disintegrated in an image that will not last.
To "understand" each other also means to share a common code of
behavior and languages. It means to create rules, practices of behavior
and univocal tools to deal with one another. To reach an understanding
means to achieve specific commitments and responsibilities for each
party in order to accomplish superior objectives, particularly in light of
the states' differing interests and idiosyncrasies. Therefore,
understanding should leave no place for unilateral impositions or
subjugation.
During the second half of the last century there was a fundamental
understanding between both nations. Mexico did not confront the
United States in its strategic interests and United States did not force
the consent of Mexico, when other non-strategic interests were at stake.
' This paper was originally delivered at the Regional Conference of the American Society
of International Law: "NAFTA-Unresolved Issues: Dispute Resolution, Environment,
Labor and Transportation", organized by the International Legal Studies Program,
University of Denver College of Law, in the City of Denver, Colorado, March 30, 2001.
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In the nineteen-nineties, the government of Mexico made a decision
that was to change this fundamental equation. With the decision to
negotiate and to enact a treaty of free trade with the United States and
Canada, Mexico decided to leave aside the concept and reality of
implicit understandings, and boldly move toward a deliberate
agreement. This agreement is built upon mandatory rules in a very
wide group of commercial topics, with important consequences in the
economic regulation of Mexico. That decision has had many
implications, some of which I shall explore in a few minutes.
The logic behind the decision was momentous but simple: Mexico
would transform itself to reap the benefits of economic globalization and
focus on achieving sustained economic growth. In the era of
globalization, Mexico should not stand defenseless and in isolation.
In order to recapture a path of stable growth in the early nineteen-
nineties, it was imperative for Mexico to open and deregulate its
economy and to insert itself, in a competitive way, in world trade.
Therefore, since 1985, Mexico has used bilateral, multilateral, and
regional negotiations to improve the conditions for access of its export
products.
The entrance to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in 1986 was the first important step in Mexico's new strategy of
international negotiations.1 A second step followed with the conclusion
of the "Understanding with the US on Consultations as regards Trade
and Investment" (Framework Agreement) at the end of 1987.2 The
Framework Agreement established a formal outline of principles and
procedures to negotiate reductions in the commercial barriers and to
approach disputes regarding trade and investment.
However, soon enough, it was evident that across-the-board
reductions of the existent commercial barriers could not be achieved
within the General Framework. The process of sector-by-sector
negotiation is too cumbersome and exhausting and, at best, only
produces marginal results. Indeed, these negotiations did not take into
account inter-sector relationships, prevented global balancing of costs
and benefits, and gave undue influence to special interest groups. On
the other hand, as is well known, GATT requires extending to third
countries any tariff reduction granted under specific sector
negotiations.
The operation of the United States Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) was another important element for Mexico. Nearly
3.5 billion dollars in Mexican products qualified under the GSP in
1. MEXICAN OFFICIAL GAZETrE, November 26,1986
2. Understanding on Consultations as regards Trade and Investment, TIAS Edition,
12395, Mexico, 1987.
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1991. 3 However, the application of the system by the United States had
many discretionary elements. Particularly, the authority to make
exclusions of products if their imports surpass the established limits of
competitiveness, or if an American producer presents a dissent
application for damage caused by foreign imports.4 These discretionary
elements imply that the most competitive products are eliminated
eventually creating uncertainty in exporters and hindering investment
decisions.
On the other hand, although the average tariff to which Mexican
exports were subject when entering the American market was low
(three percent),5 this average blurred a strong dispersion in the
obligations and the existence of important tariff picks. Many of
Mexico's most competitive products, were subject to tariffs superior to
twenty percent, and others paid rates that oscillated between thirty-
eight and seventy-seven percent.6
The biggest obstacle to free access to the Mexican products came
from non-tariff barriers and from the implementation, with protective
purposes, of United States legislation concerning the so-called "disloyal
practices." This was seen in the cases of Mexican cement, of the quotas
established for textiles and steel and of phyto-sanitary norms that
constituted important non-tariff barriers for many agricultural
products. It was also the time when Mexican avocadoes were forbidden
because of the alleged presence worms, which had actually been long
eradicated.
Lastly, it is necessary to remember that the "Omnibus Trade Act"
of 1988 which, by introducing the concept of "unfair trade," opened the
door to new forms of unilateral protectionism.7 In turn, a climate of
harmful uncertainty to the interests of Mexico resulted.
NAFTA is the most suitable mechanism to solve these and other
problems. It allows business deals and investment flows among the
three member countries to have a clear and permanent legal framework
and to have swift dispute settlement mechanisms. Additionally,
NAFTA has a long-term reach, allowing for differentiated adjusting
periods appropriate to the necessities of the most sensitive sectors,
something that is indispensable to minimize the costs of structural
change.
The political decision to promote NAFTA, in February of 1990,





7. Ronald A. Cass, Velvet Fist in an Iron Glove: The Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, REGULATION , Vol. 14, no. 1, Winter 1991.
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considered the impact on our country of the increasing resources needed
for structural change in Central and Eastern Europe.8 The decision was
to stop linking domestic growth to more foreign debt, but to link it
instead to direct investment strategy and to take advantage of an
additional instrument to accelerate the growth of the Mexican economy.
What were, and are, the objectives of NAFTA? Of course, the three
NAFTA partners share some objectives: that of eliminating, or at least
minimizing, sudden changes in the commercial policies of a country
that may affect the interests of their commercial partners or impose
new barriers to trade among those countries. But, within this great
common purpose, different particular objectives contribute to explain
the architecture of the agreement.
For Mexico: the fundamental objectives were to reduce the
vulnerability and uncertainty for its exporters in order to promote
external sales, to increase investment flows, and to elevate job creation.
At the same time, NAFTA, together with other international
commitments such as the GATT and the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development to (OECD), assured, for potential
investors, the sustainability and permanency of the market policies
undertaken in the late nineteen-eighties and early nineteen-nineties.
For the United States: the treaty represents an opportunity for its
companies and workers to recover competitiveness and participate more
efficiently in the world markets. In that sense, its high-priority
objective was to assure access to wider and surer investment
opportunities, and also to participate in the services markets,
traditionally much more closed than the markets of goods. Therefore,
with Mexico as the United States' third commercial partner, the growth
potential of United States exports was significant. That belief was fully
justified as has been proven by the three-fold increase in bilateral trade
since NAFTA negotiations began. 9
For Canada: the main objective was to protect its free trade
agreement with the United States, and to get access to the Mexican
market at least in the same terms as the United States. Particularly,
Canada was interested in safeguarding its position reached in the free
trade agreement, in sectors such as auto-parts and energy. Lastly,
Canada is one of the four important actors in international commercial
negotiations (next to the European Economic Community, Japan and
8. OECD experts estimated a diversion of investment from traditional countries
towards Central European nations. As a matter of fact, the Bank for Reconstruction and
Development was created to channel public and private resources towards that area of the
world. Mexico is a founding member of the Bank. OECD, ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, 1990.
9. In 1992, total trade between Mexico and the U.S. was 82,869 million. By year
2000 total trade jumped to 275,660 million. 2001, despite resetion in both counries, trade
amounted to 254,071 million. Banco de Mexico ANNUAL REPORT 2001.
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the United States) and in and of itself, it could not allow, for strategic
and historical reasons, to remain outside of NAFTA. A preservation of
status seems then to have been another important element to assure a
place at the NAFTA table of negotiations.
Having said all of this, it is crucial to understand NAFTA in its
double relevance: it is only a trade treaty (much less than a custom
union or a common market, and nothing near much broader projects,
such as the "Maastricht Treaty" in Europe). But it is also, by its
influence, more than a simple trade treaty.
Until recently, Mexico and the United States lived and maintained
problems perceived as "intractable" in their daily contacts. The most
significant ones are the migration of Mexicans to the US, the problems
of violence and infrastructure at the border, the fight against drug
trafficking and organized international crime, the environmental
dilemmas, and some regional and multilateral matters. In spite of their
importance, these topics were not fully recognized as a daily part of the
bilateral agenda. Dealt with in a discrete and unsystematic way, the
silence was occasionally broken by partial agreements, political storms
and, by periods of sour publicity in the media.
What changed and why did it change? To answer this question one
must remember that NAFTA produced a major contribution to Mexico's
financial stability in the spring of 1995, when the United States
administration and the international community committed support to
Mexico for almost 50 billion dollars.'0 By January 1997 Mexico repaid
all of the United States package and part of International Monetary
Fund (IMF) support." Mexico's trade with the United States and
Canada soared. The crisis was averted and the path of steady growth
reached its peak in the year 2000 at an impressive seven percent.
2
Most of the growth was fueled by the external sector and half of all new
jobs were due to exporting businesses.
Also, we now know that NAFTA had unsuspected and somehow
paradoxical economic results. Starting from their negotiations, the
interest in Mexico of the European Community, Japan and its
commercial allies in the Asian Pacific grew enormously. That interest
and attention have been translated into a General Agreement and a
Free Trade Agreement with the European Union and into exploratory
conversations toward the same purpose with Japan.
The economic success was very impressive, but it also held
10. Banco de Mexico ANNUAL REPORT, 1996.
11. Id. Mexico used, out of 20 billion of U.S.support, only 11 billion paid in 1995 and
1996, providing the U.S., with 500 million profits. Out of the 50 billion, Mexico used
27,159 in 1995.
12. Real growth for 2000 was 6.9%, 3.2 points better than 1999. Banco de Mexico
ANNUAL REPORT 2001.
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important lessons beyond economics. Three elements were important
in overall terms: the high level attention this process implied; the
shared value of certainty attached to pre-established rules, and the
operation of institutionalized mechanisms. It was only natural for
NAFTA partners to look into other areas of their complex relationships
with this experience in mind. From 1995 onward Mexico has attempted
"treat intractables" with this frame of mind. It moved to give
transparency to those difficult issues in the agendas; to create
institutional mechanisms to solve them or to administer them; and to
endow them with long-term goals that represented an elevation of the
political dialogue and the creation of more favorable conditions to solve
them in the future.
Considering the inescapable fact that Mexico and the United States
weigh considerably in the life of the "other," both have finally come to
terms with the importance of a shared framework appropriate for the
dynamics of daily interaction; one that surpasses, by far, the vertical
decisions of politics, of bureaucracies and of their personalities.
Of course, "between the idea and the reality, between the
movement and the act, falls the shade," said T.S. Elliot. In that space
lies the laboratory of diplomacy; "plumbing diplomacy," is a diplomacy
which is quiet, which is concerned with details, which does not rest in
unnecessary political noise, which believes in effectiveness.
As it happened, in five years (1995-2000), a whole network of
agreements emerged. This meant qualitative change in relationships.
Four approaches guided that change:
1. The creation of bilateral rules in practically all of the areas of
the relationship, subtracting uncertainty and offering
mechanisms for the administration of cooperation and conflict;
2. The flexibility to grant a differentiated handling of the most
conflicting topics regarding the rest of the agenda; without
disassociating them from the framework of global conception of
the relationship;
3. The adoption of long term visions to generate an agenda for the
future; and,
4. To privilege high-level political consultations to avoid surprises
and to foresee reactions on each side.
Since 1995, twenty-two treaties and forty-six executive agreements
have been signed between Mexico and the United States. 13 Both
administrations created nearly thirty-five bilateral mechanisms that
13. Secretarfa de Relaciones Exteriores, INFORME DE LABORES 2001, Mexico D.F.,
2001.
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duplicated in number the pre-existent ones."' But beyond numbers,
what is meant is that we moved from general dispositions in many
topics to something much closer to what NAFTA made for trade and
investment, that is objectives, strategies, mechanisms and task forces.
Therefore, Mexico can now deal with crisis without bringing the whole
relationship down. What all of this meant was that we began to put
perspective in each area, agreeing on the desirable scenarios for the
future.
Furthermore, high level encounters outside government structures
are now almost part of a binational routine. The members of the
Congresses of both nations frequently travel and meet. The federal
judicial powers have established contacts and developed exchange
programs for judges. Academics, managers, journalists and the Non
Governmental Organizations' (NGO) have also knitted a dense network
of contacts. Indeed, the high level and increased amount of bilateral
dialogue has changed dramatically in the last few years and it promises
to continue to do so.
Clearly, this it is not a story of kindness. Without a doubt, NAFTA
partners felt the negative impact of very serious incidents that
reminded us what the bilateral relationship should not be. The
commercial conflicts, hidden behind environmental concerns, such as
the continued embargo against Mexican tuna, the permanency of the
annual drug certification, the relative impunity of police violence
against Mexican migrants, the permanent pretense of taking the long
arm of the law - but only that of United States law - and to apply it to
Mexico and to Mexicans, are all examples of old practices and reflect the
worst aspects of the bilateral relationship. They are the result of old
attitudes and of a blindness that refuses to die.
It is a relationship, inevitably, with lights and shades, but a
relationship with a promissory future. Allow me to mention two
examples of how NAFTA partially modeled a constructive approach to
some difficult topics or, as I have labeled them, the "intractables:"
migration and drugs.
When dealing with our migrations problems one has to consider the
three thousand kilometers of open border, the police operatives of
border control and the concomitant growth of people's trafficking by
organized crime, the restrictive terms of the 1996 American migratory
law (Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act),
the income disparities, the local traditions to migrate, the social
networks for undocumented people deep in US territory, and the
expansion of the communities of Mexican origin in the United States,
among other factors. No wonder this phenomenon is one particularly
14. Id.
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difficult to administer and prone to conflict.
What we wanted in Mexico was to escape from an approach that
concentrated solely on the duality "border control/human rights
defense." Both are indispensable ingredients of the migratory agenda,
however, they are far from the only issues involved. There are also
topics of consular access to the migrants, family reunification, secure
and orderly repatriations, interstate transfers and repatriation of
people, special treatment of prisoners about to be released in the
border, the fights against traffickers of people and against the
falsification of documents, dealing with serious border incidents and
with the use of lethal force at the border, the relative impunity of local
and federal agents involved in those incidents, the use of ethnic
approaches for detentions and industrial inspections, etc.
What we therefore created was a high level mechanism that
created rules for most topics involved in the phenomena of migration
and, at a regional level, we incorporated our experiences and ideas in a
mechanism where, besides Mexico and the United States, Central
American countries and Canada are also represented. As a support of
the Bilateral High Level Mechanism, ten Liaison Mechanisms for
Border Matters had 160 meetings to solve many violent incidents and
abuses, to ensure orderly and safe repatriations, as well as to speed up
legal crossings.15  Also, at the beginning of 1996, twenty-two
Consultation Mechanisms were created to assure the permanent
communication between Mexican Consuls and district authorities of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
16
Is that effort sufficient? Well, it still does not look like a NAFTA
deal. Yet it lays the groundwork for a wider agreement or, more
realistically, for a set of various agreements in order to deal with this
phenomena in a more orderly, rational and humane way. Mexican
President Vincent Fox's administration has reiterated its commitment
to high-level discussions to explore more far-reaching agreements to
deal with the problem. As a matter of fact, in a few weeks cabinet
members of both countries will meet for that purpose. The fundamental
structures and mechanisms are already there to make those discussions
possible and productive. We shall all hope for their success.
In the also difficult topic of drugs, in the last years a simple but
fundamental agreement was reached among the key players in the
respective government spheres. Mexico looked for, and achieved, the
enlargement of the agenda and the institutionalization of the
cooperation efforts.
15. Id.
16. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Informe de Labores 1999-2000, p.1 9 . Mexico
D.F., 2000
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The High Level Contact Group (HLCG) was created, together with
several groups of experts on all topics relevant to this problem,
including the demand for drugs and the trafficking of weapons from
north to south. The HLCG has elevated the level of political attention
to the problem, something which has made it feasible both to set a
course to the bilateral relationship in that matter, and to administer
delicate situations. A common view of the complexity of the problem, a
bilateral strategy, and an agreed upon measure of effectiveness, were
the most significant contributions. Also, Mexico proposed an
Extraordinary Meeting of the UN General Assembly and moved for the
creation of the Multilateral Mechanism of Evaluation including all
countries in the hemisphere.
Ladies and gentlemen:
What then are the lessons of these past experiences? I believe that,
in order to better understand and manage the relationship, it is
necessary to discard two harmful concepts: the belief in illusory models
and the fatality of conflict. The objective should be to build a modern
and functional relationship that allows ongoing progress.
Responsibility and objectivity should take the place of prejudice and
emotional reactions, as we did for trade through NAFTA.
NAFTA symbolizes, beyond trade, a posture towards the future. It
is so because it is an exemplary practical arrangement that is based on
common sense, tolerance and respect to work out our differences.
And even though in life nothing should be taken for granted, there
is ground for optimism and, above all, there will always be space for




PRINCIPLES OF TRANSPARENCY AND
COOPERATION TO SOLVE DISPUTES IN
THE NAFTA FREE TRADE AREA
DR. LuIs MIGUEL DIAZ" & NANCY A. ORETSKIN J.D.'"
INTRODUCTION
The authors intend to introduce mediation as a legal tool to prevent
and solve international business disputes between private parties in the
free trade area created in the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).' We will demonstrate that the use of the principles of
transparency and cooperation to solve international disputes in the
NAFTA area are key objectives, and that mediation furthers those
principles concerning private disputes.2
THE TRANSPARENCY PRINCIPLE AND CONSULTATIONS
The transparency principle guided the negotiators in their
t This paper was originally delivered at the Regional Conference of the American Society
of International Law: "NAFTA-Unresolved Issues: Dispute Resolution, Environment,
Labor and Transportation", organized by the International Legal Studies Program,
University of Denver College of Law, in the City of Denver, Colorado, March 30, 2001.
' Co-Director of the U.S.-Mexico Conflict Resolution Center in Las Cruces, N.M., U.S.A.
Since 2001, he coordinates the ILO-OEA Project to support the Inter-American
Conference of Ministers of Labor. His experience in international negotiations include:
the United Nations Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes
(1977-80); the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1976-1980); the NAFTA
and its labor and environmental side agreements; the Border Environmental Cooperation
Commission; and the North American Development Bank (1991-93).
" Associate Professor, New Mexico State University, College of Business Administration
and Economics and Co-Director of the U.S.-Mexico Conflict Resolution Center in Las
Cruces, N.M., U.S.A. Recently, Ms. Oretskin co-edited a book entitled Commercial
Mediation and Arbitration in the NAFTA Countries.
1. "The Parties to this Agreement, consistent with Article XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, hereby establish a free trade area." Can. - Mex.- U.S.: N.
Am. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 101, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. "The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through its
principles and rules, including national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment and
transparency, are to. .. " NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 102 (emphasis added).
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deliberations throughout NAFTA negotiations and permeates all
aspects related or derived from NAFTA' The purpose of the
transparency principle is that all measures advocated by all Parties
must be crystal clear and should not cover objectives contrary to free
trade.'
Therefore, it was agreed that any law, regulation, procedure,
requirement or practice,' related or derived from NAFTA, should be
duly motivated, be congruent with free trade, and to the possible extent,
announced and explained to the other Parties in advance.
The transparency principle was also considered as a principle for
the prevention of disputes in the form of an obligation for the
governments to consult each other regarding measures and conflict
prevention and conflict solution. Consultations are obligatory under
diverse circumstances.7
3. This principle was explicitly an understanding among the NAFTA negotiators.
Testimony of Dr. Diaz, who was the Legal Advisor of the Mexican Foreign Affairs
Department and one of the Mexican negotiators
4. Id.
5. The definition of the term "measure includes any law, regulation, procedure,
requirement or practice." NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 201.
6. See, e.g. ARTICLE 1411: TRANSPARENCY.
1. In lieu of Article 1802(2) (Publication), each Party shall, to the extent
practicable, provide in advance to all interested persons any measure of
general application that the Party proposes to adopt in order to allow an
opportunity for such persons to comment on the measure. Such measure
shall be provided:
(a) by means of official publication;
(b) in other written form; or
(c) in such other form as permits an interested person to make informed
comments on the proposed measure.
2. Each Party's regulatory authorities shall make available to interested
persons their requirements for completing applications relating to the
provision of financial services.
3. On the request of an applicant, the regulatory authority shall inform the
applicant of the status of its application. If such authority requires
additional information from the applicant, it shall notify the applicant
without undue delay.
4. A regulatory authority shall make an administrative decision on a
completed application of an investor in a financial institution, a financial
institution or a cross-border financial service provider of another Party
relating to the provision of a financial service within 120 days, and shall
promptly notify the applicant of the decision. An application shall not be
considered complete until all relevant hearings are held and all necessary
information is received. Where it is not practicable for a decision to be made
within 120 days, the regulatory authority shall notify the applicant without
undue delay and shall endeavor to make the decision within a reasonable
time thereafter.
7. The term Consultations is used in Articles 316, Annex 300-B, 707, 722, 723, 801,
914, 1005, 1021, 1024, Appendix 1001, 1113, 114, 1209, 1210, 1309, 1413, 1414, Anne r
1404, Annex 1403, 1903, 1905, 1907, Annex 1901, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2015, 2104.
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The obligation to consult (the act of consulting, considering, having
regard, conferring, deliberation) may bring two very important benefits.
The first is that it prevents disputes through an early identification and
solution of conflicting views.8 The second is that it opens direct
communication channels between the Parties for the solution of an
existing dispute.!
The word consultation as used in NAFTA means direct talks
between the governments or the governments and a private party to
agree on a course of action to reach a goal or to find a solution to a
problem.'0
THE COOPERATION PRINCIPLE AND CONSULTATIONS
The principle of cooperation between the NAFTA Parties (Canada,
Mexico and the U.S.) is embodied as the cornerstone of dispute
settlement. It is also an expression of the principle of transparency
regarding conflict solution. The cooperation principle is presented in
NAFTA as a legal obligation:
The Parties shall at all times endeavor to agree on the interpretation
and application of this Agreement, and shall make every attempt
through cooperation .and consultations to arrive at a mutually
satisfactory resolution of any matter that might affect its operation."
However, if a matter is not solved through cooperation or
consultations, a Party to NAFTA may make a request for the
intervention of the Commission to solve the matter. 2 The Commission
may use good offices, conciliation and mediation. 3 If the Commission
has not solved the matter within a certain time period, a Party may
then request in writing an arbitral panel.
14
Thus, prior to requesting an arbitral panel, Parties are obligated to
engage in consultations and, in the absence of an agreement the Parties
then proceed to request assistance from the Commission. If the Parties
do not reach an agreement using these two processes, an arbitral panel
decides the dispute between the Parties.
Environmental Side Agreement, Articles 20 and 22. Labor Side Agreement, Articles 21,
22 and 23.
8. See L.M. Diaz and A. Garza, Los Mecanismos para la soluci6n de controversias en
el Tratado de Libre Comercio de America del Norte, Revista de Investigaciones Juridicas,
Escuela Libre de Derecho, Mfxico, 1993, 72.
9. Id.
10. See supra note 7.
11. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 2003.
12. See id., at art. 2001 (establishing the Free Trade Commission, which is comprised
of cabinet-level representatives of the Parties or their designees).
13. Id., at art. 2007 (5)(b).
14. Id., at art. 2008 (1).
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Chapter Twenty establishes the recourse to dispute settlement
procedures using an arbitral panel. 5 This Chapter applies to disputes
between Parties that address the interpretation or application of
NAFTA, specifically those disputes in which one Party considers an
actual or proposed measure of another Party is or will be inconsistent
with the obligations of NAFTA or where an action by one Party causes
nullification or impairment of an existing NAFTA obligation. 16 Chapter
Twenty does not apply to matters covered by Chapter Nineteen that
refer to Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Matters. 17
CONFLICT SOLUTION MECHANISMS FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISPUTES
NAFTA introduced for the first time in a free trade agreement the
novel concept of regulating the solution of disputes that may exist
between the Parties (governments) and private persons. NAFTA does
so in matters concerning investment, Chapter Eleven. This Chapter
applies to measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to
investors of another Party, to investments of investors of another Party
in the territory of the Party and to certain aspects of all investments in
the territory of the Party.' 8
In this context, a NAFTA claim is a legal complaint submitted by a
NAFTA Investor who alleges a loss by reason of a breach of NAFTA.
The claim is heard by an international panel, normally composed of
three arbitrators 9 appointed by the Investor and the NAFTA Party
being sued. Panels are formed under the Investor's choice of
commercial arbitration rules laid out by either the World Bank
(through its International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes - the ICSID) or by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (under the UNCITRAL Rules).20
After hearing arguments from the Investor and the three NAFTA
Parties (i.e. the government being sued for breach of the NAFTA plus
the other two governments - if they choose to intervene), the Panel
issues an award, a written decision.'
In disputes between a government authority and a private person
concerning investment, NAFTA, consistent with the principle of
15. Id.
16. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 2004.
17. Id.
18. See id., at art. 1101 (defining the scope and coverage of provisions regarding
investment, services and related matters and providing specifically for measures adopted
with respect to arts. 1106 and 1114).
19. Id., at art. 1123.
20. See id., at art. 1125.
21. See id., at art. 1135.
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transparency and the principle of cooperation, also obliges consultation
and negotiations between the disputing parties before establishing an
arbitral panel.22
CONFLICT SOLUTION MECHANISMS FOR PRIVATE DISPUTES
NAFTA does not directly regulate the possible legal processes to
solve business disputes between private persons that might arise in the
free trade area established in Article 101.23 However NAFTA contains
four key provisions that impact on private disputes.2 4
First and from a procedural perspective, NAFTA excludes the
granting of rights for private persons to sue under a Party in a national
court wherein the legal cause of action originates in NAFTA.
2 5
Second, Chapter Seven creates an Advisory Committee on Private
Commercial Disputes regarding Agricultural Goods26 . This Committee
known as the 707 Committee has decided that the best approach to deal
with quick and effective dispute resolution for perishable goods and
small businesses in the agricultural field was to create an independent
entity that would be financed privately.27 The Fruit and Vegetable
Dispute Resolution Corporation (DRC) was formed and as of February
2000, over 500 members had joined with an expected 1500 members by
the end of 2001.2 Under this system, member firms from Canada,
22. "The disputing parties should first attempt to settle a claim through consultation
or negotiation." Id., at art. 1118. See generally http'//www.cyberus.ca.-tweiler/
nafataclaims.html (listing documents and comments of actual cases under ch. eleven)
(last visited Sept. 9, 2001).
23. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 2004 (providing for dispute settlement between
the Parties).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 25 - 31.
25. "No Party may provide for a right of action under its domestic law against any
other Party on the ground that a measure of another Party is inconsistent with this
Agreement." NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 2021.
26. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 707.
The Committee [on Agricultural Trade established in Article 706] shall
establish an Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes regarding
Agricultural Goods, comprising persons with expertise or experience in the
resolution of private commercial disputes in agricultural trade. The
Advisory Committee shall report and provide recommendations to the
Committee for the development of systems in the territory of each Party to
achieve the prompt and effective resolution of such disputes, taking into
account any special circumstance, including the perishability of certain
agricultural goods. Id.
27. This information was excerpted from the NAFTA Advisory Committee on Private
Commercial Disputes Meeting Notes from its Eight Meeting which was held in San
Francisco, California November 18-19, 2000.
28. This information was excerpted from the Meeting Notes of the Ninth Meeting of
the NAFTA Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes that was held in
Calgary, Canada June 22-23, 2000. For more information on the DRC, See;
http'J/www.fvdrc.comJmain-e.htm
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Mexico and the US agree to adhere to a common set of trade standards
(practices), mediation and arbitration procedures and enforcement
provisions with respect to NAFTA trade regarding specified perishable
agricultural products.9
Third, Article 2022 of NAFTA provides:
Each Party shall, to the maximum extent possible, encourage and
facilitate the use of arbitration and other means of alternative
dispute resolution for the settlement of international commercial
disputes between private parties in the free trade area. (emphasis
added)30
Fourth, Chapter Twenty, Institutional Arrangements and Dispute
resolution procedures, Section C. Domestic Proceedings and Private
Commercial Dispute Settlement, establishes an Advisory Committee on
Private Commercial Disputes (2022 Committee).
3 '
The 2022 Committee has prepared three documents: Alternative
Dispute Resolution In International Contracts; 2 Enforcing Agreements
to Arbitrate and Arbitral Awards in the NAFTA Countries;33 and What
is Mediation.3 In 1999, the 2022 Committee organized a Conference on
Alternative Dispute Resolution for Judges and Businesses in Mexico
City.n
29. Id.
30. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 2022 (1).
31. "The [Advisory) Committee [on Private Commercial Disputes] shall report and
provide recommendations to the [NAFTA Commission on general issues referred to it by
the Commission respecting the availability, use and effectiveness of arbitration and other
procedures for the resolution of private international commercial disputes in the free
trade area." Id., at art. 2022(4).
32. NAFTA Advisory Comm. on Private Commercial Disputes, Alternative Dispute
Resolution in International Contracts, at http'J/www.ita.doc.gov/legaladr-k.htm (last
visited Sept. 10, 2001).
33. NAFTA Advisory Comm. on Private Commercial Disputes, Enforcing Agreements
to Arbitrate and Arbitral Awards in the NAFTA Countries, at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/legal/adr_enf.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2001).
34. NAFTA Advisory Comm. On Private Commercial Disputes, What is Mediation?,
in COMMERCIAL MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES 357-69 (Luis
Miguel Diaz & Nancy A. Oretskin eds., 1999) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL MEDIATION].
35. The NAFTA Advisory Comm. on Private Commercial Disputes and the U.S.-Mex.
Conflict Res. Ctr. organized a conference on Alternative Dispute Resolution for judges and
businesses on June 3 and 4, 1999, in Mexico City. More than 350 people attended the tri-
national conference. Over 120 Mexican judges participated. U.S. and Canadian judges,
as well as business people, governmental officers and private lawyers representing the
three NAFTA countries also attended. The conference focused on two main themes: 1) the
use of arbitration and 2) mediation as an alternative to courts to resolve commercial
conflicts in international law. In addition, the relationship of arbitration and mediation
to judicial dispute resolution in Can., Mex. and the U. S. was addressed. See generally
COMMERCIAL MEDIATION, supra note 34 (integrating articles submitted during the
Conference including the documents prepared by the Committee).
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MEDIATION RESPONDS TO THE PRINCIPLES OF TRANSPARENCY AND
COOPERATION
Based on the recognition in NAFTA for the use of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) for private commercial dispute settlement,
this manuscript suggests that using mediation to resolve international
business disputes between private parties, complies with the principle
of transparency and the principle of cooperation as set out in NAFTA.
Why?
Mediation is a dispute resolution mechanism, which is gaining
popularity and acceptance within the international commercial world36
since it is a process, which allows disputing parties to focus on solving a
problem rather than engaging in a complicated legal process.
Mediation is a recognized ADR procedure and therefore is included
within the terms of reference of the NAFTA 2022 Committee.
WHAT IS MEDIATION?
There is no universal definition of mediation in the international
field.' Simply stated, mediation is a facilitated negotiation. It is an
informal process where an impartial facilitator(s) assists disputing
parties to use direct communication to solve a conflict. 39 Skilled
36. See, e.g., Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the Work of its Thirty-
Third Session (Vienna, 20 November - 1 December 2000), UNCITRAL, 34d Sess., at 28-9,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/485 (2001), at http://www.uncitral.orgen-index.htm (discussing model
provisions on conciliation/mediation).
37. See NAFTA Advisory Comm. On Private Commercial Disputes, Terms of
Reference, at httpJ/www.ita.doc.gov/legal/adr-term.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2001).
38. Mediation and/or conciliation have been used as dispute resolution procedures
internationally for a number of years. In some countries mediation and conciliation are
considered a similar process while in. other countries some perceive differences between
the two. As a result, there is no international uniform definition of mediation. For
purposes of the work currently underway by the UNCITRAL Working Group, the term
conciliation rather than mediation is used and is defined as a broad notion encompassing
various types of procedures in which parties in dispute are assisted by an independent
and impartial person to settle a dispute. .See Settlement of Commercial Disputes, Possible
Uniform Rules on Certain Issues Concerning Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Written
Form for Arbitration Agreement, Interim Measures of Protection, Conciliation, Report of
the Secretary-General, UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration, 33' Sess., at 28, U.N.
Doc. A/CN/WG.II/WP. 110 (2000), at httpJ/www.uncitral.orgen-index.htm. See also ALAN
REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 27-8 (2d ed. 1991); Walter A. Wright, Mediation of Private United States-
Mexico Commercial Disputes: Will it Work?, 26 N.M. L. Rev. 57, 59 (Winter 1996).
39. Currently in the U.S., there is a joint initiative between one of the American Bar
Association's Drafting Committees and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCSUL) to draft a Uniform Mediation Act (UMA). In this
document, mediation is defined "as a process in which a mediator facilitates
communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary
agreement regarding their dispute." Uniform Mediation Act, § 3(2) (draft of Aug. 17,
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mediators are able to direct disputing parties to focus on problem
solving and interest based negotiation thereby creating a "space for
conflict solution."0 Unlike litigation and arbitration, in a mediation, a
third party never orders a solution to the conflict, rather the disputing
parties agree to a negotiated settlement. Legal strategies related to
tactics and maneuvers addressing such areas as jurisdiction, evidence
and enforcement are not relevant in a mediation proceeding.
Disputing parties are allowed to resolve their problems using a
business framework related more to business strategies and
communication than to a legal framework intertwined with mandatory
rules and procedures. One key aspect of mediation is that the process is
confidential. 4' Allegedly, all communication including the exchange of
documents that occurs during the mediation is protected from
disclosure in subsequent proceeding.42 The confidentiality protection is
just another element of mediation, which encourages parties to engage
in direct communication. Mediation is a process, which incorporates
the will of the Parties at every level; from selection of the mediator to
the resolution of the conflict."3 Although disputants are never forced to
participate in a mediation where they don't either agree to or accept the
mediator, the integrity and quality of a mediation is very dependent on
the mediator.
How DOES ONE SELECT A MEDIATOR?
Competent mediators possess great people skills and the ability to
communicate either verbally or non-verbally to influence disputing
parties to assess their problems from a humanistic approach."
2001) [hereinafter UMA], at http://www.nccusl.org. (In August, the UMA was adopted by
NCCUSL, The ABA House of Delegates is expected to vote up or down on endorsing the
ACT at its next meeting.) See generally What is Mediation?, supra note 34; Ann L.
MacNaughton & Geoffrey J. Brune, Mediating NAFTA Disputes: So, You've Never Seen a
Mediation?, in COMMERCIAL MEDIATION, supra note 34, at 267-83; L. M. DIAZ, MORALEJAS
PARA MEDIAR Y NEGOCIAR (1999) (discussing the understanding of mediation in Spanish).
40. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1981) (discussing in detail
interest-based negotiation); MARK BENNET & MICHELE HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION
(1996) (discussing problem solving techniques in mediation). See also OBTENGA EL SI: EL
ARTE DE NEGOCIAR SIN CEDER (Gerardo de Alba Guerra trans., Mdxico 1984) (translating
into Spanish the book by Fisher & Ury listed herein).
41. Preserving the notion of confidentiality in a mediation has been one of the most
difficult tasks of the drafting committee. See UMA, supra note 39, at § 5 (providing legal
protection against subsequent injuries deriving from any communication during the
mediation process).
42. Id.
43. See Model Standards of Practice for Mediators of the ABA, SPIDR and AAA, sec.
I, at http//www.to-agree.com/spidrstd.htm
44. See, e.g., Mediation Checklist at http://adrr.con/adrl/essayg.htm (listing criteria
for the selction of a mediator) (last visited Sept. 10, 2001). See also Using the Mediation
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Mediators use language in ways that give them "interactional power
and the assumed right to influence and shape the final outcome. 4 5
They must be trusty worthy, fair-minded and more committed to
process than content.
It is not a requirement that a mediator is an attorney. 6 It is widely
believed that a qualified mediator have strong people skills, an
analytical mind, have a presence that generates the trust of the parties
in both competency and integrity.47 Experience and mentoring probably
help, but the more personal qualities are the characteristics that matter
and these very often may develop in the absence of training and
educational requirements. 8
Checklist at http://adrr.com/adrl/essayf.htm (supplementing the outline of the Mediation
Checklist) (last visited Sept. 10, 2001). Over the last decade as mediation has grown in
popularity and use, many individual States in the United States as well as ADR
Institutions require and offer specific training in mediation. See generally
http://www.adr.org (including the American Arbitration Association's guide to mediation);
http://www.iccwbo.org (including information on alternative dispute resolution offered by
the International Chamber of Commerce); httpJ/www.texasadr.org (including the Texas
Mediation Trainer Roundtable Standards).
45. Karen Tracy & Anna Spradlin, Talking Like a Mediator, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
MEDIATION: COMMUNICATION RESEARCH AND PERSPECTIVES, 110-11 (Jospeh P. Folger &
Tricia S. Jones eds., 1994) [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS].
46. This topic in itself has generated extensive debate. A mediator must possess
excellent communication and listening skills. The field of mediation is a cross-section of
multidisciplinary areas and practicing mediators come from a variety of professional
backgrounds. See James H. Keil, Hybird ADR in the Construction Industry, 54-AUG DIsP.
RESOL. J. 14, 20 Keil writes " Good Mediators do not have to be attorneys, and, in fact,
many times should not be attorneys."; see also, the link to the UMA where there is no
requirement mandating that only attorney's can be mediators; or we could provide a link
to ACR the newly created merged organization representing mediators
http://www.spidr.org/.)
47. David Grappo Questions Litigators Ask About Mediation, 55-MAY DIsP. RESOL. J.
32, 35.
48. By analogy, a poetic style to present qualifications of a mediator may be compared
to the qualifications that Don Quixote described when discussing for him, the most noble
of all professions, the errant knight. Quixote said the following:
It is a science that comprises all or most of the sciences in the world, since he
who professes it must be a jurist and know the laws of justice concerning
persons and property, so that he may give to everyone what is his own and
his due. He must be a theologian, so that he may give reasons for the
Christian rule he professes, clearly and distinctly, wherever he may be
asked. He must be a physician, and especially a herbalist, so that he may
recognize in the midst of deserts and wildernesses those herbs which have
the virtue of healing wounds,... He must be an astronomer, to know by the
stars how many hours of the night are passed, and in what part and climate
of the world he is. He must know mathematics,.. he must be chaste in his
thoughts, straightforward in his words, valiant in his deeds, patient in his
afflictions, charitable towards the needy and in fact, a maintainer of truth,
although its defense may cost his life... In response Don Lorenzo replies: If
that is so, I agree that this science is superior to any... I doubt whether
there are, or ever been knight errants with so many virtues.
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Different forms and styles of mediation exist although all forms
share the common feature that a third party never acts as a decision
maker.49 Depending on the type of dispute, number of disputing parties
and the complexity of the issues, more than one mediator could be
appropriate for the process." With respect to international disputes, co-
mediation provides an excellent opportunity to offset potential power
imbalances and quell disputing parties concerns of country impartiality.
Further, the specific gender, nationality, age and ethnicity of the
mediators also have the ability to affect the mediation process.51
How AND WHEN TO REQUIRE MEDIATION
The most formal and legally recognized venue to request mediation
is to include a pre-dispute clause in the transactional agreement.
5 2
Mediation can be the only dispute resolution process requested or it can
be accompanied with a request for arbitration in the event the
mediation fails.53
In the drafting of pre-dispute clauses, at a minimum, the parties
should consider the following: whether mediation is the only dispute
resolution mechanism or if it should be integrated with other ADR
processes such as arbitration, the number of mediators, a process for
selecting the mediators, whether the mediation is administered or ad
hoc, and the language and location of the mediation.'
In the absence of a contractual provision, disputing parties can
agree to use mediation at any time. In this situation, the parties may
draft and sign a Submission Agreement " that evidences their will to
MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, THE ADVENTURES OF DON QUIXOTE (J. M. Cohen
trans., Penguin Books 1950), 582, 583.
49. See, e.g., Tracy & Spradlin, supra note 45, at 110.
50. See, e.g., supra note 19.
51. See generally William A. Donohue & Mary I. Bresnahan, Communication Issues
in Mediating Cultural Conflict, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 45, at 135-58.
52. See, e.g., the U.S.-Mex. Conflict Res. Ctr. (CRC) website, which recommends the
following mediation clause. "If a dispute arises out of or relating to this contract, or the
breach thereof, the parties agree first to try in good faith to settle the dispute by
mediation administered by the CRC." In the event mediation fails, the following
arbitration clause is suggested. "In case the mediation is unsuccessful, any unresolved
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof, shall
be settled by arbitration filed with the.. .CRC and administered by the CRC in
accordance with the CRC's Arbitral Rules. A judgment upon the award rendered by the
arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof." This language is
also available in Spanish at http://crc.nmsu.edu (last visited Sept. 11, 2001). See also
Phillip A. Robbins, Drafting Mediation Clauses for International Transactions, in
COMMERCIAL MEDIATION, supra note 34, at 255-62.
53. See Robbins, supra note 52, at 256-9.
54. Id. at 255.
55. An example of a Submission agreement advocated by the U.S-Mexico Conflict
Resolution Center:
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engage in a mediation." Other times, the parties merely verbally agree
to participate and subsequently conduct the mediation in the absence of
any formal agreement to do so.
Like many things in life, timing is critical. Research in this area
has shown that the sooner mediation is requested and utilized the
better success rate it has in settling the dispute." Since one attribute of
mediation is its flexibility and informality, it can be requested,
scheduled and completed within a very short time frame. On the other
hand, mediation can also be used and requested during either an
arbitration and/or litigation. 8
Mediation is a very versatile dispute resolution mechanism and
technically can be utilized whenever the disputants realize that it is
better for them to directly communicate with each other rather than
allow a third party to mandate a resolution.
Fundamental details to consider when arranging the mediation
Whereas disputes or differences have arisen between the parties with
respect to... [refer to transaction, project or events giving rise to the
disputes], and Whereas the parties wish to resolve all such disputes or
differences by mediation, it is agreed as follows: 1. The parties shall decide if
one or more than one mediator shall be appointed and in the absence of
agreement by the parties on the selection of mediators, the [U.S.-Mexico
Conflict Resolution Center] will select the mediator(s). If more than one
mediator is appointed, the mediators shall act collectively. 2. The parties
agree that the mediation will be administered by the U.S.-Mexico Conflict
Resolution Center]. 3. The procedural rules for any mediation shall be
determined by [ the U.S.-Mexico Conflict Resolution Center]. 4. In
determining the procedures to be followed, the mediator shall observe the
following provisions agreed between the parties: (i) the language of the
proceedings shall be. . . [language]. (ii) the place of the mediation shall be
.... [place]. See generally Submission Agreement Proposed by the US-
Mexico Conflict Resolution Center located at New Mexico State University
available at http-//crc.nmsu.edu.
56. Also known by some as a compromis, this is a process where sovereign states
refer an existing dispute more traditionally to an arbitration tribunal but also the referral
may be made to a process compared to mediation. For a detailed discussion, see DOUGLAS
YARN, DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 96-97 (Jossey Bass Publishers) (1999).
57. For the most recent statistics on the use of mediation and its success rate, see the
website of CPR, Institute for Dispute Resolution, http'J/www.cpradr.org and/or the
website of the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/home.html. A 1997 Statistical Report published by CPR
Institute for Dispute Resolution in the Metropolitan Corporate Council (August 1997)
stated that 89% of U.S. Corporations surveyed indicated that they had used mediation in
the last three years and 90% of the respondents stated they viewed mediation as a cost-
saving measure; http'//www.ilr.cornell.edu/ICRINEW/execsum.html.
58. There are institutional arbitration clauses that provide for the use of mediation
either prior to beginning the arbitration or with agreement of the parties even during the
arbitration. Many State and Federal Courts also have adopted rules which mandate the
use of mediation for certain cases, especially those dealing with domestic and property
issues. See the annotated reports of the UMA, supra note 37.
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include cities in which to meet and conditions that favor a pleasant and
relaxing milieu. One should not underestimate the importance that the
external environment has in creating a favorable ambiance.
STAGES OF MEDIATION
Although each mediation in a sense follows its own pattern
depending on the parties and the content, the general practice of
mediation does include some stages which are set out below.59
PRE-MEDIATION. During this stage, the parties learn that they
previously agreed to use mediation, they agree on the number of
mediators and their identity, and determine the location of the
mediation.' Parties also agree that the person attending the mediation
must possess decision-making authority to settle the case.61
STAGE 1-OPENING STATEMENT. The Mediator initiates the process
by giving a brief opening statement. 62 Included in this statement is a
concise explanation of the mediation process and a ratification that the
parties agreed to participate in the process and that they understand
the role of the mediator.6 3  This is the stage where most mediators
review the Ground Rules related to the process.' Some mediators may
reiterate a conflict of interest check. Others also require the parties to
sign a confidentiality agreement. 6
STAGE 2- IDENTIFYING ISSUES. Some mediators allow each party a
set time to present their case similar to an opening statement given in
court.' Other mediators let the parties start talking about whatever
issue they prefer." Whichever style is used, in this stage the disputing
parties identify or begin to identify the controversial issues. During
this phase, the mediator often restates and attempts to reframe issues.6
59. See BENNETT & HERMANN, supra note 38, at 25-70.
60. See id. at 36.
61. See Grappo, supra note 47, at 37.
62. See BENNETT & HERMANN, supra note 59, at 35.
63. See id. at 35.
64. See id. at 35.
65. It is critical during the mediator opening statement to explain the mediation
process. Although many parties may nod their heads when asked if they clearly
understand this process, the most prudent practice is to clarify the process and explain
very slowly how a mediator differs from a decision maker, how the mediator will assist
the parties to reach (or not) a negotiated settlement. During this brief statement, the
mediator may wish to review basic rules of respect that each party must show toward the
other and that only one party speaks at a time. Very often, during this stage, mediators
distribute a confidentiality agreement that explains the legal rules of confidentiality and
asks that each party sign this agreement. At a minimum, the notion of confidentiality
should be discussed even if no agreement is used. See id. at 40.
66. See id. at 44.
67. See id. at 44.
68. See id. at 48.
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Parties are encouraged to change their approach from a positional
frame to one focused more on interests. Often emotions run high and
venting is used in a controlled fashion to begin to de-escalate the
emotional commitment to the dispute.69  A preliminary step to
establishing common ground is initiated.
STAGE 3- DIALOGUE. During this stage, the parties negotiate
directly with each other.
Communication is the key. The type and style of communicate
used by the parties relates directly to their emotions. Mediators must
use their skills here to manage the emotional climate and at the same
time encourage the parties to trust each other, to work together and to
attempt to understand the others' views.7 0 Again, the milieu is decisive.
Very often, mediators use caucuses at this stage. 71 A caucus is a
private, confidential meeting between the mediator and one of the
parties.72 Caucuses allow the mediator to talk privately with each party.
During these sessions, negative negotiating behavior can be addressed,
trust in the mediator and the process can be strengthened, hidden
agendas can be disclosed, emotions, attitudes and perceptions of one
party can be shared privately and the acceptability of various solutions
and alternatives can be tested.73
Within the profession of mediation, there is quite a divergent view
around the propriety of using caucuses. At the center of this discourse
is the ethical concern of trust.74 When a mediator talks with one party
separately, paranoia and mistrust from the other parties naturally may
develop. On the other hand, caucuses are very effective to defuse tense
anger, to provide an opportunity for one side to share something openly
with the mediator that they are fearful to disclose in the mediation, or
that they don't feel appropriate to tell the other party face to face, or to
help parties save face in making concessions.75
STAGE 4- CREATE OPTIONS FOR MUTUAL GAIN. During this phase,
the mediator assists the parties in brainstorming.76 This is a very
useful tool in mediation. It is a process where the mediator works very
hard to assist the parties to spontaneously generate as many ideas as
possible to solve the conflict.77 In this stage, the mediator encourages
the parties to use their creativity to suggest viable alternatives that
69. See id. at 44.
70. See id. at 41.
71. See BENNETT & HERMANN, supra note 59, at 59.
72. See YARN, supra note 56, at 69-70, for a definition and discussion on caucus.
73. See id. at 70.
74. See id. at 70-71.
75. See id. at 70.
76. See id. at 63-64. For a more thorough discussion on brainstorming, see FISHER,
URY & PATTON, supra note 38, at 58-67.
77. See YARN, supra note 54, at 63-64.
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would meet the needs of both parties.8 Parties are constrained to let
the other talk and encouraged to trade-off each other's ideas and to try
to narrow differences.79 It is in this stage that the parties collectively
develop a plausible solution to their dispute.
STAGE 5- DEVELOP AN AGREEMENT. The mediator assists the
parties to memorialize their negotiated solution into a written
agreement where all parties willingly agree to sign. 0 Many times, the
parties' legal staff may edit this initial document. 1
Often a mediation will move back and forth among stages,
especially as new issues surface and are considered. One learns very
quickly that often the first issue presented is not necessarily the most
important. A mediation is a sequence of communication, and
information flows depending on the parties' comfort level and trust in
the process. 2
STYLES OF MEDIATORS
Over the last decade, in the U.S., at least three different styles of
mediation have emerged.8 These styles differ with respect to the level
of intervention the mediator uses during the process.
The facilitative model assumes that the mediator is totally neutral
and does not present personal views on the merits of the case.8 This
mediator is the least interventionist. In some instances, the mediator
may suggest a possible alternative that may resolve the issue but only
after it is clear that the parties cannot generate an option themselves."
This type of mediator never comments on the settlement and is not apt
to remedy a substantive power imbalance between the parties.
Although many mediators state publicly, and may feel, that this style is
the best," in practice, especially if the situation is volatile, it may not be
very useful. The facilitative model represents the purest form of
consensual decision- making by the parties.87
In the evaluative model, the mediator "pushes" for a settlement,
often by presenting his or her own views on the relative merits of the
78. See id. at 64.
79. See id.
80. See BENNErr & HERMANN, supra note 38, at 64.
81. See id. at 64.
82. See BENNETr & HERMANN, supra note 38, at 26.
83. However, other authors speak of four styles as DONOHUE & BRESNAHAN, supra
note 51, at 149-154.
84. YARN, supra note 56, at 272-284.
85. Id.
86. The authors' draw on their collective experience in this field and have determined
this to be a common opinion held by mediators.
87. YARN, at 274.
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case.8 This mediator is quite interventionist and offers his or her own
opinion (either overtly or subtly) of options at all stages of the
mediation. In this situation, the mediator may intervene substantively
in the dispute.
In the empowerment and recognition model, the mediator
encourages the parties to choose independently whether and how to
resolve the dispute. 9 Great attention is placed on each party respecting
the other.9° This model is rarely used in business conflicts and is more
common for family and community dispute resolution. 91
BENEFITS OF USING MEDIATION WITHIN THE NAFTA TRADING AREA
The NAFTA free trade zone comprises three countries with
different cultures and legal systems.' So, from a cross-cultural
perspective, mediation offers a venue for people from different cultural
backgrounds, legal systems and business training to sit down at the
same table and discuss their problems without having to learn or
understand another country's laws and customs.
Increased trade inevitably creates more business conflicts. 93
Mediation not only provides an effective way to resolve these disputes,
but also offers a number of benefits that the other dispute resolution
mechanisms lack.
Mediation is the only dispute resolution mechanism that allows the
disputing parties to preserve their underlying business relationship at
the same time and during the same process that is used to resolve the
problem.This aspect is very important for human emotions.
Often disputes arise based solely on miscommunication and
misunderstanding. Mediation allows the disputing parties to talk to
each other in a safe and controlled environment.9 Other dispute
resolution mechanisms prohibit the parties from direct communication.
Litigation and arbitration, to some extent, are built on an adversarial
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id at 281-282.
91. Id.
92. The legal system in the U.S. and Canada is a common law system and the legal
system in Mexico is a civil law system. Basic legal differences exist in the training of
attorneys and judges as well as in the actual practice of law.
93. Merchandise trade among the NAFTA partners neared $505 billion in 1998. See
NAFTA Works for America (5 Year Report-July 1999) at
http://www.ustr.gov/naftareportlintro.htm. Canada and Mexico rank first and second
respectively for overall trade with the U.S. For specific information detailing U.S. trade
with its NAFTA partners, see Center for the Study of Western Hemispheric Trade at
httpJ/lanic.utexas.edu/cswht/tradeindex/About.html
94. The authors' draw on their collective experience in this field.
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model.95 At the end of arbitration and litigation, disputing parties very
often detest and loathe their adversary. When a commercial trader is
able to resolve a dispute and continue to transact business with the
same partner, a business asset is preserved and is considered a value.
Businesses prefer to be engaged in commercial activity rather than
lawsuits and arbitrations."
Research shows that parties who use mediation generally have very
high customer satisfaction with the process.97 Mediation is seen as a
cost effective and time saving mechanism. 9
In mediation, possible conflicts of law issues are avoided as well as
the costs and uncertainty of having to retain legal counsel from a
foreign jurisdiction. 99 Mediation, in a sense, offers the same type of
environment that was used to initiate the transaction in order to
resolve the dispute: direct communication between the parties. °°
From a business point of view, one critical benefit of using
mediation is the shroud of confidentiality it provides. 0 1 Businesses do
not want their proprietary secrets made public."° Very often, disputes
arise between international trading partners when one fears the other
95. Steven K Andersen, Mediation and the North American Free Trade Agreement,
55-MAY DIsP.RESOL. J. 56, 60. See generally, Walter G. Gans, Saving Time and Money in
Cross-Border Commercial Disputes, 52-JAN DIsP. RESOL. J. 50 (1997).
96. ROBERT COULSON, BUSINESS MEDIATION-WHAT YOU NEED TO KNow, (1989) at 5-7.
97. See David Lipsky and Ronald L. Seeber, The Use Of ADR IN U.S. Corporations:
Executive Summary, at httpJ/www.ilr.cornell.edu/ICR/NEW/execsum.htm.
98. Id at 1-3.
99. This is both authors' experience in handling international mediations. See also
Dr. Julian D. M. Lew and Laurence Shore, International Commercial Arbitration
Harmonizing Cultural Differences, 54-AUG DISP. RESOL. J. 33,34.
100. When analyzing communication between two different cultures, it is useful to
review some of the empirical research in this area. Very often generalizations that one
could draw from this research must be made very cautiously since it is very difficult to
put an entire culture in one group or another and conclusions could be more destructive
than constructive. For a detailed discussion on cultural differences between many
countries, see GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES, (SAGE) (1980). The core of
Hofstede's research identified four main dimensions on which cultures can be
differentiated: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity.
This method of differentiating cultures is useful for mediators because it provides a
language for understanding cultural biases inherent in the mediation styles used. See
DONOHUE & BRESNAHAN, supra note 49, at 146-49. For a specific discussion on this issue
relating to cultural difference between Mexicans and Americans, see Cristina Gabrielidis,
Walter Stephan, Oscar Ybarra, Virginia Dos Santos Pearson & Lucia Villareal, Preferred
Styles of Conflict Resolution. Mexico and the United States, 28 J OF CROSS-CULTURAL
PSYCHOL. 6 (Nov. 1997); Walter A. Wright, Mediation of Private United States-Mexico
Commercial Disputes: Will it work?, 26 N.M. L. R. 57 (Winter 1996).
101. The core of the recently adopted UMA is to provide confidentiality protection. See
supra note 39.
102. In the experience of both authors, protecting proprietary corporation secrets is a
key element in deciding whether or not to use mediation.
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may divulge company secrets. 10 3 Many of the legal tactics used in
litigation and arbitration focus on protecting secrets.'O°  Mediation
allows the parties to discuss the problem in a confidential setting. 5
CONCLUSION
The modern international attorney today must be well qualified as
a negotiator and conflict solver. Business people must consider
mediation as a first option. There is legal protection for all participants
in mediation through the confidentiality agreement. Recognizing the
importance of transparency and cooperation to resolve international
commercial disputes will better prepare the attorney for work in the
evolving multinational business marketplace.
103. This is particularly acute in international business relationships where the
parties are unclear to the degree of protection granted by foreign laws.
104. Robert D. Benjamin, MSW, J.D., A Critique of Mediation-Challenging
Misconceptions, Assessing Risks, and Weighing The Advantages, at
http://www.mediate.com/articlestcritiq.cfmn?plain=t.
105. Donald Lee Rome, Resolving Business Disputes Fact-Finding and Impasse, 55-JAN
Disp. Resol. J. 8, 11-12.
2001

FREE TRADE BUT NOT FREE TRANSPORT?
THE MEXICAN STAND-OFF t
PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY*
With ninety-five million inhabitants, Mexico became the United
States' second largest trading partner, following only Canada.1 Nearly
$250 billion in trade moves across the border annually, a 191% increase
in the decade following the signing of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).2 In NAFTA's first decade, truck traffic across the
U.S.-Mexico border increased approximately 400%.3 By 2000, trucks
were responsible for transporting an estimated 75% of the goods moved
between the two nations. 4 Five million trucks cross the U.S.-Mexican
border each year.5
A number of legal and regulatory barriers limit operations by
Mexican bus and trucking companies within the United States. With
the exception of cross-border transportation of passengers in charter
and tour bus service, operations have historically been limited to the
commercial zones (defined as a zones extending from three to twenty
miles of a community's limits, depending upon population) of U.S.
t This paper was originally delivered at the Regional Conference of the American Society
of International Law: "NAFTA-Unresolved Issues: Dispute Resolution, Environment,
Labor and Transportation", organized by the International Legal Studies Program,
University of Denver College of Law, in the City of Denver, Colorado, March 30, 2001.
* Paul Stephen Dempsey is Professor of Law and Director of the Transportation Law
Program at the University of Denver College of Law. He is also Director of the National
Center for Intermodal Transportation. Dr. Dempsey holds the following degrees: A.B.J.,
J.D., University of Georgia; LL.M., George Washington University; D.C.L., McGill
University.
1. See Eunice Moscoso, The Wheels of Progress: U.S. Roadways Soon Will Be Open to
Trucks, AUsTIN AM. - STATESMAN, Mar. 25, 2001, at Al.
2. See Mexico's Truckers Detoured By Legal, Safety Barriers, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 4,
2001. See generally 19 USC § 3301 et. seq. (North American Free Trade Agreement
effective January 1, 1994).
3. See Alexandra Walker, No Easy Solutions To Mexican Truck Safety Issue, STATES
NEWS SERv., Feb. 22, 2001.
4. See Moscoso, supra note 1, at Al.
5. See NAFTA Trucking Deadline Passes Over U.S. Inspection Concerns, J. COM.,
Mar. 8, 2001, at WF.
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border communities.6 In the commercial zone, Mexican carriers would
deliver trailers to U.S.-based long-haul trucks, which slowed the
movement of goods and increased transportation costs. These
limitations applied to Mexican common carriers, private carriers and to
carriers of both regulated and exempt commodities. Prior to NAFTA,
U.S. carriers were completely banned from operating in Mexico, even
though Mexican carriers were able to operate within U.S. commercial
zones.
As of September 1994, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
issued licenses to 4,666 Mexican motor carriers to operate within the
commercial zones along the U.S.-Mexico border. In fiscal year 1993, for
example, the ICC obtained twenty-eight injunctions against Mexican
carriers performing unauthorized bus or trucking operations in the U.S.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) investigates Mexican carriers
suspected of operating within the U.S. without the required license and
those licensed Mexican carriers that are suspected of operating outside
of the commercial zones.7 The DOT also investigates those carriers that
concealed their Mexican ownership or control when they applied for and
received a license authorizing them to operate in interstate commerce
in the U.S.
Under NATA's terms, which became effective in January 1994,
most restrictions against Mexican carriers operating in the U.S. were to
have been phased out in the 1990s.8 More specifically, NAFTA laid out
a framework under which, beginning December 18, 1995, Mexican
trucking companies were to have been allowed to obtain licenses to
perform cross-border operations into the four U.S. states bordering
Mexico (i.e., California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas), and U.S.
carriers were to have been allowed entry into the six northern border
states of Mexico.9 On January 1, 2000, NAFTA provided cross-border
access for Mexican carriers that engage in foreign commerce only,
throughout the United States. Reciprocal rights were to be granted to
U.S. carriers throughout Mexico. 10 A similar phased-in schedule will
eventually allow full access by Mexican passenger carriers to the U.S.
6. See Leo Abrazzese, ICC Seeks to Expand Commercial Zones, J. COM., Jan. 5,
1988, at 2B.
7. See generally Statement of U.S. Transportation Secretary Supporting the Motor
Carrier Safety Improvement Bill, M2 PREssWIRE, Nov. 22, 1999 (describing improvements
to DOT operations).
8. See NAFTA Will Be Slow to Change the Rules for Transportation Operations and
Ownership, INFO. ACcESS CO., Jan. 1994, at 26. See also Robert Collier, Mexico's Trucks
On Horizon; Long-Distance Haulers are Headed into U.S Once Bush Opens Borders, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 4, 2001, at Al.
9. See Pena Announces Delay in NAFTA Crossings, HAZMAT TRANSP. NEWS, Jan.
1996. See also Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
10. See Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
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market."
NAFTA also contemplated lifting foreign ownership restrictions. 2
NAFTA provided that on December 18, 1995, Mexican investors were to
be permitted to invest in 100% of a Mexican carrier providing
international service, while U.S. investors were allowed to invest up to
49% in U.S. carriers providing international service." On January 1,
2001, that percentage increased to 51%; complete ownership is to be
permitted in 2004.'
4
The U.S. dutifully implemented those NAFTA provisions allowing
Canadian carriers, vehicles and drivers to operate in the U.S. 15 The
ease of implementation stemmed primarily from the similarity in U.S.
and Canadian truck inspection programs.' However, implementation
of NAFTA provisions relating to Mexican carriers were not as easy. On
December 17, 1995, only one day before the U.S.-Mexican border was
scheduled to open, then-U.S. President Bill Clinton issued a safety
proclamation for unilaterally closing the border to Mexican trucks
beyond the commercial zones, thereby failing to implement NAFTA.
17
The Mexican government responded by placing a similar restriction on
U.S. vehicles.'8
Ostensibly, President Clinton's moratorium was based on safety
considerations. He insisted that Mexican trucks would not be allowed
beyond the commercial zone until the U.S. was satisfied with Mexican
carriers' compliance with U.S. transportation safety laws.2 0  Some
contend, however, that President Clinton's moratorium was imposed
under pressure from the 1.4 million-member International Brotherhood
of Teamsters and the insurance industry.' Mexican drivers earn only
about one-third of the salary of U.S. drivers, and typically drive their
vehicles up to twenty hours per day.' Consequently, many anticipate
that after NAFTA is fully implemented, the trucks hauling most of the
11. See Phyllis F. Scheinberg, Commercial Passenger Vehicles - Safety Inspection of
Commercial Buses and Vans Entering the United States from Mexico, 1997 GAO REP. 97-
194.
12. See NAFTA Will Be Slow to Change the Rules for Transportation Operations and
Ownership, supra note 8, at 26.
13. Id.
14 Id.
15. See Mexico's Truckers Detoured By Legal, Safety Barriers, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 4,
2001.
16. Id.
17. See NAFTA Panel Decision Creates Uproar, LOGISTICS MGMT., Mar. 2001, at 19.
18. See Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
19. See NAFTA Panel Decision Creates Uproar, supra note 17, at 19.
20. See id.
21. See Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
22. Id.
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two nations' trade will be driven by Mexican drivers."
President Clinton's suspension of implementation of NAFTA led
the Mexican government to file a formal complaint in 1998 requesting
arbitration under NAFTA's dispute resolution provisions.2 4  The
Mexican government alleged in their complaint that the U.S. was
engaging in protectionism." The U.S. counterclaimed, accusing Mexico
of improper retaliation by sealing off its borders to U.S. carriers.6 The
arbitral process is to take six years to run its course.
While the arbitration panel was being formed, Congress passed the
Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999.27 This Act created the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration within the DOT and
increased the penalties for Mexican carriers operating outside the
21commercial zones. Under the Act, foreign domiciled carriers must
carry a copy of its registration, and if a vehicle operates beyond the
scope of its registration, it may be placed out-of-service.' The carrier is
liable for a civil penalty and, depending upon whether the violation was
intentional, the carrier may be suspended from operating anywhere in
the U.S. for a period of time.30
On February 6, 2001, the five-member arbitration panel
unanimously concluded that the U.S. decision to block Mexican trucks
from entering the U.S. breached NAFTA, as did its refusal to allow
Mexican companies to invest in U.S. international cargo companies. 3'
With the threat of possible sanctions for non-compliance, the panel gave
the U.S. thirty days to conclude a plan identifying a timetable and
action steps that the U.S. will undertake in accordance with the
arbitration panel's conclusions.2 If negotiations to implement NAFTA
are unsuccessful, Mexico has the right to levy compensatory duties
equal to the economic damage it incurred as a result of the closed
border since 1995.' Some estimate this potential damage amount to be
23. See Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
24. See Kevin G. Hall, Mexico Turning to Arbitration to Open Border, J. COM., Aug. 5,
1998, at Al (announcing its decision to exercise its Chaprer 20 options under NAFTA).
25. See Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
26. See Debra Rose, U.S.-Mexican Trucking: Standoff at the Border Continues,
BORDERLINES, June 2000, at 15.
27. See William Buxton, Read: This Act Could Change Your Business, TRANS. &
DISTRIBUTION, Mar. 2000, at 11.
28. See generally Lisa H. Harrington, Trucking Wins A Big One, TRANS. &
DISTRIBUTION, Jan. 2000, at 69.
29. See Statement of U.S. Transportation Secretary Supporting the Motor Carrier
Safety Improvement Bill, M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov. 22, 1999.
30. See Buxton, supra note 27, at 11.
31. See Daniel McCosh, DOT, Mexico Talk Trucks, J. COM., Mar. 22, 2001, at WP.
32. See Alexandra Walker, No Easy Solutions To Mexican Truck Safety Issues,
STATES NEWS SERV., Feb. 22, 2001.
33. See McCosh, supra note 31, at WP.
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around $200 billion.3
President George W. Bush promised to implement the arbitration
decision expeditiously. As Governor of Texas, Mr. Bush signed a letter
with the governors of Arizona, California, and New Mexico insisting
that, "This transborder trucking delay robs the entire U.S.-Mexico
border region of the full economic benefits that NAFTA promises.""
As noted above, Mexican truck drivers typically drive twenty hours
per day in Mexico." When they crossed the U.S. border, the Mexican
drivers would be subjected to the ten-hour safety requirements with
which the U.S. drivers must comply. 37 However, the Mexican drivers
would not be subject to U.S. labor laws, such as minimum wage
requirements. 8 Concerns remain about U.S. capabilities to police
Mexican vehicles in order to assure that they meet U.S. safety
standards. The primary reason for this concern is the fact that border
crossings are notoriously understaffed.39 The DOT Inspector General
found that while the number of federal border inspectors increased to
from forty persons to sixty persons in 2000, and from a mere seven
persons in 1995, an additional 126 inspectors are needed.0  For
example, California gave full safety inspections to only 2% of the
920,000 short-haul trucks that entered the U.S. from Mexico in 2000.
4
1
In 1999, the Texas Department of Public Safety "inspected only about
1% of the 2.9 million trucks that crossed the U.S.-Texas border..."; half
of these Mexican trucks were turned away for safety and other
violations.'
Though the DOT inspected fewer than 1% of Mexican trucks in
2000, it estimates that 35% of Mexican trucks were put out of service
due to significant safety violations, compared to a U.S. national average
of 25% for 1999 and 34% for 2000. 43 These statistics have improved
however. More than 40% of Mexican trucks that were inspected were
taken out of service in 1997-98, compared with 25% for U.S. trucks and
34. See McCosh, supra note 31, at WP.
35. Steven Greenhouse, Bush to Open Country to Mexican Truckers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
7, 2001, at A12.
36. See Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Moscoso, supra note 1, at Al.
40. See generally Mexico's Truckers Detoured By Legal, Safety Barriers, TULSA
WORLD, Mar. 4, 2001.
41. See Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
42. Charlene Oldham, U.S. Aid Sought for Truck Inspections, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 6, 2001, at 1D.
43. Mexico's Truckers Detoured By Legal, Safety Barriers, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 4,
2001; See also Unions Aim to Block Trucks, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 2001, at 11_
2001
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17% for Canadian trucks." In 1995, on the other hand, 54% of Mexican
trucks were pulled out of service.45
According to Texas legislator Ciro Rodriguez:
Mexican trucks are held to less stringent safety standards than U.S.
trucks. Unlike American drivers, Mexican drivers do not have to meet
minimal medical qualifications, submit to drug testing, or maintain
logbooks which monitor the length of time they spend behind the
wheel. Additionally, Mexican trucks are older, heavier, and more
likely to transport unmarked toxic or hazardous materials. Overall,
Mexican trucks are reported to have three times as many safety
deficiencies than U.S. trucks and without a standard regulatory
apparatus in place, Mexico has been unable to improve the safety of its
46trucks or enforce a border safety inspection program of its own.
By 2001, some 184 Mexican trucking companies applied to
transport goods in the United States. 7 Applications from 190,000
trucks were waiting to be processed." But several safety issues
required resolution: (1) road sign Standardization; (2) drug and alcohol
testing procedures; (3) medical examinations; (4) safety inspection and
inspector training standards; and (5) completion of a database of
Mexican trucking companies."
The following table summarizes the differences in the regulatory
regimes at the time of the arbitration decision:
TRUCK & DRIVER SAFETY REQUIREMENTS-
SAFETY STANDARDS UNITED STATES MEXICO
Hours of Service 10 hours consecutive No
driving; 15 hours
consecutive duty; up to 8
hours consecutive rest;
maximum 70 hours driving
in 8-days
Licensure 2 to 6 years 10 years
44. Brendan M. Case, Mexican Truckers Challenge Image, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Mar. 7, 2001, at ID.
45. Brenda Rodriguez, Mexican Trucks Have Bumpy Ride in Senate, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 3, 2001.
46. Ciro Rodriguez, Safety on the NAFTA Superhighway, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS
RELEASES, Feb. 17, 2001.
47. See Mexico's Truckers Detoured By Legal, Safety Barriers, supra note 43.
48. Diane Lindquist, Driving Controversy: NAFTA and Mexico's Trucks, COPLEY
NEWS SERV., Feb. 12, 2001.
49. Mexico's Truckers Detoured By Legal, Safety Barriers, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 4,
2001.
50. Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
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FREE TRADE BUT NOT FREE TRANSPORT?
Age of Driver 21 years minimum 18 years old
interstate
Skills Test Yes, for all drivers Yes, for new drivers
Medical Card Yes No - medical
qualifications on
license
Automatic Medical Yes No
Disqualification
National Monitoring Yes, to detect violations Information system
System in infancy
Drug Testing Testing and documentation Documentation lax
Logbooks Standardized logbooks with Standardized
date graphs required logbooks in different
format, unenforced
Gross Vehicle Weight 80,000 lbs 135,360 lbs
Limits
Roadside Inspections Yes Discontinued; new
program to be
phased in over two
years
Out-of-Service Rules Yes New program to be
phased in over two
years
Hazmat Regulation Strict standards, training, Covers fewer




Vehicle Standards Standards for antilock Voluntary
brakes, underride guards, inspections
night visibility of vehicle
Safety Rating System Yes No
2001

